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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis aims to open up the realm of what counts as political in the context of the 
Marikana strikes and subsequent massacre. It does primarily by taking into account 
the social, political and cultural context of Mpondo workers on the mines. Many 
narrow Marxist and liberal frameworks have circumscribed the conception of the 
‘modern’ and the ‘political’ so much so that political organisation which falls outside 
of this conceptualisation is often regarded as ‘backward’ or ‘archaic’. It will provide 
an examination of the history, culture and custom of men, who have, for almost a 
hundred years migrated back and forth between South African mines and 
Mpondoland. This not only reveals differing modes of organising and engaging in 
political action, but also that the praxis of democracy takes many forms, some of 
which are different and opposed to what counts as democratic in Western liberal 
democracy. By considering what I argue, following some of the insights from the 
Subaltern Studies collective in India, to be a subaltern sphere of politics and history, it 
is possible to better understand the way workers organised and acted. 
 
The thesis also argues that most labour and nationalist historiography has been silent 
on the political contributions of women because of how Marxist/liberal analysis 
frames struggles through disciplined notions of work and resistance. Rather than 
objectifying workers as representatives of a homogenous and universal class of people 
devoid of context, the thesis has linked ‘the worker’ to the community from which 
s/he comes and community specific struggles, which are supported and sustained, 
often, by the parallel struggles of women in the community. 
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 8 
Introduction 
 
The Marikana massacre, which took place on the 16th of August 2012, has been 
variously described as a tragedy, a disaster, a watershed moment, a moment of rupture 
and the first post-apartheid state sponsored massacre of citizens. It has also been 
considered a ‘turning point’ in South African society (Leggasick, 2012: 420). Many in 
the elite public sphere have compared the murders to the Sharpeville Massacre of 
1960 when police opened fire on people presenting themselves at the Sharpeville 
police station to hand in their ‘dompasses’ in defiance of the Apartheid pass law 
system (Frankel, 2013, Hart 2013:2, Stupart, 2013, News24 2012, Smith, 2012, 
Buccus, 2013, etc). This comparison has obvious merits due to the parallel use of state 
violence to effect a massacre. However, there also some respects in which the 
comparison has limits. Others like Tolsi (2013) and Figlan (2013) have pointed to 
similarities with a historical event, less well inscribed into elite nationalist history - 
the Mpondo Revolts of 1960.  
 
Of the 45 people who lost their lives at Marikana, on or before the 16th of August, 31 
were from the Eastern Cape Province in South Africa. Of them, the majority were 
from Mpondoland in the Transkei (Alexander et al, 2011: 196). Mpondoland has a 
special significance in the history of mineworkers in South Africa. In the first 
instance, Mpondoland has been one of the historic labour sending areas in South 
Africa. TEBA (The Employment Bureau of Africa), “an institution (previously) 
owned by the South African mining industry, has historically recruited large numbers 
of people from the former Transkei, the highest number of people recruited for the 
mines consistently coming from the Cape Province” (Lacey, 1981: 196). During the 
Mpondo Revolts in the 1960s, TEBA was boycotted as part of the resistance to state 
policies in the reserves because the brutal effects of the migrant labour system were 
already making themselves apparent (Mbeki, 1964: 136). This thesis suggests that this 
history becomes significant, and that we should return to this site of contestation, in 
order to historicise and contextualise contemporary struggles rooted in migrant 
histories. This period is also significant because it marks a resistance to full 
proletarianisation and a commitment to the commons, still extant but rapidly 
deteriorating. This form of resistance is a challenge to modernist conceptions of the 
political, be they liberal or Marxist. The thesis argues that this history provides an 
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alternative framework for understanding the massacre because it is rooted in the 
cultural social and political context of many mineworkers’ home-context. It argues 
that understanding how Mpondo society was organised in pre-colonial times, as well 
as the political tools used during the Mpondo revolts of 1960, reveals a subaltern 
sphere of politics, which is often silenced in nationalist historiography and ignored by 
most liberal and/or Marxist analysis, for different reasons. In the former, the Mpondo 
Revolts threaten the way in which the ANC places itself at the heart of its own 
narrative. It is also a challenge to elite nationalist discourse, and the way ethnicity 
functions to create differentiated systems of access to the public sphere allowing some 
inclusion in ‘civil society’ and ‘modernity,’ while others are still required to perform 
some kind of ‘cultural authenticity’.  
    
In his book, Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity, Mahmood Mamdani (2013) 
describes how British colonial indirect-rule created two differentiated systems of law, 
which he describes as the ‘bi-furcated state.’ In the colonial occupation of Africa, it 
was not merely that people were divided and ruled, but rather that the project became 
to ‘define and rule’ – a process whereby the colonised were divided into two different 
categories, which would have two different trajectories of growth (Mamdani, 2013: 
49). This categorisation saw the colonised split between, ‘races,’ and ‘tribes,’ in 
which ‘non-natives’ (i.e. migrants or those not indigenous to sub-Saharan Africa, like 
Asians, Europeans, Arabs, etc.) were defined as separate races and the ‘native’ 
population (indigenous to Africa) were separated into tribes (Mamdani, 2013:47). 
This separation meant two different legal systems: all races were governed under a 
single law: civil law, and thus formed part of civil society. However, tribes, which 
were far more differentiated by colonial authority, were governed by different sets of 
customary law. Mamdani, (2013: 48) describes this technology of the colonial state as 
having very specific ends  
 
“With races, the cultural difference was not translated into separate legal 
systems. Instead, it was contained, even negotiated, within a single legal 
system and was enforced by a single administrative authority. But with tribes, 
the case was the opposite: cultural difference was reinforced, exaggerated, 
and built up into different legal systems, each enforced by a separate 
administrative and political authority. In a nutshell, different races were 
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meant to have a common future; different tribes were not. The colonial legal 
project – civil and customary – were an integral part of the colonial political 
project.”(Author’s emphasis) 
 
 
Mamdani’s emphasis on space and origin as the key terms of classification meant that 
“the state portrayed the native as the product of geography rather than history” 
(Mamdani, 2013: 47). This spatial differentiation is central to understanding how the 
‘native reserves’ and later Bantustans functioned as ‘zones of exclusion’ (Pithouse, 
2012: 7), outside of ‘civil society,’ and how rural African people were subject to 
traditional authority enshrined in customary law. Today, the incorporation of 
Traditional Authorities into the South African government system has meant the 
perpetuation of a colonial system of customary law, where some people are, on the 
basis of their space, subject to a different system of law which still functions to 
exclude them from civil society and as ‘natives.’ This ‘tribalisation,’ serves to 
crystallise tradition and culture, in a way that ‘tribesmen’ are still seen and regarded 
as outside the ‘modern.’ As Mamdani, (2013: 51) explains, “Unlike race, which 
claimed to mark a civilizational hierarchy, tribe was said to be a marker of cultural 
diversity.”  
 
This is central to understanding how culture and tradition are crystallised in these 
spaces and how, often, people who come from former Bantustans are culturally 
essentialised and seen as outside of modernity. It is, also, what allows commentators 
on Marikana to refer to striking workers as ‘muti-crazed’ criminals. There is a 
profound difference between attempts to culturally fix people as products of 
geography who remain outside of the modern and opening up the way in which the 
idea of ‘modernity’ is conceptualised and circumscribed.  
 
In his critique of some forms of Marxist theory, Chakrabarty (1992: 4) describes the 
way in which Marxist theory creates a linearity of time, in which we can separate the 
“pre-bourgeois” from the “bourgeois,” and the “pre-capital” from “capital” 
(Chakarbarty 1992: 4). While Chakrabarty is not denouncing Marxist theory as an 
emancipatory tool, he is problematising the way in which this very particular 
European experience of industrialisation comes to stand for the universal experience 
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of Time and History, in which modernisation theory presents to us 'phases' and 
'periods' and ways to solve 'problems' along the way to reaching self-governance.   
 
In Provincialising Europe, Chakrabarty (2000: 8) describes this historicist 
consciousness, as “a recommendation to the colonised to wait,” the distinction 
between those who were ‘ready’ for self –governance, and those who had to be told, 
“not yet.” For Chakrabarty, this critique of historicism, is of necessity, central to the 
question of political modernity in the non-western world,  
 
“If “political modernity” was to be a bounded and definable phenomenon, it 
was not unreasonable to use its definition as a measuring rod for social 
progress. Within this thought, it could always be said with reason that some 
people were less modern than others, and that the former needed a period of 
preparation and waiting before they could be recognized as full participants 
in political modernity. But this was precisely the argument of the colonizer—
the “not yet” to which the colonized nationalist opposed his or her “now.” 
The achievement of political modernity in the third world could only take 
place through a contradictory relationship to European social and political 
thought.”  
 
Thus, the critique of Marxist and modernist theory is not ignorant of the fact that there 
are many Marxisms. Marx himself was a complex figure and his own thought became 
more composite and nuanced later in his life when he became more sympathetic to 
rural struggles and peasant actions (see Anderson, 2010). What is important, however, 
is to highlight how some forms of Marxist thought, which have been created around 
the texts and writing of Marx, rather than around Marx himself or his own intellectual 
project, have attempted to create a linearity of time, history and progress and how this 
has functioned to limit the conception of ‘modernity’ and even democracy. This 
circumscription has serious consequences for how the Marikana massacre has been 
framed in the elite public sphere in South Africa and in the academy and must be 
addressed as such. It is also important to note that Marxist historiography has a 
particular framing within the South African academy, this thesis does not attempt to 
exhaust the possibilities of a Marxism that, to quote Aime Cesaire (1972: 22), “made 
to the measure of the world” could be an inclusive and emancipatory project. It does 
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however take cognizance of how this discourse (whether cohesive or not) is currently 
framed in some of the South African academy and public sphere and how this serves 
to occlude aspects of workers organisation and lived experience in the context of 
Marikana.  
 
Since the Marikana Massacre occurred very recently in South Africa’s history, most 
responses and accounts of the strikes and the subsequent massacre have been through 
the mainstream media and there have been few academic publications so far. The 
mainstream media has tended (it would be impossible to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of every article), to focus on the breakdown of union bargaining structures of 
the NUM, the failure of Lonmin and the state to adequately deal with the strikes, or 
the economic implications of ‘strike-action’. When the massacre started, there was 
startling silence on the part of the government and trade unions. While President 
Jacob Zuma, took a month to speak publicly about the violence used by police at 
Marikana, which he did at the funeral of cleric in KwaZulu Natal (Timeslive, 2012), 
the chief of the South African Communist Party, Blade Nzimande described strikers’ 
actions at Marikana, as ‘criminal.’ Nzimande’s response was in fact a defence of Cyril 
Ramaphosa, a board member at Lonmin, now Deputy President of the ANC and 
formerly the first president of the National Union of Mineworkers). Ramaphosa, 
according to Dali Mpofu (the lawyer representing the slain miners and their families), 
sent emails to Lonmin management and government officials, on the eve of the 
massacre, saying that the strikes “are plainly dastardly criminal acts and must be 
characterised as such,” and then called for “concomitant action” (Timeslive, 2012; 
Citypress, 2012). This was the discourse from which most mainstream reporting 
occurred. In fact, Jane Duncan’s (2012), analysis of newspaper reports on Marikana 
found that, of 153 articles from over a dozen major South African news publications,  
 
“Miners’ voices outside of the National Union of Mineworkers’ (NUM) and 
the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU), accounted 
for a mere 3% of sources: the lowest of all the source categories. Of these 
miners, only one miner was quoted speaking about what actually happened 
during the massacre, and he said the police shot first. Most miners were 
interviewed in relation to the stories alleging that the miners had used muti to 
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defend themselves against the police’s bullets, as well as the miners’ working 
and living conditions. 
 
This shows clearly how the official media conceptualise mineworkers as being 
outside the realm of civil society, or ‘official voice’ and therefore not useful as 
sources on what occurred on that day. Indeed it is clear that for most of the 
mainstream media there was not even any interest in what their version of events 
might be. On the few occasions when strikers were interviewed it was clear that the 
only issue that mineworkers were thought to be authorities on was muti, which echoes 
colonial attempts to culturally and ethnically essentialise them.  
 
For most of the mainstream media organisations, especially the South African 
Broadcasting Company (SABC), Marikana was a spontaneous event, which surprised 
and perplexed, and the men on the mountain were made to look as if they were muti-
crazed, simple-minded workers who were destroying ‘hard-won’ union bargaining 
structures. This narrative denies that the workers’ had their own political project or 
that they were organised, disciplined, and that it was their conception of democracy 
and justice, informed by a subaltern sphere of politics, which led them.  
 
Later on media coverage would become more nuanced. In 2013 the Mail and 
Guardian devoted a space online for special reports on Marikana; writer Niren Tolsi 
and photographer, Paul Botes, travelled the country collecting stories from the family 
members and loved ones of the men killed at Marikana, there have been few attempts 
to humanise the people involved in and affected by the strikes. In their December, 
2012 edition Amandla! Magazine, which describes itself as a progressive magazine 
standing for social justice, devoted a section to the massacre too. Spliced in between 
the humanising stories of mineworkers and their lives in Marikana were articles 
written by Amandla! correspondents and other contributors. Many of the articles take 
a very formulaic approach. In fact the overwhelming presence of words like the 
‘working class’ and ‘working class power’ give an uncomfortable feeling of writers’ 
often crude attempts to fit empirical evidence into already existing theoretical 
frameworks. In an article entitled, Embryos of Working Class Power and Grassroots 
Democracy in Marikana, Thapelo Lekogwa and Luke Sinwell (2012:24), begin by 
stating, “The formation of a workers’ committee is an act of power by the working 
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class. It has shaken capital by advancing far beyond trade union bureaucracy.” Yet, 
they go on to add,  
 
“At the risk of being ultra-critical of their exercise of working class power, 
their main demand has been for more money, not less capitalism or the 
formation of a workers’ party…The Challenge posed to anti-capitalist forces 
is to embed their ideas within the consciousness of the strikers while 
simultaneously enabling the strikers to lead them” (Lekogowa and Sinwell, 
2013: 25).  
 
The portrayal of mineworkers, as representatives of working class power, allows the 
easy objectification of people who need to be embedded with a certain kind of 
consciousness, rather than understood in their own social, economic and political 
contexts. It is not untrue to say that workers’ went beyond trade union bureaucracy, 
however the article doesn’t explore what that means, and in what ways their political 
praxis is informed from outside of trade union experience. Rather, it is attributed 
strictly to ‘class consciousness,’ even if, by their own admission, the workers 
themselves were not articulating a Marxist/socialist or even workerist position.  
 
The authors of this article, in fact, also authored a book with Peter Alexander, 
Botsang Mmope and Bongani Xezwi. The first book to appear, merely two months 
after the massacre, Marikana: A View from the Mountain and a Case to Answer, is an 
example of how uncritically applying narrow and reductionist Marxist frameworks of 
class analysis to any protest can go awry. The triumphalist tone taken by Alexander, 
et al, in the book gives the impression that the writers were led, not by people’s daily 
lived experiences and the context from which they make life decisions, but by a pre-
given and reductionist form of Marxist theory which provides a linear trajectory of 
workers’ struggles as universal historical fact. For instance, when Alexander et al, 
note,   
 
“But not all has been bleak. While we have been saddened, we have also been 
inspired. The strike at Lonmin symbolised, as much as ever, raw working-
class power – unhindered by the tenets of existing collective bargaining and 
middle-class politics. The workers developed their own class analysis of the 
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situation at Lonmin and, instead of being silenced and falling back when the 
steel arm of the state mowed down 34 of their colleagues, they became further 
determined, and more workers united until all of Lonmin came to a 
standstill”. (2012: 9)  
 
Or, two pages later:  
 
“The workers’ agency and leadership is no obscure radical rhetoric or theory 
of ivory tower academics or non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Rather, 
it is the unfettered praxis of the working class – which could not be contained, 
even with national security, the ANC, NUM, and the ideology of the ruling 
class pitted against it” (2012: 11). 
 
There are two assumptions here. Firstly there is an idea that there is something to be 
gained, learned, or celebrated from the massacre of 43 people. That in fact, rather than 
a horrific event which should have never occurred in the first place, we should 
celebrate the ‘unfettered praxis of the working class.’ The use of the word 
“unfettered” is troubling for various reasons, not least because of the way it evokes 
the image of black workers needing only the right moment of provocation to unleash 
their inner barbarism. It reinscribes the liberal idea that this kind of collective action 
cannot be organised, thought –out and well planned; that it must due to the ‘nature’ of 
people like mineworkers who are outside of realm of ‘civil society’ to behave as, in 
the disturbing words of Peter Bruce (2012), editor of Business Day, “a 7,000-strong 
band of armed and angry miners.” Secondly, it assumes it was the intention of the 
workers, acting as the ‘working class’ to ‘smash capitalism’ or to realise a socialist 
ideal knowing they had the “ideology of the ruling class pitted against IT” (my 
emphasis) rather than people demanding a decent living wage. 
 
It is clear that this kind of rejoicing is not only indicative of the ways in which 
dogmatically adhering to theory can limit one’s understandings of any historical event 
or even allow one to ignore the myriad other narratives and experiences present, but it 
also promotes the idea of categorising and objectifying people to such an extent that 
death becomes a victory rather than a tragedy.  
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In The Revolution of Everyday Life, Raoul Vaneigm (1967: 29) critiques precisely this 
idea of ‘necessary suffering,’ in which ‘suffering’ becomes “dogma –fodder:” a 
necessary case for theory to further an –ism. He charges the Marxist Left with 
continuing to fetishize history, even when they expelled Christian religion, which 
viewed suffering as the basis for reward in the afterlife, yet failed to do the same with 
suffering itself: “suffering, far from disappearing, found new pretexts for its existence 
in the requirements of history, itself suddenly trapped in the famous one-way street.” 
In Alexander et al’s extensive interviews, which have no doubt been an incredible 
resource for many commenting on Marikana, the narrow set of structured questions, 
does not leave space open for interviewees to speak about other experiences which 
they thought were important and relevant to their own lives. Questions about race, 
community, housing, services, family etc., are completely absent in the narratives 
presented in the book, as are any attempts to follow up when interviewees start to 
speak about these issues. Instead, one sees the replication of standardised 
questionnaires geared towards fetishizing and over-stating the importance of narrow 
class theory.  
 
Many have pointed to the limitations of using reductionist Marxist and euro-centric 
analysis when considering post-colonial societies. Frantz Fanon articulated the need 
to stretch Marxist frameworks when thinking about colonial society because of the 
specific way in which colonialism created two different ‘species.’ Labour historian, 
Dunbar Moodie has pointed to the limitations of South African labour historiography 
in failing to adequately consider the cultural context and everyday lived experiences 
of mineworkers in South Africa, and rather, relying heavily on trade union theory and 
nationalist historiography to explain workers’ actions. For a long time now, the mines, 
which have been the centre of economic production in South Africa have been 
theorised using a very narrow framework of, mostly, modernist theory to the 
exclusion and marginalisation of culture and context. In order to understand the 
particularities of the mines in post-apartheid South Africa, there must be more 
significant attention paid to the cultural context from which mineworkers come.  
 
Suren Pillay, Micah Reddy and Crispen Chingono are some who have written about 
the Marikana massacre, and taken into consideration the cultural and rural spheres 
which have been completely left out of the narratives by others. Suren Pillay has 
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emphasised the importance of re-visiting what Mahmood Mamdani has called, the 
‘bi-furcated state’ in South Africa, in which Marxist analysis fails to consider the 
particularities of race and ethnicity in the logic of colonialism and in-direct rule, yet 
he does not go into details about what form this discussion would take. While it is 
incredibly useful to raise the limitations of current analysis, it does not explore what 
an alternative account might look like. Reddy, however, who wrote a thesis entitled, 
“Unrest on South Africa's Platinum Mines and the Crisis of Migrancy (unpublished 
MA) goes further in linking the rural Eastern Cape to the urban mining space through 
the crisis of migrancy. While he is one of the few people, discussing the men who 
work at Lonmin as migrant labourers still rooted in the rural socio –political and 
economic context, his analysis is limited to socio-economic factors. He argues that the 
rural areas are no longer producing enough to provide a subsidy to migrant labourers 
and therefore this puts them under more pressure to earn money for two households, 
and the discussion only briefly addresses cultural factors.  
 
Crispen Chingono’s (2013), booklet called Marikana and the Post-Apartheid 
Workplace Order, gives a broad overview of what happened at Marikana, a brief 
history of Lonmin and unrest on the mines and a reliable and detailed account of the 
events leading up to the massacre and the constitution of worker committees. While 
Chingono is one of the few people who discusses the cultural context of mineworkers 
at length; including the cultural significance of the ‘koppie,’ and the traditional beliefs 
of the workers who used muti and carried traditional weapons and consulted 
sangomas (traditional healers), the discussion does not give these ‘cultural artefacts’ 
any further significance beyond traditional practice. When Chingono (2013: 28) 
outlines that sangomas are consulted for various reasons: for instance to help 
overcome opponents during times of warfare, or gathering on the mountain represents 
a moment of crisis for a community, there is a failure to delve deeper into the culture 
of people who come from Mpondoland in the Eastern Cape and to link culture to the 
political. Here, it appears that culture functions as a way in which to clarify the 
obscure features of what should, otherwise, be considered a modern strike. Cultural 
analysis is a way of explaining away an aberration rather than exploring the use of 
cultural political tools within the strike. While trade unions are used to explain 
‘worker action’ and political decisions, ‘culture’ is galvanised to make symbolic 
gestures more palatable to the reader who would otherwise struggle to explain or 
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rationalise such beliefs through western/euro-centric or modernist discourse. In his 
conclusion, far from bringing the large range of political tools mineworkers used, be it 
through culture and traditional practices, or trade unionism into dialogue with each 
other, Chingono (2013: 33) makes an extremely dry political science related 
statement, 
 
“Marikana is important in understanding the new post-apartheid industrial 
relations regime. It demonstrates worker’s power and agency even when their 
formal collective voice, in the form of unions, has been subdued. This affirms 
that power can be asserted from below if only it is claimed.”  
 
Unfortunately, the work of all three, Chingono, Pillay and Reddy, as well as almost 
all the existing academic literature on Marikana, is silent on gender and women, 
although there have been various media reports which have told their story. What is 
interesting about Marikana is that the women’s movement appeared very publicly and 
militantly during and after the strikes. For this reason, there has been more attention 
paid to the women living there than previously. However, they are always treated as if 
they represent separate issues, either they are the widows, wives, or daughters of 
deceased mineworkers, or as they are fighting separate struggles. One of the aims of 
the thesis is to tell both the story of the men on the mountain and the forms that their 
political organisation took, and the story of the women’s movement, and how both 
these struggles, not only help to sustain each other, but are together representative of 
community struggle.  
 
The thesis suggests that it is possible to trace this subaltern sphere of politics, 
informed by culture and custom, from its inception in Mpondoland to its transfusion 
on the mines from the early 1930s to 1984. In 1984, the arrival of the National Union 
of Mineworkers (NUM) marks a new period of formal bargaining structures and trade 
unionism on the mines. It argues that, as the relationship between workers and the 
NUM begins to break-down, workers’ have sought to once again return to older 
modes of organising that are outside of and different to, the way in which union 
structures work. It argues that, rather than seeing ethnicity or culture as detracting 
from a broader class struggle, it is crucial to understand the context of mineworkers in 
order to understand how their conceptions of democratic praxis informs the way in 
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which they organise. It also examines the changing nature of space on the mines after 
the introduction of shack settlements and women and children on the mines. It 
examines the consequences of this for understanding workers’ struggles as rooted in 
and connected to community struggles, in which women play a large role. This has 
also been left out of, or marginalised within Marxist/liberal frameworks of struggle 
and resistance.   
 
What this thesis aims to do, in part, is to create the kind of dialogue that will open up 
the realm of what counts as political, especially given the way in which political 
modernity is still, largely, framed within narrow Marxist and liberal understanding of 
society. It will provide an examination of the history, culture and custom of men, who 
have for almost a hundred years migrated back and forth between the South African 
mines and Mpondoland. This not only reveals differing modes of organising and 
engaging in political action, but also that the praxis of democracy takes many forms, 
some which are different and opposed to what counts as western liberal forms of 
democracy. What Marikana requires then, is for us to consider a subaltern sphere of 
history and politics, following the Indian subalternist school, in order to understand 
the way workers’ organised and acted. By considering this internal logic, it is no 
longer possible to see the ‘worker’ as an isolated universal subject of capitalist 
exploitation. Rather, the worker must be linked to the context and community from 
which s/he comes.  
 
The thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter outlines a broad theoretical 
framework that provides a lens through which the following three chapters can be 
read. It outlines the limitations of modernist and elite nationalist theory and highlights 
the powerful work that silencing does within history and the consequences this has for 
present day South African politics. It also points to the way in which economistic and 
modernist theories of society often taken a masculinist form, replicated, sometimes, in 
nationalist discourse. It has often been the case in South African nationalist 
historiography that women have been relegated to the margins of the political and that 
they have often been seen as non-actors unless their contributions have been through 
mainstream urban political activity and this narrative often finds its way into how 
contemporary politics is read. It then offers a way in which we can begin to think 
about history outside of the historical method prescribed by euro-centric discourse, 
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and to locate the history and politics of the subaltern as a way to challenge hegemonic 
and elite historiographies. What the thesis attempts is to use this critique, to write a 
living history of the subaltern sphere of politics present in Marikana today.  
 
Chapter two discusses how the rural sphere in South Africa has been silenced in most 
elite nationalist historiography and how this has functioned to ignore the history and 
political praxis of people living in rural areas. It specifically discusses the history of 
the Mpondo Revolts of 1960. This history provides insight and context into the 
political tools and pre-colonial democratic practices of people in Mpondoland, who 
travelled to the mines for many years. It also points to a gap in the recent 
historiography of the Mpondo revolts that leaves women’s political contributions and 
activities out of the political sphere. It outlines how cultural context, which explains 
how men and women sometimes practice politics differently and separately, is not 
fully explored in the mainstream narrative, even while it is, in other ways, posing a 
challenge to elite national discourse.  
 
Chapter three provides the link between political praxis in Mpondoland, evidenced 
though the Mpondo revolts, and how Mpondo men on the mines were engaging 
politics from 1948 to 1984, when there were no unions for black people on the mines. 
It argues that most labour historiography in South Africa has focused largely on class 
analysis or modernist theory and relied heavily on national liberation narratives to 
explain workers’ organisation on the mines during this period even in the absence of 
formal union structures. Furthermore, up until the 1970s, most men came from rural 
areas that were not as directly involved in national liberation struggles, which were 
mainly occurring in the urban centers. Moreover, it argues that there must be an 
attempt to re-read this history with the new knowledge of subaltern history and 
politics and to engage the cultural context of people, outside of the universal worker 
subject, which most Marxist analysis requires. This re-thinking allows deeper insight 
into what was happening on the mines during this period and why, workers in 
Marikana flouted union bargaining structures and chose instead to return to cultural 
political practices during the 2012 Lonmin strikes.  
 
Chapter four deals with the changing spatial landscape of the mines in the post-
apartheid era. It is here that the link between worker and community struggles 
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becomes apparent, given the changing nature of space and community on the mines. It 
becomes more difficult to deny women’s roles and contributions to political life on 
the mines in South Africa when we are confronted with the Marikana massacre. For 
the first time, women on the mines have made a public statement about living and 
working and being on the mines, a realm of experience previously ignored or silenced 
in most labour historiography. After the 1980s, mine-compounds were ethnically de-
segregated and in the recent past, mine companies began to offer a living out 
allowance (LOA) to mineworkers who preferred not to stay in the hostels. As a result, 
there was an immediate growth of shack settlements around the platinum belt. With 
the development of shack settlements has been the introduction of family life on the 
mines, which has brought with it a new form of community politics that has not 
adequately been addressed in the public sphere or in new labour literature. It shows 
the continuation of a subaltern sphere of politics on the mines evidenced by the 
worker committees, and it shows how these struggles are linked to, and reinforced by 
the struggles of women and community. The chapter presents research done in 
Marikana in November 2012 and it is an attempt to write a living history of people 
who currently occupy the shack settlement called Nkaneng.   
 
Most of the research presented here was done with the Marikana women’s group 
called Sikhala Sonke. This happened for three reasons. The first, was that the 
appearance of an active women’s organisation on the mines, linking their community 
struggles to the struggles of the men on the mountain was of immediate interest to me, 
particularly because it interrupted some, triumphalist, masculinist, Marxist analysis of 
the massacre at the time and it revealed a gendered space usually ignored in the 
mainstream media and academy. The women of Marikana made their existence and 
struggles public during and after the Marikana massacre, and shattered the quiet 
assumption that the mines remain a space that is inhabited by men only, or that their 
contributions remain purely sexual. Examining the cultural context of migrant 
labourers, through rural and urban struggles, helps to conceptualise how the political 
sphere for women is constructed and how they exercise their political agency. 
Secondly, at the time of visiting Marikana, it was extremely tense and most of the 
men were not allowed to speak to journalists, researchers and outsiders on advice 
from their lawyers since most of them were involved in legal battles or about to be 
called to the Farlam Commission to give evidence. Most of the men I spoke to were 
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family members or friends of the women in Sikhala Sonke, who very generously, 
offered to convince some of the men to speak to me. Lastly, the first book to appear 
about the Marikana massacre, by Peter Alexander et al, echoed the sentiments of an 
overly triumphalist and resolutely masculinist class analysis. Not only did they miss 
the significance of cultural context and the subaltern sphere of politics present at the 
mines, but also they completely ignored the strong links between the workers’ 
struggles and the struggles of the community. This is of course, extremely 
unfortunate, since they were able to access the resources to go to Marikana 
immediately after the massacre had occurred and were able to speak to people before 
lawyers started putting pressure on them not to speak to anyone from outside their 
community. Thus the chapter also aims to tell some of the stories which were left out 
of mainstream analysis, or which occupied different spaces within it. It is an attempt 
to address many issues at the same time, precisely because of the messy and complex 
nature of politics in the Nkaneng community.  
 
Chapter four also outlines the experience of visiting Marikana and how the research 
was conducted. The research was conducted according to what Lather (1988), calls a 
participatory research design that focuses on sequential interviews conducted in an 
interactive, dialogic manner that entails self-disclosure on the part of the researcher to 
foster a sense of collaboration. She also refers to ‘member checks’ as a way of 
ensuring the researcher does not impose their interpretive definitions on the data and 
it remains open-ended. “Member checks” are then a process of checking (whether one 
is doing interviews or participant observation) that all members of the group are 
happy with the process of the research and the questions being asked (Lather, 1988). 
Thus the series of semi-structured interviews undertaken focused on participatory 
research methodology in which the research design was worked out with the people 
involved in the research to create the maximum amount of space for the people to 
articulate their own experiences of themselves and their lives. 
 
In many ways the research was undertaken with the idea of showing the intersection 
between race, class and gender politics and to show how, even if it is difficult, 
academic work cannot attempt to tell only certain parts of a complicated story. In fact, 
complex stories are often more humanising, and avoids the trap of objectification that 
pure class, race, or gender analysis, done separately, sometimes achieves. During the 
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two weeks I spent listening, talking to and spending time with the women in Sikhala 
Sonke, and other people I was able to speak to, I began to understand more and more 
the limitations of theory, and here I am referring modernist theory, to explain lived 
experiences of people who straddle two different worlds and realities, and the 
importance of presenting it in this way.  
 
The following body of work will make this subaltern sphere of history and politics 
more visible in an attempt to broaden and deepen our understanding of Marikana, and 
the modes of politics occurring on the South African mines. 
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Chapter One  
 
 An Alternative Framework for Understanding 
 
  
 
“While taking care not to deny the importance of the leading players, more profound 
historical study takes the whole into account: spectators, situations, the canvas of the 
immense commedia dell'arte. Once the historian and the explorer of human reality 
realise they have been fooled, and begin consciously linking history and the 
knowledge of mankind with life - everyday life - in the past and in the present, they 
will have left their na'ivety behind.” 
         
    Henri Lefebvre, The Critique of Everyday Life 
 
This chapter provides a conceptual framework that sets up the possibilities for 
alternative understandings of the Marikana strikes and the massacre presented in the 
thesis. Rather than transposing a pre-determined method or framework onto an event, 
the literature explored here allows for different kinds of knowledge, understanding, 
and histories to inform the way we think about an event like this. It is an attempt to 
undiscipline the way in which knowledge about certain ‘big’ events is produced and 
to offer a different kind of process in which stories that have been silenced can be re-
visited, alternative histories revealed and the process for writing a living history, re-
thought.  
 
The chapter argues that current popular evaluations of the Marikana massacre, 
through both liberal and Marxist analysis are inadequate to understanding the political 
implications of the massacre. It is important here, to note that rather than conflating 
liberal and Marxist ideologies, it is more useful to see this framing as directed towards 
their similarities when it comes to the circumscription of modernity and rationality. 
Both liberal and Marxist discourse have a teleology of development and progress 
(discussed in the introduction) which are based on an inherently productivist idea 
about life and the social world, at the heart od which lies the notion that labour is 
what is required to be fully human (Pithouse, 2014). Furthermore, and particularly 
important to this thesis, is that they both take on a very masculinist form which 
whether consciously or not, circumscribes the realm of the political particularly to the 
public sphere.  
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Therefore, often, purely economistic analysis of the mines creates a linearity of South 
African history, rooted in modernist forms of historiography, and leaves out a whole 
other sphere of political activity, which is silenced as a result. The chapter outlines the 
shortcomings of this analysis, points to the gaps in understanding that it offers and 
shows how often, this analysis is used to form elite nationalist historiography which 
silences other narratives. It also reveals how, often, elite nationalist historiographies, 
take on a masculinist form where women’s activism and contributions are seen as 
outside of the public/political realm and are thus forced into categories of private 
domesticity.  
 
This kind of elite conception of politics denies the everyday lived reality where 
people practice politics in different and sometimes opposing ways, which I refer to as 
the ‘subaltern’ sphere, following the Indian subalternist school of thought. By making 
these events visible and rejecting a purely urban-centric ANC –led history of 
resistance we might find other narratives of struggle present which help to inform our 
present. It is important to consider how these forms of silencing work to mystify 
resistance in the public sphere. The chapter ends by offering an alternate way to read 
national history and provides a basis from which we can write the living history of 
Marikana today.  
 
The limitations and consequences of Economistic Analysis  
 
In the Introduction, the brief discussion on the limitations of the existing literature on 
Marikana pointed to how narrow class analysis functions to silence other narratives. 
This however is not a recent development in the historiography of labour in South 
Africa. This discourse takes its cue from the way workers’ strike activity on the mines 
have always been conceptualised through narrow forms of class analysis, discussed in 
detail in chapter three.  
 
There is a long history of framing worker’ struggles in this way, which is most 
certainly due to the way in which workers’ struggles are conceptualised using narrow 
Marxist or liberal frameworks. In fact, the seminal text in the literature on the South 
African mineral-based economy is Harold Wolpe’s famous paper, written in 1972, 
Capitalism and Cheap Labour Accumulation in South Africa: From Segregation to 
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Apartheid. Wolpe first attempted to show the link between class, race, and the 
migrant labour system in South Africa. While Wolpe’s paper was illuminating and, 
one of the first and few, attempts to show how Apartheid used racial laws and the 
reserve policies to create a system of white capital and cheap supply of black labour 
to the mines, it privileges class analysis and fails to capture other narratives of 
workers’ experiences in their communities as well as the gendered nature of work in 
the reserves. Labour historians, Buhlungu and Bezuidenhout (2010: 242) have also 
highlighted the shortcomings of over-stating economic exploitation as the trigger for 
worker agency, which most neo-Marxist labour historians have done following 
Wolpe, because it does not allow one to explore how moral geographies operate and 
shift over time.  
 
The privileging of class analysis achieves two things that are of importance when 
considering the historical events culminating in the Marikana massacre. Firstly, the 
way in which these forms of liberal and Marxist analysis use European teleology to 
create linear trajectories of progress and experience finds its way into most post-
colonial nationalist historiographies following an elite Eurocentric conception of 
nationalism. These elite nationalist historiographies, not only serve to silence other 
narratives that do not fit with modernist conceptions of struggle and liberation, but 
they also, often, take a masculinist form. This form, following reductionist Marxist 
and liberal, conceptions of what counts as work, resistance and struggle creates a 
gendered historiography in which women are silenced or domesticated. These two 
consequences deserve greater discussion.  
 
Silencing and Elite Nationalism  
 
Lungisile Ntsebeza and Thembela Kepe (2011: 5) have argued that the rural sphere in 
South Africa’s countryside has been marginalised in the history of resistance to 
colonialism and Apartheid in South Africa. For them, “The question that faces South 
Africans, as well as those who have an interest in South African issues, is how history 
features in post-Apartheid South Africa. Critical questions include, what is 
remembered, recorded, and by whom, and crucially the manner in which different 
histories contribute or do not contribute to current understanding of nationhood” 
(Ntsebeza and Kepe, 2011: 3).  
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The Mpondo Revolts, which lasted nine months and, in some cases, endured well into 
the 1960s, were sustained for a longer period than most urban struggles in South 
Africa, and Ntsebeza and Kepe (2011: 21) make the important point that urban 
struggles culminating in the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960, still do not over-shadow 
the popularity and significance of the events in Mpondoland occurring roughly around 
the same time. Yet this event, which presented an organic, organised, militant peasant 
rebellion, has been silenced in most nationalist historiography and the rural sphere has 
been portrayed as quiescent and backward. The Mpondo revolts, which were a 
sustained resistance to colonial and apartheid policies and an affirmation of people’s 
defence of democracy in Mpondoland, in many ways shatter modernist conceptions of 
the political and the way struggle should be organised, which has always been seen as 
an urban, ‘progressive,’ project.  
 
Michael Neocosmos is useful when thinking about the relation between certain forms 
of liberal and Marxist historiography and post-colonial elite nationalism and the idea 
of the ‘modern’ is constructed. For Neocosmos (2012: 532),  
 
“It is important to note that, in the case of the study of anti-colonial resistance 
movements in Africa, not only has political subjectivity rarely been central, 
but when it has indeed been the object of study, it has been regularly reduced 
to its social location as well as interpreted, ‘anthropologized’ and translated 
into an idiom comprehensible to liberal or Marxist post-enlightenment 
historical science. Variously described as ‘religious’, ‘tribal’, ‘ethnic’, 
‘traditional’, or ‘pre-capitalist’, many such subjectivities have been 
distinguished from those of modernity precisely by relating them to their 
apparent social foundations. While so-called traditional, ethnic and religious 
expressions of resistance have been seen as being typical of ‘tribal’, ‘peasant’ 
and other primarily rural-based movements, urban ones have been seen as 
focused on more evidently recognizably modern characteristics such as those 
of class and nation.  
 
The treatment of the rural within this framework has meant that the west has failed to 
adequately come to terms with the fact “that supposedly ‘ethnic’, ‘traditional’, 
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‘religious’ or any so called ‘pre-modern’ cultural idioms could be deployed in the 
field of politics not to advocate a return to a supposedly golden past, but to affirm 
humanistic and popular-democratic demands for a better future (Neocosmos, 2012: 
534). The discourse of Eurocentric rationalism has always rendered the rural as 
backward and pre-political so much so that there is little understanding of the 
subaltern sphere of politics in elite publics, even today.  
 
This denial of the emancipatory potential of people organising outside of the 
categories of class and nation has certainly influenced African historiography which 
has, for a long time been unable to break-free from the western methodology that 
shape the theoretical cannons of history as a discipline. The African historian Peter 
Ekeh (1997: 28) explains this phenomenon well:  
 
“Even when post-colonial Africa has tried to reclaim its history from Europe, 
“the autonomy of African history and religious experience has been 
compromised through nationalist experience which reacts to western 
dominance by replacing the contents of imperialist history and theology with 
African images while adopting imperial methodologies that built up the 
models which have led to the conclusions rejected by them.”  
 
Shaka Zulu for instance, the great warrior king, is allowed his space in nationalist 
historiography, not merely because he was a great king or warrior, but because of the 
ease with which narrative of nationhood fits within European models of 
historiography. 
In fact the subalternist Dipesh Chakrabarty (1992: 1) adds that the dominance of 
“Europe as the subject of all histories is a part of a much more profound theoretical 
condition under which historical knowledge is produced in the third world.” European 
knowledge and history appears as solely capable of uttering the universal, while the 
non-European remains mute and forever the empirical evidence to the theoretical 
canons.  
The Mpondo revolts would be an awkward insertion into this kind of historiography 
because the peasant rebellion, calls into question ‘regal’ power and relies on other 
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forms of organisation captured neither by the way in which western theory 
circumscribes modernity nor ‘tribal’ ethnicity.   
 
The Mpondo revolts, as a political anti-colonial intervention, interrupt the kind of 
rigid ethnicity that is promoted as part of the South African rainbow nation, in which 
people are crystallised as bearers of ‘African culture and tradition,’ that allows 
systems of patronage to be kept in place and denies access to the universal, in what 
Mahmood Mamdani has called ‘the bi-furcated stated’. Therefore, the multicultural 
‘rainbow nation’ rhetoric which proliferates in popular nationalist discourse today 
does not easily allow for alternative understandings of ethnic and cultural politics and 
seeks rather to silence them. Furthermore, the narrative that the nationalist elite 
chooses, to tell the history of the liberation struggle, requires a modernity and 
linearity in which the rural and cultural struggles do not easily fit, because it interrupts 
the urban-centric, modernist struggle of the ANC-led liberation historical narrative.  
 
The Haitian historian of the Haitian Revolution, Michel Trouillot, provides a key 
thought when thinking about writing any history in a post-colonial society when he 
asks, “How do we begin to write the history of the unthinkable, how… as part of a 
continuous discourse on slavery, race and colonisation, do we break the iron bonds of 
the philosophical milieu in which it was born? (1995:73). In Silencing the Past: 
Power and the Production of History, Trouillot speaks about the silence on the part of 
the international academy on the black slave rebellion which led to the Haitian 
Revolution of 1789, and the establishment of the first independent black state. He 
highlights how even while the rebellion was taking place, the intellectuals, who had 
been writing about freedom, universal suffrage and the rights of man (sic), were 
unable to accept the idea of a slave uprising so even then, they began to find ways to 
silence it because they could not understand it.   
 
Trouillot (1995: 72) says, “When reality does not coincide with deeply held beliefs, 
human beings tend to phrase interpretations that force reality between the scopes of 
these beliefs. They devise formulas to repress the unthinkable and to bring it back 
within the realm of accepted discourse.” Trouillot documents the way in which slave 
resistance was reduced to individual acts that denied political content and 
universality, in which  “ Slave A ran away because she was not fed properly by her 
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master, Slave B killed herself in a fatal tantrum, Slave C poisoned her mistress 
because she was jealous” (Trouillot, 1991: 83). Thus, the rebellious slave became in 
turn “the maladjusted Negro, a mutinous adolescent who eats dirt until he dies, an 
infanticidal mother, a deviant” (1991: 83). He (1995: 96) describes this kind of 
silencing as having two categories: forms of erasure, and banalisation. The former is 
either a general silencing of resistance in pretending it did not happen, or phrasing it 
in terms that make it appear “not as bad as it seems.” The latter is a trivialisation of 
mass organisation in which single stories are given different interpretations where 
struggle is rooted in individual claims rather than in a fault within the system. Both 
are present in current narratives on rural resistance as well as mineworker strikes. The 
attempt to drain, from rural and other more contemporary, struggles which appear 
‘unthinkable’ all political content is part of a broader process of disciplining 
knowledge in which European thought and ‘modernity’ remain at the center of 
political action. The idea of rural resistance and other forms of political praxis which 
function differently from the way in which the ‘modern’ is conceptualised threaten 
the way elite nationalist historiography functions to create ‘modernist’ narratives of 
resistance to colonialism and apartheid and the continuation of the bifurcated state in 
the post-apartheid era.  
Marxist analysis and Women  
 
The universalisation of Marxist analysis has been incredibly useful to understand how 
capitalist domination works in society. As noted above, the work of Wolpe, Martin 
Leggasick and other Marxist writing on the creation of ‘native reserves’ revealed the 
racially stratified system of capitalism under colonialism and apartheid clearly. Yet, 
what happened was not the inability to see how the native reserve systems were able 
to ‘subsidise’ African labourers so the mines could undercut wages and increase 
profits, but, rather a failure to move beyond the economistic view of labour to the 
issue of how women’s contributions have been relegated to narratives about economic 
rural subsidies in the reserves and not women as agriculturalists and care-workers and 
organisers.   
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The Italian autonomist Marxist feminist Sylvia Federici (2008:92) problematises this 
gap in most Marxist literature when she argues, that Marx’s critique of capitalism has 
been hampered by the inability to conceive of value-producing work in the process of 
capitalist accumulation. “Had Marx recognised that capitalism must rely on both an 
immense amount of unpaid domestic labour for the production of the work force, and 
the devaluation of these activities in order to cut the cost of labour power, he may 
have been less inclined to consider capitalist production as inevitable and 
progressive” (Federici, 2008: 92).  
 
Often what this form of Marxist class analysis does, in addition to privileging certain 
spaces, and certain actors, is to produce a particular configuration of resistance and 
struggle which, because of the significance placed on the factory floor or the mine 
shaft, often takes a masculinist form particularly within a nation-building project.  
 
These narrow Marxist thematisations of resistance and work are taken up by some 
feminist discourse. This sometimes does the work of disguising the sphere of politics 
of the woman unwaged labourer and the home as the space of both her oppression and 
the basis from which she is able to organise and resist. Yet, women in the home; 
women as social reproducers; women as political activists etc. have always been 
attacked by some forms of narrow feminist discourse which assert that women who 
resist the state or are involved in political action which centers around their role as 
mothers or care-givers are not feminist.  
 
Take for instance, South African academic Shireen Hassim’s definition of feminist 
movements after she notes, “Women’s movements and feminist movements are not 
the same thing” (Hassim, 1991: 72).   
 
“A women's movement can be defined as women organising on the basis of 
their identities as women, in exclusively female organisations, taking up issues 
that they consider important. A women's movement can contain within it 
conservative elements that organize women from a particular social base but 
do not seek to question the power relations within that base, let alone within 
society more generally. Feminism, on the other hand, has a direct political 
dimension, being not only aware of women's oppression, but prepared actively 
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to confront patriarchal power in all its manifestations. Socialist feminists 
would refuse to separate the struggle against patriarchy from struggles 
against capitalism (and apartheid)”. 
 
Nombaniso Gasa, critiques this sort of narrow conceptualisation and arbitrary 
distinction, situating her argument within the broader critique of the goals of 
feminism she asks “What and who is a feminist?” (Gasa, 2008: 227). In her paper, 
Feminisms, Motherisms and Patriarchies: Women’s Voices in the 1950s, Gasa 
outlines how women in South Africa in the 1950s, organising on the basis of their 
various identities, and frequently as mothers, were exercising their own agency: 
“Women were learning new political skills...This pushed women into re-evaluating 
their own attitudes towards themselves and encouraged a greater feeling of 
assertiveness and solidarity with other women” (Gasa, 2008: 227). Thus Gasa’s 
(2008: 226) appeal for a non-linear and nuanced, contextualised approach which 
understands that “women straddle many positions (whose) lives defy the binaries that 
are dominant in South African feminist academic discourse has resonance here 
specifically in response to the narrow thematisation of South African women’s 
involvement in the political sphere. Perhaps, it would be appropriate to situate this 
argument in lights of Gasa’s (2006: 217) that “we must acknowledge the different 
forms of self-representation, the choices that are available to women.” 
 
Furthermore, the discourse of reproductive care which focuses on the investment 
made by women, many mothers and wives, in thousands of hours of unwaged house-
work and care work in the form of sex, care, love, medical attention and education, 
remains a history which is outside of conceptions of work, resistance and the realm of 
the political. Often it is feminist literature itself, which unproblematically accepts 
reductionist Marxist notions of work, organisation, and resistance rooted solely in the 
economic.  
 
The way in which these categories have been assimilated even in so called 
‘progressive’ histories is indicative of how disciplinary method becomes difficult to 
escape. Even in the recent historiography on the Mpondo Revolts, the lack of 
consciousness on the part of historians is evident when it came to retrieving from the 
archives the everyday lived reality and struggles of women in Mpondoland. Not only 
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does the literature preclude the everyday, but also women whose everyday resistance 
is what, as James Scott (1985) puts it, happened ‘in-between rebellions’ since women 
did not often go to war but exercised political agency from within the home or 
religious spaces.   
 
Often certain kinds of Marxism fetishise the factory or the mine and the big 
insurrections and protests that take place within these spaces, leaving out the everyday 
negotiated resistance taking place in the home or in workers’ communities, and 
usually by women. By examining what is left out of narratives of factory workers’ 
resistance that focus only on major strikes and riots and miss the daily struggles over 
leisure, wages, privileges, and respect. Scott, believes that “vital territory is won and 
lost here too.”  In fact, in his famous essay, Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, 
James C Scott (1985), expresses a frustration with the historiography of peasant 
rebellions which not only favoured large-scale North American peasant insurrection, 
but was also blind to the internal space-time that is not visible at first glance and 
which cast peasant’s as non-historical actors and merely contributors to statistics.  
 
Scott’s response to this was to create a historiography that also covered the vital day-
to-day struggles of peasant resistance. It was not only the big insurrections that were 
important but also rather, how people negotiated and resisted in their everyday lives 
in order to survive or resist an oppressive system. Scott (1985) realised, that for the 
peasantry, “scattered along the countryside and facing even more imposing obstacles 
to organised, collective action, everyday forms of resistance would seem particularly 
important.” 
 
Scott (1985) calls these everyday forms of resistance, “ordinary weapons of relatively 
powerless groups” which included foot-dragging, dissimulation, false –compliance, 
pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so forth.” It is these 
‘ordinary weapons of the weak’ that allow us to understand what the “peasantry does 
‘between revolts’ to defend its interests as best it can’. It is here in the realm of the 
everyday, where many political contributions women make are to be found. It is not 
merely that women have been left out of narratives of resistance, but also how these 
categories of resistance are constituted, and how, now, being aware of the method of 
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this kind of historiography, it requires us to re-think the possibilities for writing a 
living history of Marikana today.   
Writing a Living Subaltern History  
When we are faced with what Michel Foucault describes as disciplinary method that 
constantly shapes the cannons of historical knowledge there needs to be several de-
colonial processes occurring simultaneously. The first is to recognise which histories 
are silenced and an attempt to show how silencing functions to produce elite 
discourse. The second is to re-think and make visible marginalised stories. It may be 
useful to employ Chakrabarty’s (1991: 23) notion of  “a history that deliberately 
makes visible, within the very structure of its narrative forms, its own repressive 
strategies and practices, the part it plays in collusion with the narratives of 
citizenships in assimilating to the projects of the modern state all other possibilities of 
human solidarity.” This is an important insight for reflection on historical disciplinary 
method, since this elite conception of the political disciplines anti-colonial struggle 
within particular margins. It is subalternist theory that offers a way in which to 
understand how elitism takes both colonial and nationalist forms and how we might 
use this theory to conceptualise and write about an otherwise, silenced or 
marginalised sphere of history and politics. 
 
In the introduction to Subaltern Studies: A Reader, Ranajit Guha (1997:xv) describes 
the project of Subaltern Studies as creating an alternative mode of thematization, 
whose function it would be “to illuminate rather than hide the non-unitary character of 
that (national) politics.” Rather, it would draw attention to “the other domain” treated 
in dominant discourse as of no importance or even as altogether non –existent”. For 
Guha, (1997: xv) “The failure of elite discourse to, in both its imperialist and 
indigenous nationalist varieties, identify, far less interpret, many of the most 
significant aspects of our past (which) follows from a thematization framed rigidly by 
the presuppositions of its monistic view of colonial power relations” in which the 
study of colonialism “opens up in entirely new ways to bring into relief the manifold 
diversities that it has been beyond the oversimplified elitist interpretation to cope 
with” (1997: xv). 
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Subaltern studies then, offers a way of examining parts of history that do not ‘fit’ 
within statist and elite nationalist figurations, in which there is an “official domain of 
politics.” Consequently, in order to truly understand how people function in society, 
one must understand what their conception of society is, and often this is informed by 
culture and custom1.  
 
If the starting point then is not to take elite nationalism, often informed by linear 
trajectories, as the category through which we tell historical narratives of struggle and 
resistance, what are the possibilities for human solidarity if we are to begin to think 
beyond these, often state-driven, projects?  
 
One example of this kind of subaltern sphere of politics is what S’bu Zikode, 
Chairperson of the urban shackdwellers movement in Durban, Abahlali base 
Mjondolo (in Neocosmos, 2012: 532) calls a “living politics,” which is “the 
movement out of the places where oppression has assigned those who do not count.” 
For Neocosmos (2012: 532), “politics begins at the point of displacement, and it is the 
inability to grasp the subversion of place which lies at the core of a failure to 
understand the politics of emancipation.” For him, politics is emancipatory and it is 
this conception of the political that is useful here. Urban social movements like 
Abahlali base Mjondolo in Durban, articulate a politics which is often ignored or 
banalised in the elite public sphere not only because they occupy a subaltern sphere 
but also because of the mode of political action that is sometimes employed. In his 
book, Fanonian Practices in South Africa, Nigel Gibson (2011: 21) describes the 
modes of politics employed by Abm as a “humanstic development based in life,” 
where: 
 
Outside of civil society, indeed ‘barred’ from civil society (unless 
subordinated to an NGO which represents them in civil society), the organised 
shack dwellers have forced themselves into political society. By initially 
                                                        
1 E.P Thompson’s description of culture and custom is useful here, rather than the reified static conception of 
culture at play in popular discourse in South Africa today. In his book, Customs in Common, following Bordieu’s 
‘habitus,’ he describes custom as ambience, not as fact but “as a lived environment comprised of practices, 
inherited expectations, rules which determined both limits to usages and disclosed possibilities, norms and 
sanctions both of law and neighbourhood pressures” (Thompson, 1991: 102). It was precisely this confluence of 
practices, examined in chapter two, that came together in the peasant rebellion of 1960 and which appeared again 
more than fifty years later at Marikana. 
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coming together and acting on their own, they have put post-apartheid society 
on trial, challenging its raison d'être: its morals and values. By creating their 
own organisation they have also created a self-conscious that has shattered 
any ‘impulsive position,’ insisting, that they are not dependent on anyone else 
but ‘immanent’ in themselves (1967a: 135). Insisting also, that they are not a 
potentiality of something but are, the shack dwellers’ movement has 
articulated a living politics that challenges the ascriptive idea of South 
African citizenship.   
 
Thus, it is important to note that this mode of politics that challenges ideas of 
citizenship and the way in which the poor and marginalised are represented in the 
elite public sphere, definitely has resonance with other urban struggles around the 
world. Often challenges to the state are framed as mob-like uprisings rather than an 
attempt to understand the internal logic of people practising politics outside of the 
elite domain.  
 
Raoul Zibechi (2012: 11), writing about urban social movements in Cochabamba, 
Bolivia, reiterates that elites and masses sometimes tend to mobilize in completely 
different ways, particularly in post -colonial societies.  
 
“The former do so vertically, closely linked to the institutions; social action 
takes place in a "cautious and controlled" manner and its high point comes in 
electoral contests. However, the mobilization of the poor is, on the contrary, 
horizontal, more spontaneous and based "on the traditional kinship and 
territoriality or associations of class" that appear linked to the insurgency. 
The characteristics of a horizontal mobilization enable it to reveal the hidden 
aspects of cooperation that, upon bursting forth, displays what is implicit” 
(Zibechi, 2010: 11).  
 
For Zibechi this sphere of politics is defined by its kinship base and the ability of 
people to organise outside of the state or state institutions. For him, it is important to 
state the role of spontaneity in subaltern politics because poor people are so often not 
taken seriously, when they are involved in political acts of defiance that do not fit 
categories of ‘organised protest’ and are hence silenced by these categories: 
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“The poor of the cities do not usually formulate explicit agendas with key 
strategies and tactics laid out, nor political programmes or demands but as is 
often the case in the history of the oppressed, they make the road by walking. 
One can only posteriori reconstruct the coherence of the journey that always 
seems to pass by or amend the initial intentions of the subjects (Zibechi, 2012: 
190).”  
 
This is evidenced again in the orgnanisation of workers at Marikana, who did not 
expect what would happen after they chose to act outside of the union. In fact the 
decision to go directly to management before consulting their union, taken perhaps 
spontaneously, would later lead to the mass scale organisation after they were met 
with bullets from NUM officials and consequently the constitution of independent 
worker committees outside of union and bargaining structures.  
 
Often the failure of elite nationalism to recognise a subaltern sphere of politics, and to 
grasp the significance of this mode of politics, results in a criminalisation of the poor, 
who organise outside of the ‘official domain.’  E.P Thompson makes a similiar claim 
in his essay, The Moral Economy of the Crowd, in which people are appealing to a 
sense of community and custom in order to bring the price of staple foods down. 
Often these people were seen as hungry mobs of people who were rioting only 
because their stomachs were empty, and the rowdy crowds were often dismissed 
because it did not appear as if they were rational, reasonable and appealing to the 
political principles of morality and equality. This sense of custom and community is 
also missing in the economistic analysis of worker struggles, which sees the worker as 
isolated and in an one-dimensional relationship to capital. In post-colonial society, it 
is particularly limited to use the concept of class alone to consider the exploitation 
and domination of a black mineworker. The idea that workers represent one 
homogenous class of people, devoid of context, allows the proliferation of the kinds 
of violent insurrection that is often fetishised by the left. The feeling the death of 34 
black mineworkers evokes, cannot only be representation of class struggle but rather 
what Kimberlė Crenshaw (1997:7) has described as the ‘uncomfortability’ with the 
use of black violence in narratives of struggle or political unrest. “The problem 
however, is not so much the portrayal of violence itself as it is the absence of other 
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narratives and images portraying a fuller range of black experience” (Crenshaw, 
1991:7). The way in which slave and peasant resistance has always taken on a 
grotesque form of violent images, not unlike Quentin Tarantino’s portrayal of slave 
vengeance in Django Unchained, illustrates this narrative of violence - as – life - 
history. Here again, some forms of Marxism, the kind that is also evident in 
Alexander et al’s book, that see Marikana as a necessary event in the march towards 
socialism miss the inherent racism in this kind of analysis. Moreover, the reaction of 
the elite public in South Africa, particularly the state, which arrested workers rather 
than expressed outrage at the massacre, re-inscribes the idea of the poor black body as 
dispensable to History.  
 
To explore the narratives of people who form part of a subaltern sphere of history and 
politics requires a sensitivity and awareness of the everyday lived realities of many 
people who live and work at the mines and who form part of communities, families, 
and relationships that are rooted in different cultures, customs, traditions and 
histories.  
 
This chapter has presented many different sets of ideas particularly because it is the 
aim of this thesis to think about the political meanings of Marikana, outside of narrow 
thematisations and frameworks. It has presented four key points, the first of which is 
to critique a narrow class analysis of workers’ struggles on the mines and to show 
how this is inadequate for thinking about the political meanings of Marikana. The 
second is to show how this form of analysis is rooted in Eurocentric historiography 
and how this is often assimilated into post-colonial elite nationalist historiography 
which silences other histories that do not ‘fit.’ The third has been to show how this 
elite nationalist historiography often takes a masculinist form and how often 
historians and even some forms of liberal and Marxist feminism serve to marginalise 
and silence women’s political actions. Lastly it has offered a different set of ideas 
which can be used to broaden our understanding of Marikana and the implications for 
thinking about workers as part of communities with specific cultures and customs; 
here a subaltern sphere of politics can be located where workers’ organise in different 
ways from an ‘official sphere’ of politics, which is not often grasped by the state or 
middle-class intellectuals alike. It is here also, where workers’ everyday lived realities 
and their communities are particularly important, and that is where, in many cases, the 
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political activity of women takes place. If subaltern studies was highlighting an 
absence of the subaltern from history, there must be a parallel attempt to show how 
women remain stuck in the kind of domesticity which consistently renders them 
outside of the realm of the political, even when, at times of insurrection, subaltern 
men appear politically active, women are often relegated to the margins.  
  
 The next chapter will explore these four points with reference to the Mpondo Revolts 
of 1960, and how re-visiting this historical event, and re-reading it, may allow for a 
different understanding of the ways in which we can interpret the Marikana massacre, 
and the roots of the political tools the men on the mountain used to organise.  
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Chapter Two 
 
Sediments and Silences: The Mpondo Revolts of 1960 
 
This chapter will present an examination of the ways in which the political and 
cultural tools, which were used in the Mpondo Revolts and which were carried over 
from Mpondoland, to the mines, over years of migrant labour contract, which reveals 
a political sphere absent in both liberal and narrow Marxist modes of analysis. It also 
makes historical links and connections between the people who have come and gone 
through the mines and back to Mpondoland for many years, and how this space and 
these memories have informed their current struggles for life and for dignity.  
 
The Mpondo Revolts of 1960 have remained largely silenced in nationalist 
historiography because of the relative threat the event poses to the nationalist 
narrative of anti-apartheid struggle and current understandings of nationhood that 
place the African National Congress (ANC) at the centre of both. Thembele Kepe 
(2013) has noted that the revolts remain marginal to nationalist historiography 
because of the way in which ethnicity is mobilised in the current political climate, in 
which the revolts are used to reinscribe traditional authority as opposed to the 
challenge posed by the amaMpondo rebels. This kind of silencing is a powerful 
mechanism, which allows the construction of certain nationalist discourses, to the 
exclusion of other narratives that have the potential to shatter neatly defined and 
hegemonic categories of resistance. In the Introduction to their edited book on the 
Mpondo Revolts, Ntsebeza and Kepe (2011: 12) provide an excellent starting point 
when they say of the section of the book titled: The Rural in the Urban,  
 
“The question could be phrased thus: ‘How did the Mpondo rebellion of the 
1950s and 1960s impact on the politics and organisational abilities of 
Mpondo migrant workers in the urban areas?’ Phrasing the question this way 
is important given the influence of modernisation which views the rural 
(traditional) as ‘backward’ and the urban as ‘progressive.’ The logic of 
modernisation suggests a linear approach where the rural learn from the 
urban and not vice-versa. 
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The chapter begins with a historical overview of the creation and implementation of 
reserve policy resulting in the migrant labour system, it goes on to examine the 
conditions which made the Mpondo Revolts possible in 1960 and the cultural political 
tools employed in the revolts. These political tools are evidenced through what is 
referred to as “mountain committees” the bodies which were constituted by ordinary 
peasants who organised and sustained the revolts. The chapter then argues that this 
sphere of politics is important to our understanding of events at Marikana; it further 
highlights another gap in the historiography of the Mpondo Revolts that of the 
political activity of women and the work performed by women in the reserves. This 
historiography, if re-visited, will help us to understand the constitution of work, 
resistance and a subaltern sphere of politics better and we can use this knowledge to 
write a living history of Marikana today, rooted in notions of dignity and community 
organisation.   
 
Laying the Foundations: The History of Native Reserve Policy in South Africa   
 
In 1894 Cecil John Rhodes took the first steps towards the segregated reserve policy 
to serve mining capital interests in the form of the Glen Grey Act (Lacey, 1981:13). 
The Act, which divided the land of that district into surveyed private holdings limiting 
the carrying capacity of the land and levied taxes collected by headmen indirectly 
forcing the ‘surplus’ people into the capitalist sector, would later inspire J.W Sauer to 
draft the 1913 Native Land Act. While the British had always favoured indirect rule 
through chiefs and practiced this at the Cape and Natal, (Ntsebeza, 2011: 32), the 
Afrikaner farmers were against the reserve policy because they favoured master-slave 
relationships which meant African ‘labour’ would work and live on their farms 
(Lacey, 1981: 25). For white Afrikaners who opposed the Native Land Act of 1913, 
which would see large tracts of land allocated for African people and would require 
whites to move off some future reserve land, “such areas would be spoiled or wasted 
by natives” (Lacey, 1981: 31). Indeed while The Native Land Act of 1913, Native 
Registration Act of 1917 and Native Reserve Act of 1927, (which saw mass removals 
of African people to areas without water or electricity) were being passed, the silence 
and lack of consciousness of white people was overwhelming as they fought over 
where cheap African labour was required the most (Lacey, 1981: 104, Mbeki 1964: 
29). The need for the apartheid government to remove African people from towns and 
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urban centres, in order to force them into work on the mines or farms, forced the 
National Party to revisit the United Party’s reserve policy and consider re-tribalisation 
which was seen as the best means of rural control (Lacey, 1981:94, 106).  
 
In his seminal text, The Peasant’s Revolt, Govan Mbeki rigorously describes the 
‘bastardisation’ of the traditional system and the attempt to draw the Chiefs and 
headmen into the machinery of the state. At first, as Mbeki (1964: 42) describes, 
many chiefs bought into the Transkeian Territorial Authorities, because they thought 
they could really achieve self-government, autonomy, or a relative stake in the 
government of the union of South Africa. However it was soon clear that the chiefs 
who formed part of the United Transkeian Territories General Council (UTTGC), 
whose Xhosa pun was Utata woj’ inj; emsini, (father has had dog’s meat blackened 
with smoke), were just puppets of the state who would later vote in the Bantu 
Authorities Act (Mbeki, 1964: 33). The once, relatively inclusive and constantly 
shifting and changing tradition of chieftaincy was now being crystallised in colonial 
‘tribal’ law, and the chiefs paid by the South African government, were being made to 
subtract all kinds of taxes from their subjects who were forced into migrant labour as 
a result.  
 
The migrant labour system, which persists around the mining areas in South Africa 
today (Breckenridge, 2011) is still at the centre of understanding struggles for land, 
wages and dignity in contemporary society. The history of mineworkers and their 
families reveals a constant battle to protect the commons against the system of racial 
oppression and capitalist attempts to fully proletarianise the rural population of the 
Transkei. It must be mentioned that a purely ‘working class’ reading of the migrant 
labour system would be completely inadequate to understand the kind of resistance 
being waged since the advent of colonialism in South Africa till today. Buhlungu and 
Bezuidenhout (2010: 242) have argued, that positioning economic exploitation as the 
trigger for worker agency, which most neo-Marxist labour historians have done 
following Wolpe, does not allow one to explore how moral geographies operate and 
shift over time. While others like E.P. Thompson and Dunbar Moodie have added the 
notions of justice and integrity to the structural analysis, Buhlungu and Bezuidenhout 
are also trying to root worker struggles in conceptions of dignity, even though this 
takes a very modernist form.  
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The privileging of big history, broad class narratives, and struggles has always been 
the preferred methodology of most social historians. By highlighting issues of 
community, justice, integrity, and most importantly dignity, it is possible to release 
the analysis of Marikana from the straightjacket of dogmatic Marxism and to focus 
rather on workers as people who form part of a broader community. This point will be 
revisited later in the thesis, which examines recent work on Marikana which uses the 
narrow lens of class analysis and therefore fails to express other realities of working 
and living conditions at Marikana, including and most especially the work done by 
women in reproducing miners.  
 
It was Harold Wolpe (1972) who first theorised the system of racial capitalism in the 
country hypothesising that colonialism and Apartheid were set up to create the 
condition for the exploitation of cheap African labour. The reserve economies were 
kept going so that the costs of maintaining and reproducing the proletariat would be 
lowered and mining capital could rely on the part subsidy of agricultural production in 
the reserves (Westaway, 1993:18; Lacey, 1981: 224). The reserves then became a 
labour source and many writers of the time concluded that the introduction of 
betterment schemes in the 1930s, focused on ‘saving the soil’ because “the reserves 
had to be poor enough to create a supply of labour and prosperous enough not to 
produce miners who were malnutritioned and unhealthy” (Lacey: 1981: 42). 
However, Westaway (1993:25), Mbeki (1964) and Ntsebeza (2011) all refute the ideal 
rural output hypothesis. Since mining houses themselves weren’t calling for policy to 
restore or stabilise African agriculture and there was no objective ecological crisis 
(Westaway, 1993: 25), they credit it to the rise in conservationism and modernity 
science in South Africa after World War II. The role of land had become less 
important after the decline of agricultural activities on the reserves (Ntsebeza, 201: 6). 
Consequently, the focus had now shifted to the reserves as breeding grounds of the 
work force and as peripheral spaces of control rather than subsistence and production. 
Thus, it was conservationism combined with anthropology that led to the introduction 
of betterment schemes in the reserves, which coincided, with other government 
policies, like the maintenance of a cheap labour force, but was not as a result of them 
(Westaway, 1993: 50).  
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Conservationism in South Africa had first been introduced in relation to white 
farming. In a bid to be more scientific, rational and modern the South African state 
was encouraged to allow research, testing and then later re-shuffling of entire areas 
and living spaces in a bid to “save the soil” (Westaway, 1993: 45, Mbeki, 74). Thus 
betterment, the modern science that was supposed to save the soil and increase 
agricultural production in the reserves was instated with disastrous outcomes. 
Betterment schemes required fencing off areas of land for ‘rehabilitation,’ rotational 
grazing, culling of livestock due to over-grazing, and the mass resettlement of people 
in areas targeted for betterment (for greater discussion of this see Westaway, 1993, 
Mbeki, 1964 and Ntsebeza, 2011). People lost arable land, their cattle could not graze 
freely, and living arrangements were changed. People who previously enjoyed the 
privacy of large homesteads where they could host religious events or hold parties and 
gatherings without judgement, or merely enjoy the privacy of their own homes, were 
now forced to live close to people they hardly knew and in western –style houses 
which increased visibility and surveillance of each other (Westaway, 1993: 21). 
 
By the early 1950s, it was clear that betterment had failed. There was also widespread 
agreement in the reserves that it was not poor soil, or over-grazing that was the issue 
but lack of land as a direct result of racist state policy (Mbeki, 1964 Ntsebeza, 2011, 
Westaway, 1993).  
 
This kind of programme was not the first of its kind either, in Tanzania and other 
African countries; colonial missions had also tried to ‘rehabilitate’ African societies 
through various self-help schemes. In an attempt by the colonial state to capture the 
peasantry through community development programmes under the technical 
development paradigm of “self-help,” the colonial state used interventist methods and 
punishments to enforce compliance.  In Tanzania, “African cultivators were to 
construct terraces, undertake tie-ridging, were forced to grow particular crops 
according to specific horticultural practices. Attempts were made to tackle perceived 
over-stocking in pastoralist areas, and control disease through compulsory dipping. 
The result of this new pro-active and invasive approach was increasing resentment, 
passive (and sometimes active) resistance” (Jennings 2007: 75). Having lost the 
peasantry, who then formed an alliance with the liberation movement, the colonial 
state sought to create a privileged class of farmers (Jennings 2007: 75), which is what 
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the NP government tried to do in the Transkei when it played the Mtwaku district 
against Gwili-Gwili, offering them extra benefits and more access to farming 
resources to join the betterment scheme and cut off Gwili-Gwili (Westaway, 1993: 
80). Yet the continutation of these resettlement schemes into the post-colonial area 
was met with as much resistance and opposition by people who were still unwilling to 
be ignored. This is evidenced through the diasterous effects of Ujamaa in Tanzania, 
when Nyerere tried to implement the re-villagisation of people.  
 
 This is not unlike attempts to relocate people, without consultation in Zimbabwe. In 
Suffering for Territory, Moore (2005: 2) describes the resistance of people, who were 
previously squatters, refusing to join the post-colonial states’s resettlement schemes. 
He argues for a spatial senstivity to cultural politics and demonstrates how people 
who are “not self-sovereign exercise agency through – suffering for territory, in 
which people invoke memories of suffering for territory or kutambudzikira nyika and 
kushingirira nyika, to stake claims for post-colonial land rights (Moore, 2005:2). 
These terms are shaped by local practices, and “nyika is at once local and national, 
spanning the semantic terrain of chiefdom, country, and nation. It specifies no single 
sovereign or mode of subjection. As a contested terrain of landscape, nyika is 
simultaneously symbolic and material” (Moore, 2005:3). While they lived inside the 
resettlement territory in Kaerezi, they lived outside of planned settlement sites, which 
they referred to as maline, the lines – the same name given to imposed colonial 
settlements (Moore, 2005:1).  
 
This contestation of space, which starts from a point of colonial spatialisation, is 
often, as evidenced by the post-colonial state in Africa, a politicisation of space in 
which poor people, who are outside of ‘civil’ society and the elite public sphere, are 
seen as unable to think,or take decisions for themselves (see Neocosmos, 2012; 
Pithouse, 2012). The stress on consultation and participation often supercedes 
nationalistic interpretations of liberation struggles especially in rural areas, which are 
often marginalised by urban politics and movements.  
 
In many ways the Mpondo revolts were the local praxis of custom and tradition which 
shares points of connecion with many groups of dispossesed people in the global 
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South, who use their common resources and local political practice to influence a 
larger system in which they feel they should have a stake.   
 
The History of the Peasants Revolt 
 
Politics begins exactly when those who “cannot” do something show that in fact they can. 
      - Jacques Ranciere, Politics and Aesthetics  
 
There have been many attempts, especially amongst early anthropologists, to create 
the image of African people as outside of the political realm, led by primordial rituals 
and beliefs. Paul Landau (2012:250) describes this emerging anthropological tribal 
model, as one that  
 
“Influenced the worldwide image of colonised people, as people struggling 
with “change,” to conserve their “traditional ways,” as if the trouble under 
colonial rule were due to their own intransigence, their inability to adapt. The 
question of land and autonomy was removed and an image created of the 
tribesman facing the world from his oasis of custom and ritual.” 
 
The history of political tradition and practice thus still remains eclipsed by colonial 
literature unwilling to deal with struggles for autonomy and dignity which now, 
returning to the archive we must attempt to retell. 
 
In Mpondoland by the late 1800s, traditional authority was a loose association of 
district chiefs usually recognising a paramount chief according to lineage; people 
chose their allegiance on the basis of the area that they occupied. Size, solidarity, and 
custom of a ‘tribe’ varied according to the extent of outside threats and the personality 
of the paramount (Hunter, 1961: 379). While there was no standardisation in 
Mpondoland, chiefs were usually the commanders in chiefs of their respective armies, 
responsible for the allocation of land, and the arbiters of district disputes (Hunter, 
1961: 392). The mutual relationship between the chief and his people was measured 
by generosity of the chief. People were called upon to work together to build huts and 
cultivate land and the chief, who was always expected to live and work amongst 
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people, would also have to provide refreshments and hear the grievances of anyone in 
his district who called at his kraal (Hunter, 1961: 394).  
 
The re-introduction of ‘tribal’ authority in its static, codified form and the use of 
African Chiefs to impose betterment and later ‘Stabilisation’ in 1954 on African 
people is largely seen as the reason for the Peasant Revolt’s in 1960s (Mbeki, 1964, 
Hendricks, 2011, Ntsebeza et al, 2011). The power of the chiefs, who previously 
enjoyed a relative measure of legitimacy, was attacked from two directions: the 
government and the people. While Mbeki (1964: 47 – 50) is adamant that the entire 
traditional authorities system had been corrupted by the chiefs,who had bought into 
the Transkeian Authorities System, the various resistance to the system of traditional 
authorities do not reveal so neat an analysis.  
 
In Eastern Mpondoland, where the first and most violent outbreaks of the revolt 
began, people were entirely against Chief Sigcau for many reasons: not least his 
participation in the Bantu Authorities system and his insistence on betterment. In 
addition, they viewed his Chieftaincy as illegitimate; since it was his brother Nelson 
Sigcau who, it was widely believed, had the birth- right to rule (Pieterse, 2011: 53). In 
other places, chiefs were deposed because of their refusal to adopt the Bantu 
Authorities Act or betterment and their support of local struggles. Chief Moiloa at 
Marico was deposed because women refused to carry passbooks; Chief Moramoche at 
Sekhukhuneland was deposed for not accepting Bantu Authorities or Bantu Education 
in 1956, in Gwili-Gwili Headmen Myeki led the resistance against betterment. Chief 
Ntlabati was banished for his involvement in the All African Convention (AAC) with 
I.B Tabata, a representative of the Khongo and author of the pamphlet Rehabilitation: 
A New Fraud. Tabata, claims Ntsebeza, (2011: 37) is actually the first theorist of what 
Mamdani later called the bifurcated state in Citizen and Subject.  
 
Many chiefs were coerced at gunpoint, or did not have the betterment schemes 
explained to them. For others their consent was fabricated, taken for granted when 
they were silent or not even solicited, and when they were required to implement the 
policies, people started to get increasingly enraged (Westaway, 1993:62). Others 
however, like the despised Paramount Chief Botha Sigcau and the puppet chief Victor 
Poto, publicly and actively pledged their allegiance to the National Party government 
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and did their bidding. The people who were the biggest supporters of betterment were 
the new professional class that had risen as a result of reserve administration, the 
teachers, nurses, NAD (Native Administration Department) officials, policemen, 
headmen and other professional people who were estranged from peasant life and 
drawn into other kinds of labour (Westaway 1993:75, Ntsebeza, 2011: 6). Thus, it is 
generally agreed that the peasants, mostly the uneducated and illiterate, were the 
people who organised, mobilised, and resisted the implementation of betterment and 
eventually led the revolts (Westaway, 1993: 75; Ntsebeza, 2011: 38, Mbeki, 1964, 
111). 
 
In the years, months and weeks as the resistance intensified leading up to the 6th of 
June 1960, when the police dropped tear gas and opened fired on a gathering of 
people on Ngquza Hill followed by the declaration of a state of emergency that finally 
broke the resistance, peasants resisted consistently and determinedly, wanting to have 
their grievances heard. Steinberg (2011) recounts the day of the massacre through 
various documents and accounts of people,  
 
“The whites took Botha Sigcau, king of Eastern Mpondoland, up in a 
helicopter. They flew him to Ngquza, and there the helicopter stopped, 
hovering just over the rebels. Then the white commander put a rifle in Botha 
Sigcau’s hands, and he said: ‘Whether we end this rebellion is your decision 
to make. We can do nothing if you cannot fire the first shot. The choice is in 
your hands, not ours’. Botha Sigcau thought for a little while, took the rifle 
from the white man, aimed at the rebels below, and fired the first shot. It hit a 
man in the chest and killed him. That is how the massacre began.”  
 
Botha Sigcau and his followers were met with anger of the crowd, when they burned 
them out of their huts, Tim Gibbs (2010; unpublished), tells how “To the Chiefs’ own 
deep shame, they had run away from their own people. How disgraceful and absurd it 
was to see a chief guarded by police (and home guards) armed with revolvers! – mere 
hirelings, not true supporters or followers." The chiefs who had previously been 
surrounded by their people and always in dialogue with them were now trying to get 
away from them for fear of what they would do, and the royal system was in total flux 
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and upheaval. While the government was trying its best to keep order in the Transkei 
through the chiefs, many chiefs who did not agree with betterment were being 
targeted as allies for the ANC.  
 
In the antagonistic relationships which grew in the Mpondo royal family, it was often 
the daughters and sons of these chiefs who later joined Umkhonto We Sizwe, or 
supported the rebels. Zoleka Langa remembers that it was around this time that the 
ANC, which was ‘looking for people of influence and position,’ made contact with 
Chief Babini (her father). ‘I was just a school girl at that time, but I would sit with 
him and advise him.’ These seditious conversations were too much for Kaiser 
Matanzima. Chief Babini was jailed repeatedly until his health collapsed and he died” 
(Gibbs, 2010; unpublished). Winnie Madikizela was also one such daughter, who hid 
rebels in her hut, unbeknown to her; the same rebels had just come from burning 
down her father’s hut. Columbus Madikizela had been a collaborator and was very 
unpopular amongst the rebels, according to Gibbs (2010; unpublished); he later 
admitted that Winnie had been right to support the rebels and to oppose the 
bantustans.  
 
People all over Mpondoland and the rest of the Transkei opposed betterment fiercely. 
Fence cutting was a popular form of resistance and took place in Wittizehoek, 
Lusikiski, Sekhukuneland, Gwili-Gwili, Mtakwu, and the Mbau area (Westaway, 
1993, Mbeki, 1964). There were many clashes between the people and the state. In 
Bizana, the resistance was very strong and it is often said to be the incitement point of 
the revolt. 
 
In Wolf River, the resistance was most fierce and collective, one man was forced off a 
cliff for being pro-betterment, and people collectively disrupted government meetings 
that tried to disenfranchise squatters (Westaway, 1993: 100). In Zululand, Tokazi, 
opposition to rehabilitation was so strong that clashes between the peasants and police 
occurred when Chief Dinizulu accepted the betterment scheme. Thereafter, the whole 
community was ordered to move, those who did move were attacked by peasants for 
being collaborators (Mbeki, 1964: 46). The government responded with even more 
terror and brutality, in the year 1960, 4769 men and women were arrested, 30 
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amaMpondo were sentenced to death (11 were reprieved), there were 22 deaths in all, 
and hut burnings were widespread especially the huts of chiefs, headmen, and 
collaborators or people who spread government propaganda in support of betterment 
(Mbeki, 1964: 117).  
 
Yet, people remained determined and continued to act collectively. Mbeki stresses the 
discipline, rationality and humanity of the mountain committees: even in the face of 
brute force of the state, most people were asked to leave their huts before they were 
burned down and when violence and death did occur it was at the height of the revolts 
when people were scattered, disappeared, exiled or arrested and could no longer take 
collective decisions (Drew: 2011: 79).  
 
A big part of the Mpondo resistance is mired in discussions about traditional kinship 
mountain/hill committees sometimes also referred to as Ikongo or the Congo. The 
mountain committee, so named because men usually met on a mountain or a hill, was 
significant because mountains were spiritual places where the ancestors were said to 
dwell and where rituals were performed, They provided protection during wars, and 
were places where people could meet undisturbed (Drew 2011: 76). There are various 
interpretations about the committee as manifestation of a subaltern politics where 
people critiqued the state “and gave voice to a politics at the centre of which lay the 
ancient and enduring problem of authority and social health (Pieterse 2011: 60).  
 
There is also evidence of a large number of influences on the rebels at the time and 
they engaged with a range of political groups and organisations, including, no doubt, 
what E.P Thompson called customary politics. 
 
In her book, A Taste of Freedom, Helen Bradford, (1988:1) says “Oppressed and far 
flung, isolated and illiterate the rural poor have for generations been given 
contemptuous nicknames by urban black sophisticates and have been largely 
neglected by political movements.” Yet, the Mpondo Revolts revealed a moment 
when a subaltern sphere of politics came into dialogue with a range of disclosed 
possibilities. One such was the launch of the Industrial Commercial Worker’s Union 
(ICU) in 1919. The ICU was able to mobilise the rural poor in a way in which no 
other political movement has done to date, infused with the traditions and demands of 
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ordinary South Africans it spread quickly and gained 150 000- 250 000 members in a 
short space of time (Bradford, 1988:2). They also admitted women, tried to raise farm 
worker wages, and engaged in dockworker strikes in East London (Bradford, 1988:5). 
The influences on the ICU and the later breakaway Independent ICU (IICU) were 
myriad2. Firstly, the Communist Party of South Africa had begun to realise the 
importance of the agrarian question in South Africa, (Bradford, 1988:2) and Clements 
Kaladie, the first secretary, who studied Trade Unionism in Britain, started the 
Workers Herald publication in Johannesburg and affiliated the ICU to the 
International Trade Union of Amsterdam (Hunter, 1961: 567). The ICU definitely had 
influence in Mpondoland, especially as an idea taken up by people and interpellated 
into local politics. It mixed with Garveyism, and the Israelite movement (which was 
an African church movement combining European and African specifically Ethopian 
church beliefs) and the more controversial Wellingtonites (Hunter, 1961: 570). 
 
Self-appointed, Wellington Buthelezi, and others took on the aegis of the ICU in 
Mpondoland, collecting membership fees, ordering people to kill their pigs and 
preached that the domination of Europeans would end when Garvey arrived in 
American planes. This swamped a lot of actual ICU activity in the area since people 
did know not who was an official agent and who was not (Hunter, 1961: 570). These 
movements themselves were highly infused with the Christian beliefs of the people, 
and the ICU and the Wellingtonites even took to holding their own Sunday Services 
(Hunter, 1961: 573). Charles Palwa who led the resistance in the Mbau area, certainly 
had the backing of the IICU, which had a good following in the area, and it thus 
became very convenient for chiefs and government to blame the revolt on the ICU 
and the ANC (Westaway, 1993: 88).  
 
Some like Mbeki have tried to link the word Congo to Khongolosi, or Congress, i.e. 
the ANC. However, Drew (2011: 70) and Ntsebeza (2011: 26) say there is not enough 
evidence to support this claim, and in fact it was the broad-based demonstrations in 
                                                        
2 For a greater discussion on the influences and spread of the ICU in Southern Africa see Van der Walt, 
L. 2007. The First Globalisation and Transnational Labour Activism in Southern Africa: White 
Labourism, the IWW, and the ICU, 1904–1934, in African Studies. Vol. 66. No.2-3.  
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the Transkei that influenced the ANC to take mass action and not the other way 
around3. 
 
In fact, in the early 1900s already, people began to gather on mountains. Enoch 
Mgijima, who preached the end of European domination and believed that the day 
would soon come when Europeans would be swept into the sea and African people 
would be free, led the Israelite movement, combining African beliefs with Christian 
ones (Hunter, 1961: 563). Mgijima and the Israelites clashed with police several times 
in the years between 1918- 1920 after they began to occupy Ntabelanga, a mountain 
in the Bulhoek district, because he believed that God wanted them to meet there. In 
May 1920, the police opened fire on people gathered on the mountain, after 
Europeans began to complain about the ‘squatters’ and their anti-white sentiment, 163 
‘Israelites’ were killed, and 125 were wounded. Mgijima was ex-communicated from 
the American parent church because of his ‘politics’ (Hunter, 1961: 564). 
 
Almost forty years later, in Mpondoland in the 1960s the mountain comes into focus 
once again. Leonard Mdingi, one of the organisers of the Mpondo Revolts believed 
that the hill was a space of peace and blessing by the ancestors where one could 
discuss matters; they met on Ndlovu Hill (Beinhardt, 2011: 101). The Khongo was 
said to have branches in Bizana, Lusikisiki, Thonduke, and Dundee and was 
represented by RM Tutshane at the AAC annual conference in 1948 (Drew, 2011: 
70). According to Mbeki, the mountain committee and Ikhongo was indeed the same 
council, known for their resistance to Bantu Authorities as well as setting up of 
people’s courts, the boycotting of grave-digging and funerals for immoral leaders and 
most importantly the diverting of taxes away from the state to a collective fund for the 
poor (Mbeki, 1964: 134)4. When the state set up a commission of inquiry after the 
massacre at Ngquza Hill, people became even more angered because they had 
participated in the commission in the hopes that the state would finally hear them and 
take their grievances seriously (Mbeki, 1963: 122). In many ways, reminiscent of 
                                                        
3 Drew (2011: 70) argues that the ANC in fact had little focus on the rural countryside, and even 
though Mbeki was committed to rural struggle, the Transkei Organising Body (TOB) in which he was 
involved later affiliated itself to the All African Convention (AAC) which was itself affiliated to the 
Non European Unity Movement (NEUM). 
4 Even though Sitas (2011: 183) claims one interviewee, Qabula, thought of the Congo as a white 
man’s fabrication there are many who do believe it existed and have testified to this. 
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imbizos (district meetings with the chief) people attended and presented their 
concerns, when the demands of people were ignored, they rejected the outcomes of 
the commission and stopped paying taxes, diverting them instead to the mountain 
committees and boycotting white traders in Bizana who often doubled as recruiting 
agents for the mines (Mbeki, 1963: 122).  
 
Again we return to why, if this was an extraordinary story, is it left outside 
mainstream history? Some believe it is because of the ANC’s urban bias, or perhaps 
because their influence was not strong in the Transkei during that period (Ntsebeza, 
2011: 6). Perhaps, it is because they were rooted in the urban elite space, that peasants 
in the rural areas appeared backward and still beholden to the kind of traditionalism 
from which they were trying to distance themselves at the time. Or perhaps it was 
because, as Leonard Mdingi said, never about changing the government but rather it 
was about having the government listen and respond to its people. He felt that 
Anderson Ganyile over stressed the influence of the ANC, especially when they had 
failed to respond to pleas for financial help for legal fees (Beinhardt, 2011: 110). The 
gulf between the Mpondo rebels and the ANC deepened after that. By 1981 Rowley 
Arenstein, a Durban based lawyer and activist, who aided the rebels and referred them 
to the ANC, pulled away from the organisation saying he did not think the ANC took 
the rebels seriously and spoke down to them despite the scale and depth of their 
organisation (Beinhardt, 2011: 111). 
 
 
Thus, it was clear that the rebels were, however influenced, organising by themselves, 
outside of the nationalist framework that the ANC was using to wage its own battles 
in the urban centres. It is this ‘non-unitary character of politics,’ what Guha (1997: 
xvi) refers to as “the other domain,” of history “treated in dominant discourse as of no 
importance or as altogether non-existent” which Westaway (1993:103) highlights in 
the discourse on resistance in Western Mpondoland. He argues that while Bundy and 
Beinhardt are concerned with the “realm of the parochial, every day, spontaneous 
rural struggles” (Westaway 1993: 106), social historians like Hendricks and De Wet 
fail to consider the everyday resistance that occurred in western Mpondoland as 
‘proper’ resistance. By privileging only big insurrections and mass forms of actions 
Hendricks and de Wet are de facto “insisting that resistance has a typical form 
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(which) results in failure to recognise countless activities as instants of resistance” 
and simultaneously casting the people of Western Mpondoland as submissive. In fact 
by discounting these ordinary weapons of the weak, history of the peasant revolts 
takes on exactly that character which James C Scott is warning us against.  
 
Yet, Hendricks continues this line of thought even in his co-authored 2011 article, 
tellingly entitled All Quiet on the Western Front: Nyandeni Acquiescence in the 
Mpondoland Revolt. Even while he mentions that there was in fact some resistance in 
Mpondoland, like fence cutting, he diminishes their significance by declaring these 
were “symbolic resistance – akin to damaging telephone poles and obstructing roads 
with stones – rather than objections to fences as such” (Hendricks and Peires 2011: 
134). What he means by “rather than objections to fences as such” remains extremely 
unclear since fences were a huge part of betterment policies which people, in Eastern 
and Western Mpondoland alike, opposed and about which they were not consulted 
(see Mbeki 1963, Westaway 1993). Fence cutting, in fact, has always been a powerful 
revolt against enclosure of the commons throughout history. E.P Thompson (1991: 
119), describes fence-cutting as being “stubbornly maintained as a lawful assertion of 
right” in which people revolted against the enclosure of commons to which they felt 
was a common right to be respected in accordance with custom.  
 
Hendricks and Peires, (2011: 137) later qualify what they mean by saying, “It is 
apparent therefore, that widespread hostility to Rehabilitation and Bantu Authorities 
existed in the west as well as the east but was insufficient in itself to trigger a 
comparable revolt.” This certainly does raise questions around what counts as revolt 
or resistance and what doesn’t? If we are to take seriously the idea of the subaltern 
project and its focus on everyday struggles then we must level the critique within this 
realm.  
 
It is in this domain of the everyday, where we find the letter writing and attempts to 
seek justice, in what Mbeki (1983: 101) calls a rigged legal system. People spent 
money to contact lawyers, to seek representation and to be heard even if that meant 
mobilising through the system. In some ways this worked, sometimes to the benefit of 
people and in other times not, but there was definitely a two way relation between 
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state power and rural resistance and the direction and nature of rural resistance 
impacted directly on the strategies used by the state (Westaway, 1993: 107).  
Thus, every ‘little’ resistance made up the event that we today consider the Mpondo 
Revolts, which culminated in the violence of 6th June 1960 that could have been 
avoided if the everyday concerns were taken seriously by the chiefs and the state. It is 
these attempts to participate in the political and for people to have their voices heard 
that must also count as part of an attempt to alter an unjust system.  
 
The disciplining of history then, requires a reciprocal ‘radical different perspective’. 
What we witnessed in the Mpondo Revolts was that ultimately no one party, no one 
group was able to take responsibility for leadership or to substitute itself for the will 
of the people. It is in this ‘other domain,’ where popular resistance is framed by moral 
codes and custom and what Guha (1997: xviii) describes “as idioms derived from the 
communitarian experience of living and working together.” The Mpondo Revolts 
cannot be seen merely as a revolt against betterment schemes and state policy, since 
there exists a whole sphere of complex nodes of resistance that coalesce around the 
dignity of space, the right to be heard and against the enclosure of the commons.  
 
Yet within the attempts to reclaim these narratives from hegemonic elite nationalist 
discourse, is another sphere of banalisation and silencing which remains to be 
uncovered, documented and thematised within the discourse of the peasant’s revolt.  
 
The other, ‘Other domain’ 
 
'The familiar is not necessarily the known', said Hegel. Let us go farther and say that 
it is in the most familiar things that the unknown - not the mysterious - is at its richest 
and that this rich content of life is still beyond our empty darkling consciousness, 
inhabited as it is by impostors, and gorged with the forms of pure reason, with myths 
and their illusory poetry.      - Henri Lefebvre, 
Critiquing the Everyday, Volume 1 
 
What forms of rich life remain beyond our “empty darkling conscious”? One such is 
perhaps, the reproduction of life itself and the forms of erasure, which it has 
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undergone. This can be seen significantly in the work of the mainstream accounts of 
the Mpondo Revolts. While Ntsebeza and Kepe make apology for the lack of 
women’s voices in their edited volume Rural Resistance in South Africa: The Mpondo 
Revolts after Fifty Years, none of them seem to be interested in incorporating these 
other histories of marginalised voices into the narrative. With the exception of Ari 
Sitas in the volume who interviews a woman trade unionist in Natal, the others seem 
to be fine with apologising for the gap in their literature written with almost 53 years 
hindsight, while still claiming to be undoing the marginalisation of rural voices.  
 
Mbeki (1963:17) makes the well-known point that voting lines in the 1963 Transkei 
elections were telling made up of women and elderly people because most of the 
young men had gone to the mines and secondary industries. Yet he fails to account for 
the organisation and protection of the commons so evident in Moodie’s (1994) 
accounts of men on the mines resisting proletarianisation and relying on their wives to 
keep the imizi going in their absence as they sent money home. In fact, the 
amaMpondo were known to prefer the mines because they had food and 
accommodation paid for so they could save more money to send home (Moodie, 
1994: 106).  
 
Women did not only keep the homesteads going in the absence of fathers, husbands 
and brothers. Women were also drivers of direct action during the Mpondo revolts. 
The boycotts organised in Bizana, against white traders in the 1960s, lasted for six 
months (Beinhardt 2011:106) and as in Marikana shop owners were approached for 
money to help with food and legal fees. In Bizana, those who did not offer assistance 
were boycotted. The boycott has often been a very successful mode of resistance in 
South Africa from the boycotts of red meat and Simba Chips to Colgate during 
apartheid - often when factory workers went on strike it was matched by a community 
boycott of the factory product (Naidoo, 2010: 86). Women, the household keepers, 
are often at the centre of these activities and make decisions about which household 
good to buy and where to buy them. They are certainly the ones who keep these 
boycotts alive. They also, through their other subsistence activities keep people alive, 
and yet there is little acknowledgement of these political decisions taken on a daily 
basis. 
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For the last two centuries at the very least, planting and harvesting (before the 
introduction of ploughs) have always been, what Victor Poto, Paramount Chief of 
Western Pondoland aptly described as “women’s work” (Hunter, 1961: 74). Usually 
when a woman joined a family in Mpondoland, whether she was the first, second or 
third wife, she would be allocated her own plot of land, as was customary. This is the 
land from which she would cultivate, harvest, and then cook meals for her family, 
with the help of other women who formed collective working parties during planting 
and harvesting seasons and eventually her youngest son would inherit her property 
(Hunter, 1961: 20-25). Cattle (and sheep), which used to be at the heart of agrarian 
economies were usually looked after and herded by men. Women would have to look 
after pigs, chickens, goats, fetch water up to three or four times a day, collect 
firewood, clean the umzi which included re-plastering floors with dung, weed fields, 
cook and were involved in various arts and craft making (Hunter, 1961: 102 -106). In 
addition, it is estimated that already by 1929, 46.7% of males over the age of 18 were 
away from home doing migrant labour (Hunter, 1961: 108). It is this agricultural 
labour and building of the umzi, to which men contributed wages and little else, 
which, goes unacknowledged in the literature and in accounts of ‘work’ and 
resistance. This is evident in Ntsebeza and Kepe’s (2011) book and even in historical 
accounts of the reserves (see Lacey, 1981), which focus on policy rather than people. 
Yet, at the heart of the revolts was the protection of the commons and at the root of 
theorisation about the reserve subsidy is agricultural production, of which women are 
at the center. Federici (2008: 92), has already problematized the unwaged and 
devalued nature of this invisible work and how it adds value to the household, yet it 
becomes more stark in the case of Mpondoland and the Transkei at large because of 
the demographic of people who performed most of the agricultural labour. Since most 
men were at the mines, it was women who bore the burden of agricultural production 
and care work even after men return from the mines (see Roberts, 2009).   
 
 While there are detailed analyses of some organisers of Mpondo revolts, like 
Anderson Ganyile and Leonard Mdingi, no mention is made of any details of people 
involved in or organisational detail of events like the boycott of cattle dipping, a 
contentious issue in the reserves at the time of betterment and then stabilisation in 
1954. Even though Mdingi clearly states that they joined the cattle dip boycott, which 
was organised by the women in Ixopo who stoned the dip tanks (Beinhardt, 2011: 
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100) there remains no detailed account of this in mainstream literature. Later on his 
chapter, Beinhardt (2011: 104) asks his interviewees about the mountain or hill 
committees:  “Were women allowed to attend? To which Mdingi replies, “No no, no 
women were there I think this stems from the traditionalist point of view that men will 
meet and discuss the affairs of the community and women are only told what has been 
decided upon.” In his analysis, Beinhardt (2011: 104) says, “They missed the irony 
about lack of consultation.” Yet, Beinhardt seems to miss the irony of his own 
assertions that women were clearly being silenced and marginalised by men in the 
mountain committee while interviewing someone who was saying that men were 
supporting their boycotts and even respecting prayer time in their mountain 
committees. Furthermore, not only does it ignore tradition and custom as a reason for 
this exclusion (not asked), it denies that women had other spheres of political activity 
not shared by men, which does not preclude any communication between them as is 
clear from the few mentions of women’s involvement. As Mdingi said in his 
interview, “most people were not Christian but accepted the importance of a prayer:  
“It was mostly the women who go to church.” This custom is revisited in chapter four, 
where men and women in Marikana speak about different spheres of political activity 
for men and women and why only men were allowed to go to the koppie.  
 
Beinhardt’s analysis unfortunately slips into the mode of second wave white feminist 
discourse. Gasa (2007: 214) speaks specifically to the issue of silencing raised by 
Beinhardt by first highlighting the inadequacy of feminist scholarship that sees at its 
core asking questions about or paying careful attention to gender stratification or 
sexual division of labour in one’s analysis of social relations and hierarchies; 
secondly she states that the issue has never been about silencing, especially amongst 
black South African women in the 50s and 60s. Rather during this period, the women 
were loud and articulate and thus the issue was whether they were being listened to as 
opposed to whether they were silenced. Saying that the women were absent at the 
meetings should not be taken as evidence for their silencing, especially since it is 
clearly the case that they were involved in various activities like boycotts, food 
organisation, farming and were not being politically silenced rather there is a whole 
‘other domain’ of political activity ignored and therefore silenced in the literature. 
What is described in the historiography as the political activities of the Mpondo 
Revolt, which I have argued point to a subaltern sphere of politics, still precludes 
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women from this political realm because their actions are either silenced, banalised or 
domesticated by their sex.  
 
For instance, Mbeki describes how “Women played an active part in the campaign 
against Bantu Authorities. They remained at home when men took to the hills, and 
raised the war cry to mark the arrival of police land rovers. They wore black to show 
that Pondoland was in mourning. They refrained from any action that might bring 
strife” (Mbeki, 1964: 125). 
 
Furthermore, in Zeemont in 1951, the women of Dinokama protested when the 
National Party government tried to depose their chief for not imposing pass laws on 
the women in that area. When Verwoerd sent Chief Moiloa a letter ordering him to 
tell his wife to carry a pass, he wrote back saying, “Who the hell is this Verwoerd? I 
have never heard of him before. Why is the government interfering with other 
people’s wives?” (Gasa 2007: 226). The point is well made; resistance was never 
levelled purely on one plane. While it would be impossible to claim that women in the 
reserves under apartheid enjoyed absolute autonomy, this is also because they were 
living under a racist repressive regime. Furthermore, woman has never, as a sex, 
enjoyed absolute autonomy in the history of humankind, not even from her own body, 
Simone de Beaviour makes this point extremely well in The Second Sex, but she has 
always made attempts to assert her autonomy.  
 
This implies then, that Beinhardt, and other historians writing at the time were at 
pains to provide dignity in the way of detail to men of the Mpondo revolts and yet 
continue to silence women with statements like those. We also know that women 
were used as casual labour in the reserves and paid substantially less than men and 
that they, like the men, were required to do unpaid forced labour by assisting in 
building government infrastructure (Mbeki: 1964: 98, Gibbs, 2010). Yet the added 
burden of being women meant they were also required to cook for the men who were 
labouring: there were no provisions and they had to find the food themselves, “even if 
her own children go without, they (the government) do not care” (Mbeki, 1964: 99).  
 
This is one of the only accounts of women in compulsory labour, yet it also fails to 
link this to the way in which the government curtailed women’s movements by 
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introducing passes so they could reserve secretarial and other “women’s jobs” for 
poor white women (Lacey, 1981: 270). Even when black labour was required in the 
towns, the single-occupation, males only, mine –compound style housing was so 
designed to keep the family and wives in the reserves (Lacey 1981: 269), which suited 
some neo-tribalists just fine.  
What is extremely surprisingly is that accounts of a peasant revolts at the center of 
which are struggles for land and for agrarian production should have so little account 
of women. Or that “the women” are referred to as a homogenous entity who don’t 
need the kind of detail or complexity afforded to men who were on the front lines. 
 
It has historically been women who are the agrarian producers of the world. Most 
anti-systemic struggles have not been fought primarily by industrialised workers but 
by the rural, indigenous, anti-colonial, anti-apartheid feminist movements of the 
world (Federici, 2008:92). Anti-apartheid feminist movements here, refers to a 
broader movement of women who understand the global intersection of race, class 
and gender politics and the need to struggle against all three forms of domination at 
the same time. Silvia Federici (2008: 127) says that “women are the subsistence 
farmers of the planet – they make up the bulk of subsistence but this hard to measure 
because it is unwaged, unmeasured and often not considered work.” Following Marx, 
some Marxist historians have sometimes unproblematically taken up the capitalist 
criteria for what constitutes work (Federici, 2008: 95), yet women’s contributions in 
the Eastern Cape have always been central to subsistence and keeping families alive. 
Later, this notion of the commons, which men and women both invest in, which has 
shifted and evolved over the years will be discussed in further detail. What is 
significant here however, is that there is evidence that women were involved in 
political activities and subsistence work during the Mpondo revolts which has 
remained on the peripheries of history. So much so, that we are unable to fill many of 
the gaps in the history of women’s organisation during this period.  
 
What is clear from the literature however is that the Mpondo Revolts were organised 
by ordinary peasants, disciplined, and militant. These struggles were about daily 
issues in the lives of people: arable land, culling of stock, fencing of land. It was not 
the surge towards equitable industrialisation by the proletariat trying to capture state 
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power, it was the defence of the commons, a resistance to proletarianisation. There 
was no ideology other than the right to be heard and a right to the commons. The 
centrality of the question of land and the way in which people identified with their 
land and space is evident in their struggles for it. The Mpondo revolts took the 
authorities by surprise, none of the chiefs thought that they would ever be burned out 
of their huts or that traditional councils would be boycotted and money, political faith 
and hope would be put in the hands of peasant organised mountain committees. It is 
clear also that these were community collective efforts to ensure the continuation of 
the way of life that people were used to and the kind of society they wanted to live in. 
People opposed the tribal authorities system not merely, because they were unhappy 
about Bantu Authorities, but also because of the lack of consultation, lack of 
information and lack of consideration of what people wanted. Their participation in 
meetings and even in the commission after the massacre shows their willingness to be 
involved in decision-making processes. Yet, their concerns were not taken seriously. 
The cultural political tools which were used in the Mpondo revolts to assert political 
claims and to express anger and discomfort were not merely limited to Mpondoland 
or the Transkei, and made their way to the mines with the young and old men who 
went back and forth for many years.  
 
This chapter has provided a historical account of the creation of the migrant labour 
system as a direct result of the Native Land Act and Reserve Policies of the colonial 
and Apartheid governments. It has highlighted how people resisted betterment, 
corrupt chief systems, and the apartheid state through a subaltern sphere of politics 
that is outside of liberal and reductionist Marxist understandings of resistance and 
struggle. The way in which people resisted proletarianisation does not follow the 
linear historical trajectories outlined by economistic class analysis. It therefore 
requires an examination beyond economistic understandings and an attempt to reveal 
the internal logic of culture and custom of Mpondoland that informed the subaltern 
political sphere of action. This is revealed through re-visting past and recent 
historiography. It also, however, pointed to a gap, even in recent attempts, to give 
voice to a silenced history of peasant revolts in which the work, resistance, and 
contributions to struggle by women are missing from the historiography. This lack of 
knowledge does not allow us to gain a fuller picture of all kinds of political 
organisation and activity that was occurring in Mpondoland and how the struggles of 
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men and women, sometimes separate, sustained each other. The rich historiography 
that does exist on the Mpondo Revolts however, allows us to make certain links 
between this mode of politics and the mode of politics present on the mines during the 
years before unionisation and then after the breakdown of the NUM at Lonmin in 
2012. This will be examined in detail in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Three: Mpondo Men on the Mines: Mmereko for Tiro 
 
The last chapter discussed some of the cultural political tools peasants used during the 
Mpondo Revolts in the 1960s, which reveal a hidden history of a subaltern sphere of 
politics that is excluded from elite nationalist historiography, and which focuses 
largely on urban-centric modernist narratives of resistance. It also highlighted the way 
in which recent attempts at making this sphere of political resistance visible exposes a 
gender – biased historiography where women’s contributions to resistance and 
political life in the South African rural countryside still, remain muted. Further, it 
pointed to a long history of migrant labour between the former Transkei, particularly 
Mpondoland, to the South African gold and later platinum mines.  
 
This chapter performs three functions. Firstly, it further explores the notion of 
silencing within nationalist historiography by examining the historiography of worker 
organisation by several South African labour historians. It offers a critique of some 
labour history that relies on nationalist modernist - trade union narrative to write a 
history of mineworkers’ political organisation and activity on the mines. It argues that 
apart from a brief period of unionisation in 1946 the NUM only arrived on South 
African mines in 1984, consequently the space between these periods cannot be a 
political vacuum which is filled purely by a national liberation narrative, particularly 
because migrant labourers mostly came from rural areas. What becomes clearer as 
one reads the history of labour in South Africa is that the emphasis on nationalism, 
trade unionism and the state seem to be transposed onto the history of earlier periods 
of worker organisation in the country. This labour historiography does not 
acknowledge or include the cultural, social, and political influences of the context 
from which migrant labourers come. It therefore imposes purely modernist and 
economistic frameworks onto a period where formal trade unionism is absent. 
Secondly, it analyses the influence of culture and custom on the political organisation 
of workers and considers what space there exists in the literature for this kind of 
analysis. Lastly, it points to a return to cultural and subaltern forms of political 
organisation and political expression on the mines during the 2012 strikes across the 
platinum belt and particularly in Marikana, given the failure of the NUM and 
workers’ loss of faith in the union.  
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The Limitations of a Modernist and Nationalist Reading of South African 
Labour History  
 
Since there is a clear gap between the brief establishment of the African Mineworkers 
Union (AMWU) in 1946 and the arrival of the National Union of Mineworkers 
(NUM) in 1982 worker resistance cannot be attributed to trade unionism or the 
national liberation struggle alone. It is true that union politics came to reflect national 
politics in the country after the 1970s: the 1973 Durban Strikes were the beginning of 
an attempt to form a mass-based political union that soon aligned itself with national 
liberation movements. It must be stressed though that the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM) only came to the mines in the early 1980s. Mining companies, 
like Anglo and De Beers, which had previously rejected the idea of black 
unionisation, began to allow union organising as part of broader re-structuring of 
worker controls in preparation for the coming post –apartheid political order.  
 
The years from 1948 to 1982 are thus usually filled with a nationalist narrative of 
struggle, as if there were a political void on the mines between the two periods where 
poor uneducated black mineworkers were waiting to once again become unionised 
and therefore politicised. If the history between these two periods is re-read, then a 
different perspective begins to emerge, where mineworkers were practicing more 
organic and horizontal forms of democracy by employing the cultural political tools 
from home to the new political and social context in which they found themselves. It 
is here that we can once again locate the subaltern sphere of politics in the history of 
amaMpondo people.  
 
Aside from the African Mineworkers Union (AMWU) in the early to mid-1940s, 
African workers were not allowed membership to any unions between these two 
periods (see Moodie, 1994, Van der Walt, 2007, Buhlungu, 2009). For many labour 
historians, who rely on unionism as the basis for worker action and progress, the 
history of the labour movement then focuses on these two periods, and there is usually 
a lull between them. Dunbar Moodie (2007: 164) makes this point well in his review 
of the three-volumes of A History of Black Mineworkers in South Africa, 
commissioned by the NUM and written by Vic Allen, which remains a foundational 
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text on labour history because of the lack of a comprehensive history of the NUM and 
mineworkers more generally:  
 
If one insists, as Allen seems to, that organized worker resistance can be 
expressed only through a union, one ends up unable adequately to explain the 
1922 strike and is left to scramble around for every little tidbit one can find to 
exaggerate the importance of the AMWU in 1946. The second volume deals 
with the "interregnum" between 1948 and 1982. There were no unions on the 
mines during this period, so Allen takes a detour into more general South 
African history, dealing especially with the rise of independent unions and the 
Soweto student uprising, to move his reader from the 1946 strike on the mines 
to the establishment of the NUM in 1982. 
 
Furthermore Moodie (2007: 163) critiques Allen’s reliance on purely structural 
understandings of mineworkers’ lives, even after having done extensive research with 
NUM ordained access to informants, which meant in Moodie’s own words that “the 
significance of the life histories of his informants was lost on him; to ask the right 
questions, one needs to know the specificities of events.” Thus, the daily struggles of 
people in the compounds and the social and cultural contexts of their lives outside of 
it “are reduced to "the monotonous uniformity" of miners' lives "over the last 90 
years," (Moodie, 2007: 163). This methodology endures until today. 
 
One example of over emphasising structural analysis and the national narrative can be 
seen in the work of Sakhela Buhlungu. In his article, The Rise and Decline of the 
Democratic Organisational Culture in the South African Labour Movement, 1973- 
2000, Buhlungu (2009) argues that the democratic culture or what he calls union 
democracy was born out of the 1970s moment, in which black consciousness and the 
1973 Durban strikes played a huge part in influencing trade union culture and 
practice. For him this was modelled on notions of union democracy in Britain and the 
United States but took its shape from the experience of black trade unions from 1900s 
to the 1970s (Buhlungu, 2009: 91). Thus union democracy formed part of the political 
and ideological counterculture of the broader liberation movement, which “sought to 
demonstrate the movements’ moral and political superiority over racial discrimination 
and apartheid by operating in a democratic fashion” (Buhlungu, 2009: 91). He 
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attributes the rise of this kind of union democracy to apartheid state repression, which 
had crushed AMWU and other trade unions before, making it extremely difficult for 
militant mobilisation within black trade unions. Consequently, “It was within this 
context that a democratic culture or union democracy became useful. Union activists 
learned that a union that relied on a few charismatic leaders was more vulnerable than 
one with layers of active members and democratically elected leaders” (Buhlungu, 
2009: 94) which later led to the concept of worker-control fiercely defended in the 
unions till today. There is no attempt to show that this was already the praxis of 
democracy by migrant labourers before the arrival of the NUM or formal 
unionisation, since a having a few leaders was often a dangerous practice and made it 
easier for management to identity and intimidate workers.  
 
While Buhlungu (2009:107/108), in the last two pages of the article, mentions that 
these democratic practices cannot be considered outside of the cultural and traditional 
milieu in which they took root, there is no mention by what is meant by this cultural 
milieu and furthermore there is no attempt to understand the period of organisation 
between the 1940s and 1970s, where there were a great many battles being fought on 
the mines daily, before and after the arrival of unions. Bulungu, in an entirely 
modernist argument, assumes that democracy only comes out of the Durban moment 
and not pre-colonial practices, even though as the last chapter has shown, there is a 
large body of evidence for the various democratic practices amongst rural 
amaMpondo people and the subaltern sphere of politics which this occupied.  
 
In the last chapter also, the influence of the Industrial and Commercial Workers 
Union (ICU) was briefly discussed, but it is important to return to this history because 
in many ways it offers us something outside of the nationalist labour history presented 
by many and it is often seen as the root of black trade unionism in South Africa. 
Lucien Van der Walt (2007), reiterates that we cannot take the state as the sole 
analytical tool when speaking about labour history in South and Southern Africa, 
because of the transnational character of this labour history which  “played a critical 
role in shaping working-class movements, which straddled borders and formed 
sections across the region and beyond it” and because “ideological, ethnic and racial 
divides within the working class across southern Africa played a more important role 
in constituting divisions than state borders.” Van der Walt (2007) discusses the way 
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the ICU spread throughout the Southern African region from South Africa to what is 
now Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, in which migrant workers and educated 
elites set up branches of the ICU in various ports and carried news between Kaladie in 
South Africa, himself born in Nyasaland (Malawi) and educated in mission schools, 
and other organisers. Furthermore, global influences like Garveyism, the International 
Workers of the World (IWW) and International Socialist League (ISL), which also 
had some influence on the culture of the trade union, ran almost counter to the politics 
of white labourism. White labourism, which arrived with white workers from 
Australia and soon had a local South African practice combining labourite 
parliamentary socialism with a commitment to white supremacy soon spread from 
South Africa northwards to other white workers in Mozambique, Northern and 
Southern Rhodesia, the Congo and South West Africa (Namibia) (Van der Walt, 
2007: 228).  
 
What Van der Walt illustrates is that although European models of trade unionism 
influenced the ICU, as with trade unions in the 70’s and 80’s (see Buhlungu, 2009), 
there was a confluence of transnational actors, influences and politics that came 
together and made up the history of the ICU, which cannot be patterned along state 
borders, especially because these borders were often not present at the time. 
Accordingly, he describes the movement and culture of the ICU by the “human rivers 
of labour flowing within the sub-continent (which) profoundly shaped the spread of 
the ICU northwards from South Africa and gave it an additional element of 
transnationalism” (Van der Walt, 2007: 240). Yet, even in some narratives of the ICU, 
the stress on its ‘transnational’ nature does not leave space for a discussion about the 
way in which the union was no doubt infused with the cultural traditions of the people 
who constituted it.   
 
While it is impossible to attribute the trade union movement and labour history in 
South Africa to one element, as can be gleaned from the discussion above, what is 
clear is that the discussions around labour movements today fail to adequately 
consider the various influences on the ICU and further, what happened when unions 
like ICU and AMWU came to a quick end. It appears that structural analysis alone 
cannot offer us a comprehensive history about the origins of union democracy or 
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worker-control and attributing it to national liberation narratives or modernist theory 
seems to be inadequate a framework of understanding.  
 
As a result, reducing this history to an elite nationalist dialectic does two things: 
firstly, it creates a modernist narrative that is shaped by economistic understandings 
of progress and organisation; secondly and consequently, it creates a masculinist 
historiography in which gender is attributed purely to culture and not, also, as a 
constituent part of the project of nationalism itself.  
 
For example, in another article entitled: Union Solidarity Under Stress: The Case of 
the National Union of Mineworkers in South Africa, Buhlungu and Bezuidenhout 
(2008: 267-268) trace the way the NUM’s politics shifted from Black Consciousness, 
of which Cyril Ramaphosa was a follower to the more congressional and charterist 
politics of Elijah Barayi during its integration into the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU) in 1985. This shift also heralded the NUM and COSATU’s 
close alliance with ANC politics and the national liberation struggle and a shift from 
worker-control to a more centralised and leadership based union politics 
(Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu (2008: 268).  
 
While they outline the problems inherent in this shift, as well as the changing nature 
of union politics after 1994, ‘gender’ which “remains a blind-spot’ in the union, is 
attributed to the way in which NUM’s members “traditionally drew on a masculine 
sense of pride for their solidarity” (Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu, 2008: 279). While 
masculinity and gender will be discussed later, it is also important to note there was 
not an uncontested tradition of masculinity within the trade union movement in South 
Africa5.  
                                                        
5 In her article, Generations of Struggle: Trade Unions and the Roots of Feminism, Iris Berger traces 
the feminist tradition present in the unions in the 1980s to its roots in militant family histories and 
women who were doing and saying the same in the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union in the 
1930s. When the ICU started to admit and focus on drawing more women into the union. It was 
through the militancy of Charlotte Maxeke and others, that the ICU was pushed to take gender equality 
more seriously within the union (Berger, 2008: 187), which had a fair membership of female workers. 
This was a period in which African women; leaving the rural areas and entering the towns to eek out 
their own living were not willing to be passive in the face of state repression. 
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The masculinity inherent in trade union politics today, which will be re-visited later, 
takes a particular form especially after the 1970s in South African society and the 
arrival of young proletarianised youth on the mines. Perhaps it would be more apt to 
discuss the issue of masculinity and the challenges it poses for women on the mines 
today by more closely examining the shift in politics in South Africa after the 1970s 
and the masculine form which nationalism often takes. Moodie (1994) discusses at 
length the different forms masculinity took on the male-dominated mines up to the 
1970s and how this was based on men who were investing in their rural homesteads, 
which they would return to when their contracts on the mine had ended.  
 
So while one there is obviously a need to read labour history in the context of the 
socio-political context at the time, the national narrative has its limitations, and it fails 
to offer enough explanation as to the culture of worker organisation in the long 
periods before unionisation. It is here that we must return to the cultural political tools 
and the subaltern sphere of politics that existed amongst amaMpondo on the mines 
before the arrival of the NUM in 1982.  
 
The Cultural, Social, and Political Setting on South African Mines before the 
NUM 
 
Mbeki (1964), Moodie (1994) and Hendricks (2011) describe amaMpondo people as 
historically proud and loyal to (legitimate) authority. On the mines in the 
Witwatersrand, the compounds were ethnically divided and the system of 
management paralleled that of the Bantustan. It is important to note that the 
continuities between ethnically segregated reserves and ethnically segregated 
compounds on the mines allow us to make very clear observations about this period, 
this becomes far more fluid and nuanced after the 1970s. Many of the people who 
came from Mpondoland lived together and shared news from home and it was 
amaMpondo men from the Transkei, who were the known as the rock drillers.  
 
The power structure the men arrived to on the mines was hierarchal. The ethnically 
segregated single-sex male compounds were made up of several rooms, (some of 
which housed up to and more than 16 men in a room). The room official, or isibonga, 
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was an elected representative, usually an older and wiser person chosen by the 
occupants of the room. He would counsel people and take their grievances to the 
induna, this also paralleled systems of patronage in the hierarchy of chiefs who 
surrounded themselves with amaphakati, councillors without whom the chief would 
usually not take decisions (Hunter, 1961: 394). The induna was a mine official and 
there was one induna per every ethnic group who had their own black ‘police boys’ 
who helped maintain “law and order.” It was the induna who reported to the 
compound manager and the compound managers were then accountable to the mine 
manager (Moodie, 1994: 108).  
 
Before the re-structuring of the mines in the 1980s and the arrival of the NUM, most 
mines in South Africa functioned according to what Moodie, following E.P. 
Thompson, describes as ‘the moral economy.’ Moodie (1994: 86) defines moral 
economy as “encompassing mutually acceptable rules for resistance within systems of 
domination and appropriation.” Mineworkers expected certain things from mine 
officials and in return, mine officials came to expect less disruption, violence, or 
strikes from workers. Some of these were: wages comparable to other mines, a decent 
quality of food, fair adjudication of disputes, equal treatment for each ‘tribal category’ 
of workers, and informal rules which involved “a considerable measure of latitude in 
allowing workers private lives of their own in regard to matters such as 
homosexuality, beer brewing, hospitality for visiting friends, dagga smoking and 
other “forbidden practices”” (Moodie, 1994: 86). These informal rules, known as the 
mine ‘imiteto’ were in practice into the 1980s and only began to change in the late 
‘70s and then slowly transformed with the introduction of the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM) in the 1980s. The imiteto consisted of three interlinked levels, 
1) formal rules and regulations; 2) the unwritten but well-established rules by 
supervisors underground (moral economy of the mine) and 3) those less well 
established informal customs among workers which made up migrant cultures 
(Moodie, 1994: 84). The moral economy was not practiced in a cultural vacuum, and 
the experience of the mineworkers, which they brought with them to the mines, 
provided the collective power to enforce it by the internal relations of workers. Such 
mobilisation was not spontaneous but emerged from established social networks 
(Moodie, 1994: 96). These established social networks relied on a sense of cultural 
pride and organisation, something that remains outside of most labour historiography. 
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AmaMpondo people were a powerful group even on the mines, and the only group 
who had adopted their youth organisations to mine life (iindlavini, amaqaba, 
amanene)6 and they were not afraid to fight for their honour which meant that 
complaints by them were taken more seriously on the mine by management. In fact 
amaMpondo people quickly gained a reputation on the mines for being troublemakers 
because of their pride – “they fought so they are not looked down upon. They are also 
seen to be physically stronger” and they became the high-paid rock drillers because of 
this reputation (Moodie, 1994: 184). It would be rock drillers (RDOs), many from the 
former Mpondoland, who would start the strike at Lonmin in 2012.  
 
One of the main functions of migrant cultures on the mines was commitment to the 
independence and satisfaction of patriarchal proprietorship over a rural homestead. 
Home-networks were sustained so that mineworkers could return to their rural lives 
one day, which represented ownership and building of a long- term creative project 
(Tiro) with their wives in the imizi (Moodie, 1994: 20-23). In the 1940’s about 45% 
of amaMpondo mineworkers from Lusikisiki were deferring their pay in full and 
perhaps 60 – 70% of their pay was repatriated (Moodie, 1994: 33). The tension with 
the individual unfulfilling life which is merely represented as a means to an end 
(Mmereko), is representative of a resistance to proletarianisation and a “practical 
integrity that not only is inconceivable outside of social existence but also lived out 
courageously within” (Moodie, 1994: 23).  
 
Reproductive – Work and ‘Traditional’ Masculinity 
 
The joint project of men on the mines sending money home was not merely an 
investment in their future homesteads but also the recognition of the care-work their 
wives would have to perform when they were sent home or when their contracts came 
to an end. While it is true that the introduction of shack settlements and women on the 
mines has changed the spatial setting of the mines, many amaMpondo men (young 
and old) still return to their rural homes when they leave the mines. They depend on 
having a rural home to return to and the care-work of wives when their mining 
                                                        
6For discussion on migrant cultures see Moodie, 1994: 22- 23, 34.  
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contracts end because most of them are discarded and sent back home without any 
retirement or compensation packages even when they are ill. For mineworkers, the 
mines are merely a means to an end that enables them to make their part of the 
contribution to the homestead and to ensure they will be cared for when they return. 
 
In her report on Silicosis amongst former miners in the Eastern Cape, Jaine Roberts 
(2009), gives a devastating account of ex-miners’ lack of access to healthcare and 
information on respiratory diseases in relation to dust prevalent in the mining 
industry. Only 2 out of 205 former mineworkers had gained any knowledge of 
ODMWA (Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act 78 of 1973 as Amended) 
while in mine service, which meant none of them were informed about the possibility 
of compensation for respiratory disease or medical check-ups. From the 205 men who 
had returned from the mines with symptoms of respiratory illness, Roberts (2009:67) 
reports 98% had been married, 83.9% were still married, 10.2% were widowed, and 
3.9% were divorced with only 1.9% single. Most of the men reported that their health 
had deteriorated so badly by the time they returned home from the mines, that their 
wives had to take care of them, find food and prepare it for the family in addition to 
taking care of children (Roberts, 2009: 67, 104). 92.8% of her sample reported that, 
despite the efforts of wives, they experienced hunger and periods of not having food 
monthly with no compensation or medical care from the mines (Roberts, 2009: 129). 
The care work provided by women in rural areas to young children and then to sick 
ex-miners who have returned home is compounded by the lack of access to good 
healthcare or compensation by the mines. Roberts (2009: 85/86) also suggests rock-
drillers are most susceptible to silicosis because of their proximity to dust, as one 
interviewee put it, “They sent the older group home in exchange for strong active 
people, they sent us home, and that was it.”  
 
Mine-work has profoundly shaped the life experience, expectation and health of 
people in the Transkei and often the sick and discarded men, sent back home to the 
rural areas are easily forgotten despite the daily contribution they make to the 
economy of the country. In an article titled, Suicide amongst former mineworkers in 
the sub region of the Transkei, Banwari Meel (2003), tracks stories of returned 
mineworkers, sent home from the mines, unable to find other work because of their 
health and relying on their wives for support. Meel (2003:88) raises the point that 
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there has been no comprehensive study done on mental illness or suicide amongst 
former black mineworkers. In the five case studies that she presents, the suicides 
amongst former mineworkers, and in one case a child of a former mineworker, are 
directly linked to how working in the mines has shaped the life trajectories of people 
in this area. The ex-mineworkers, unable to cope with the reality of life at home, 
commit suicide. Accordingly the focus on the household, or building the umzi, as the 
centre of reproduction was definitely seen as a project in which both men and women 
would have to contribute, the men by working on the mines and sending money 
home, and the women by sustaining the homestead and caring for them when they 
returned. Often the joint nature of the project of building a homestead is missed by 
labour historians who only stress economic and political organisation and fail to see 
or acknowledge how traditional, cultural and social context plays a larger role in a 
collective decision making process.   
 
For instance, the form of masculinity prevalent in trade unions today, is somewhat 
different from what ‘manhood’ represented before the 1980s. The latter was rooted in 
“presiding justly over a homestead and not in ‘warrior’ syndrome’”, much to 
Moodie’s (1994: 38) surprise. In fact, many of the older men interviewed in 1988 
spoke of their wives in rural homesteads, as having ‘ubudoda’ (manhood) which was 
linked to the men’s moral definition of manhood rather than being biologically 
determined. They explained women could have attributes of ‘ubudoda’ especially 
when men were away from the homestead and they had to take on those roles 
(Moodie: 1994: 38). Often the kind of work that is being performed reflects a certain 
gender role that isn’t always tied to sex. In the same interviews which Moodie (1994: 
39) conducted, none of the men agreed that a man could have womanhood, except in 
a metaphorical sense that implied cowardice, although he never probed them as to 
what this meant for younger men in mine marriages.  
 
Mine marriages, also known as Nxontshana marriages, also signify the difference 
between the older generation of migrant mineworkers and the younger more 
proletarianised youth that would come to the mines later and are part of understanding 
how gender functioned differently at the mines, where roles which would usually be 
ascribed to women were performed by younger men. It also highlights the recognition 
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of reproductive labour as care-work and the assumption that the one who performs it 
would need to be compensated in other ways, mostly through material goods.  
 
These mine marriages which were part of the mine imiteto and often functioned 
according to seniority, the older men, especially the izinduna would have their pick of 
the young men who came to the mines, whom they took as wives. These younger men 
would perform ‘wifely duties’ like sewing, or housekeeping and cooking, and the 
older men took ‘care of them providing money, clothes, alcohol and gifts, they would 
also engage in ‘ukumetsha’ or ‘thigh-sex.’ (Moodie, 1994: 122). Although mine 
marriages helped in resisting the ‘temptation’ of town women and the danger of 
becoming amatshipa, then going home to die in poverty and humiliation, one could 
save one’s money to invest in the home as well as stay “faithful in a system in which 
their future lies in what can be built up at home by their wives” (Moodie, 1994: 141). 
In fact, as Moodie (1994: 141) discovered through his interviews with mineworkers, 
even those who took town lovers usually tried to retain their rural links. 
 
Mine marriages were very much a part of the structure of the mines and migrant 
culture, although not everyone took mine wives, it was not a practice that was looked 
down upon, until the arrival of more proletarianised and urban -politicised youth in 
the 1970s who saw mine-marriages and ‘thigh-sex’ as old-fashioned. For them, 
masculinity represented ‘manhood’ not defined through a joint-project of building a 
rural home, but to seize the opportunities to earn higher wages, live in better 
conditions and to create a new world for themselves. Before this, like in the reserves, 
people used their systems of patronage to extract whatever benefits they could from 
the system, which they found themselves in, wanting to merely make enough money 
to send home and eventually leave the mines. For many this is still the goal. 
 
The Political Organisation of amaMpondo Men on the Mines  
 
According to Moodie (1994: 194), amaMpondo men had a wider circle of trust and 
solidarity than did home-friend networks amongst other groups. Although the ethnic 
assertiveness grounded in their firm networks on the mines gave them a reputation, 
especially when faction fights broke out, the other accounts of Mpondo pride and 
loyalty to authority makes one wonder whether the illegitimacy of the mine 
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management system is perhaps what made amaMpondo more violent than they were 
back home, especially given the moral outrage at Botha Sigcau’s Chieftaincy and the 
way in which Dunbar Moodie describes the moral economy on the mines. 
 
Moodie (1994: 86/87) explains that in many instances compromise had to be reached 
through speaking and engaging directly with management when interventions at 
induna or isibonga level failed. Outside of any formal unionisation, it is evident then 
that mineworkers turned to other forms of organisation outside of the trade union 
tradition and fused cultural forms of political organisation with the new space in 
which they now found themselves at the mines. It is here that we can locate various 
continuities with the subaltern sphere of politics taking place before and during the 
Mpondo revolts and the way in which these political tools were carried over to the 
mines when Mpondo migrant labourers had to deal with conflicts in the work place.  
 
Moodie (1994: 88) outlines the way in which collective action was frequently used 
against injustice at the compounds, even though protests sometimes turned violent  
“such violence was generally directed against mine property that represented the 
source of the grievance” and compound manager feared the wrath of the mine 
manager if workers were not kept happy (Moodie, 1994: 89).  
 
Yet, before 1973, violence was rare and Moodie (1994: 92) remarks that even though 
there were thousands of mineworkers present in the compounds over many years, 
“gold miners were remarkably disciplined in expressing grievances and turned to 
violence against management only when representation by other means failed.”  
Moodie’s accounts of worker action echo some accounts of the Mpondo Revolts 
where people as Mbeki noted, remained extremely disciplined and adhered to a plan 
of action that was collectively discussed and decided upon. He outlines the way in 
which the police were always ready to intervene on behalf of the mines, and on 19 
July, 1928, in a classic case on Van Ryn Deep, mostly isiXhosa-speaking workers 
bypassed the compound manager, indunas, black mine police and gathered on the 
lawn to approach the general manager himself. They wanted to speak to the manager 
only and refused to leave until he appeared. Only one person was arrested, even after 
they retreated to the bushes and got sticks and stones and threw them at the police. 
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The ONE person arrested was sentenced to three months hard labour (Moodie, 1994: 
90, my emphasis).  
 
Again in June 1974 at Harmony Mine workers complained about wages being 
increased on the other mines but not theirs. The Chamber of Mines met hastily in 
Johannesburg and implemented increases immediately. Wages had been unequally 
rising and this immediately brought wages into contention along moral economy lines 
(Moodie, 1994: 244). Eight years later, in 1982, when wage increases on Gold Fields 
and Gencor mines were only half as much as Anglo American mines, almost all the 
mines controlled by the former erupted in violence (Moodie, 1994: 244). Thus 
Moodie (1994: 244) concludes “Although we have few details about how Gold Fields 
and Gencor mines organised in 1982, worker behaviour made it clear that differences 
between wage increases amended by the different mining houses were at the heart of 
the action, once again the moral outrage at the inequities between these mines had 
inspired militant protest demonstrations”.  
 
The tradition of meeting on the mountain was definitely carried over to the mines and 
it is a thread that seems to run through the history of mineworker revolts until today. 
In the early years before the arrival of the NUM and then even after unionisation, 
people would go to the mountain in difficult times to discuss work matters and the 
way forward, or to show their discontent. In 1973, 200 machine drillers at Western 
Deep Mine refused to go underground and wanted to meet with management, they 
went to the hill to discuss, when they came down they had decided to try to stop the 
nightshift, the mine police opened fire on them killing 12 people and wounding 28 
(Moodie, 1994: 246).  
 
What are the possibilities for understanding the way in which workers organised 
before the entrance of the NUM on the mines? Perhaps a starting point is the striking 
continuity between practices of collective action and the demand to be heard directly 
by the authorities. People in Mpondoland and workers on the mines placed great 
significance on appearing in person to meetings and to address gatherings, they were 
often suspicious of people who brought letters, not only because many were illiterate 
but because voting was not the favoured mode of democracy in large meetings 
(Beinhardt, 2011: 105). This is again reminiscent of the importance placed on imbizos 
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(mass district meetings) in Mpondoland where, ‘consultation,’ “means discussion 
until some measure of agreement is reached. In accordance with custom in law courts 
and traditional meetings no vote is taken, rather the matter is thrashed out until some 
compromise is reached (Hunter, 1961: 26). This was characterised by the proverb, 
Isaala kutyelwa siva ngolophu, which meant, “He who refuses to take advice hears by 
a hot wind” (Hunter, 1961: 26).  
 
When electing leaders on the mines it was consensus that was stressed, often people 
would talk for hours until they agreed on a leader, if there were two favourites and no-
one could decide on one often a third candidate whom everyone agreed on was 
chosen to avoid factions (Moodie, 1994: 260). This seems somewhat in contrast to 
Buhlungu’s (2009: 92) claim that most commentators on union democracy have 
tended to stress ‘formal’ aspects like elections and attendance at meetings, rather than 
more ‘substantive’ aspects. For him, “this preoccupation with formal aspects of union 
democracy fails to comment on the growing instrumental orientation of current 
practices of union democracy, namely, that union activities more generally tend to 
focus more narrowly on collective bargaining” (Buhlungu, 2009: 92). Yet the 
evidence which Moodie (1994) provides is that the stress on meeting attendance and 
elections (with democratic consensus not voting) presented organic forms of 
democracy which amaMpondo miners were already accustomed to from home. This 
more organic and horizontal praxis of democracy occurs in a subaltern sphere of 
politics which is missed by modernist interpretations of worker action because it takes 
place in a different forms from what Guha describes as the “official domain.” 
Recognising these different forms not only allows for an understanding of how they 
function to deepen democracy but also provides a critique of the kinds of labour 
historiography which assumes that mineworkers were unpoliticised and inactive 
during the period between 1946 and 1982. Or further, that they were introduced to 
democratic practices and ideas of worker control exclusively though the unions.  
 
What started in rural Mpondoland was carried over to the mines in a different form 
yet consensus was the dominant mode of interaction. Often when people felt their 
grievances were not taken seriously by the induna, whom they felt was already 
illegitimate because he was not popularly elected, they would inform their isibonga 
(Moodie: 1994:  88). People would gather, sometimes in thousands, outside the 
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compound managers office, sit, and wait until he noticed and sent someone to talk to 
them and hear their grievances. This usually happened quite promptly since 
compound managers dreaded such meetings because they would bear the wrath of the 
mine manager if workers were unhappy or not at work (Moodie: 1994: 89). Like the 
chiefs in the Mpondo revolts, the manager would have to come and speak to them as 
an equal within the bounds of the moral economy. Often the isibonga would be the 
spokesperson, they avoided choosing leaders and would rather have someone air the 
grievances of the group. In this way, what was most important to the workers, like the 
peasants in the revolt, was to be listened to.  
 
Once again, this contrasts with the picture Buhlungu (2009) paints in which union 
democracy gains momentum and popularity in the 1970s, because of state repression. 
In fact the appearance of the five madodas on the koppie at Marikana once again 
proves not merely the lack of faith in leadership, but also the need to have 
representatives of the people and not decision makers on behalf of the people as well 
as continuity with the politics of the moral economy rather than union democracy. It 
was also a way of protecting themselves against management who may victimise 
leaders of a strike. This moral economy is also evidenced by the way in which chiefs 
were expected to provide their subjects with land and protection in return for work 
and allegiance, which was in no way uncontested if chiefs were seen to be neglecting 
their end of the bargain (see Hunter, 1961, Guy, 2013, Mayer and Mayer, 1961).  
 
This collective memory is not exclusive to migrant labourers at the mines, many 
amaMpondo who left home after the revolts remember them, through personal 
experience or oral history as being a definitive moment in their political education. 
Ari Sitas (2011: 180) recounts interviews with former Transkeians who were now 
migrant labourers in Natal who felt that what was significant was not the material 
defeat of the Mpondo Revolts but the gain of pride in themselves. In fact, fellow non-
Mpondo workers said that they “were stubborn in their hope for freedom” and “shared 
a common trauma based on the brutality of “the experience” which later influenced 
their engagement in trade unions and union organising (Sitas, 2011: 180). The 
amaMpondo came to dominate mine politics because of their strong organisational 
abilities and home-networks, but more importantly because of the compound system, 
which made organising easier since people from the same ethnic groups lived 
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together. Although there is also strong evidence that people also organised on the 
basis of their work teams which were often made up by people who were from 
different ethnic groups (see Moodie 1994).  
 
In many ways, the spatial organisation of the compounds lent itself to increased 
accessibility between workers, who were able to meet and organise with greater ease, 
even though the conditions mineworkers lived in were appalling. Buhlungu and 
Bezuidenhout (2012: 245) speak about the various regimes of control, which acted on 
the bodies of mineworkers as they left one node of spatial control, in the reserves, and 
moved into the compounds on the mines. In effect the compounds, situated close to 
the mines to enable drawing a large number of men into the mines at any given time, 
were complemented by the apartheid geography of spatial control: black people were 
forbidden in the white towns, and mine police, which often got support from the 
apartheid state police bolstered control of the work force and violently crushed any 
kind of protest (Buhlungu and Bezuidenhout, 2012: 245). Yet the way in which these 
spaces of control were used to organise and to meet, was something that the NUM 
capitalised on when they eventually came to the mines in the 1980s and tackled the 
indignity of the small, squashed and over-crowed compounds (Buhlungu and 
Bezuidenhout, 2010: 248). In some ways the policy of ethnically segregated 
compound systems as well as the home-friend networks also laid the foundations for 
the bitter faction –fighting that would rock the mines during the ‘70s and ‘80s 
(Moodie, 1994: 82). This would eventually force mining companies to de-segregate 
the compounds and allow the NUM to unionise workers and restructure the ‘tribal’ 
system on the mines. Although this system was extremely flawed in many ways, it 
was also what facilitated the retention of migrant cultures and political tradition for 
that period of time, making it easier for amaMpondo to respond to issues of living 
conditions in a collective way.  
 
The Changing Moral Economy and the deterioration of the NUM  
 
There is no doubt that the Mpondo revolts had some influence on migrant labourers 
who were coming and going through Mpondoland during those years, and continued 
to work on the mines for many years after. The nature of the relation of miners to 
mine management through the moral economy may have had a substantial amount to 
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do with the idea of mmereko and tiro, something that later generations were less tied 
to as they became more isolated from rural land and embarked on new struggles for 
access to urban land and belonging.  
 
The 1973 gold price hike reformed things dramatically. The politics and changing 
South African economy in the latter part of the 1970s brought a new kind of worker to 
the mines, there was a shift on the mines from a largely illiterate peasant workforce 
(with its migrant cultures) to one that now included numerous better-educated 
proletarian if still migrant workers (Moodie, 1994: 4). The NUM relied on inter-
personal networks to spread the word, sign up members and to work at building union 
structures at the workplace. The re-structuring that took place in the 1980s as part of a 
broader-restructuring of the South African economy and labour practices in 
preparation for the end of apartheid, meant the end of the induna system, and the 
beginning of union shaft stewards (see Moodie 1994, Buhlungu and Bezuidenhout, 
2008). In fact, all black workers had respect for the ‘representative’ aspect of the 
unions and for their work in combatting unfair dismissals and what they viewed as 
‘more equitable imiteto’ on the mines (Moodie, 1994: 258). There were several 
continuities between the ways in which people had organised previously and union 
organising. Often decisions taken at meetings were binding whether one was present 
or not, the meaning of elections was still consensus: even if one did not raise 
objections in the meetings one was subject to the outcomes. Thus, “in such a 
conception, a compromise that accommodates the minority is much preferable to 
reliance on a bare majority” and open discussion was less about bringing matters to a 
vote than negotiating a concern (Moodie, 1994: 262).   
 
The introduction of young people with revolutionary and perhaps in their view more 
‘modern’ ideas, the eroding old moral economy of the mines and the introduction of 
the National Union of Mineworkers had profound effects on the mines, even though 
some still carried their memories of the Mpondo revolts with them into the trade 
unions, there were varying responses to the new power configurations. What is clear 
is that the NUM only appeared on the mines after the 1980s, and before this men 
relied on their own custom, a subaltern sphere of politics, which made unionisation 
appear threatening, especially to traditionalists, when the old moral economy began to 
change albeit very slowly. Even as more educated proletarianised youth came to the 
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mines from urban townships in South Africa and Zimbabwe, less tolerant of bad 
conditions because they did not have land to go back to, they still had to reckon with 
the old moral economy preferred by the older mineworkers who had already been 
there on several contracts (Moodie, 1994: 242).  
 
The moral economy soon expanded to include wage disputes, after the gold price hike  
(Moodie, 1994: 244). The response to uneven rising wages in the mining industry, an 
issue that was raised by the younger proletarianised men, was incorporated into the 
old moral economy and the NUM began to organise workers into the unions. In many 
ways this organisation was eased through the labour law reforms introduced by the 
apartheid state in the 1980s (Buhlungu, 2009: 98).  
 
There is little space for a comprehensive retelling of the establishment of the NUM 
but there are various sources available (see Allen, 2003, Buhlungu, 2010, 2009, 
Moodie 2010). What is clear from the trajectory of the NUM in recent years is that the 
vigour, consciousness and energy which encapsulated the arrival of the “Organise or 
Die” giant, has waned and mineworkers are once again returning to direct meetings, 
democratic consensus and “equitable imiteto.” At Lonmin in 2012, the rock drill 
operators’ (RDOs’) first attempt to speak to management, bypass union channels and 
present themselves in the tradition of the old moral economy was precisely because 
one shaft had received a wage increase and Karee Mine had not. They were denied an 
audience and after many attempts at a meeting with both their union and mine 
management, they returned to yet another custom, they gathered on a little koppie 
which sits behind the Nkaneng shack settlement, which they call ‘the mountain.’  
 
Buhlungu and Bezuidenhout, Eddie Webster, Karl Van Holdt, Dunbar Moodie as well 
as other academics at the Society Work and Development Institute (SWOP) have 
done extensive research on the NUM and labour movements in South Africa, and 
there is general agreement that organising workers into a union on the South African 
mines in the 1980s was no easy task. However, Buhlungu and Bezuidenhout (2008), 
point to a general trend in the trade union movement which follows the argument 
made by Buhlungu (2010) in his book A Paradox of Victory: COSATU and the 
Democratic Transition in South Africa that COSATU’s loss of organisational power 
is largely due to membership growth over the last two decades which has changed the 
 82 
face of the union from a working class site of struggle and worker power to a middle 
class union. It now encompasses a whole range of professional white collar workers 
including teachers, lawyers, accountants etc. all of whom form part of the same union 
now in which the increasingly hierarchical relations of leadership positions has served 
to bureaucratise the union further (Buhlungu, 2010: 120). In addition the expanded 
political and representational role of COSATU in the context of the new democracy 
and the opening up of the South African economy to global markets have had a 
further negative effect on union organisations particularly in the workplace 
(Buhlungu, 2010: 161). For Buhlungu and Bezuidenhout (2008: 284) “the NUM 
mirrors all the achievements, setbacks, and problems facing the other unions from the 
militant tradition of unionism that is represented in COSATU. This changing union 
landscape offers new challenges, which according to Buhlungu and Bezuidenhout 
(2008: 283/4) include the introduction of women on the mines and upward mobility. 
The latter points to the increasing distance between paid shaft stewards from 
mineworkers: shaft stewards become alienated from their membership base and take 
on the role of businessmen which has lead to a decline in the practice of consultation 
with members and more unilateral decision making.  
 
Furthermore, the NUM has failed to deal with the change in space: most mineworkers 
now live in towns or shack settlements. Furthermore, the union has still never 
managed to adequately deal with and overcome issues of ethnicity, language and 
nationality, which remain huge issues within these spaces, as the next chapter will 
show. In fact, they point to “just how fragile non-racialism can be, particularly when 
it is confronted by ethnic mobilisation” (Buhlungu and Bezuidenhout, 2008: 285), and 
the real issues which this mobilisation sometimes masks, which can be seen clearly in 
Moodie’s (1994) article on faction fights.  
 
This chapter has sought to show the inadequacy of a nationalist narrative of labour 
history to explain the defence of union democracy by militant mineworkers. Since 
there was only one brief period of unionisation on the mines by AMWU in 1946, it is 
impossible to credit the rise of union democracy purely to the internal political events 
taking place in the country at the time. Furthermore, we know that most of the 
mineworkers who came from Mpondoland were part of the native reserve system and 
lived in the former Transkei which was a Bantustan during this period. It is evident 
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from the discussion in the previous chapter that the rural areas were largely 
marginalised by urban movements like the ANC and people practiced politics within 
a sphere which was in many ways outside of the elite urban nationalist sphere. 
Therefore, it is not illogical to assume that before the 1980s and the arrival of the 
NUM on South African mines workers were using political tools that were familiar to 
them to organise. The increasing gap between the NUM leadership and its members 
has meant that mineworkers have turned once again to a subaltern sphere of politics to 
express their discontent at both poor work conditions and with formal union 
bureaucracy which has failed them.  
 
The arrival of more politicised and proletarianised youth on the mines, the re-
structuring in the 1980s and the post-apartheid economic restructuring as well as the 
end of apartheid law system has meant many changes on the mines, including the 
introduction of large shack settlements, which mineworkers now occupy with their 
families. The next chapter will discuss how it is no longer possible to see worker 
struggles outside of community struggles because of the new social context in which 
workers now find themselves on the mines, and the forms which these ‘new’ ways of 
organising and political action take and how these have been fused with the cultural, 
social and political forms of organisation from workers’ home contexts.  
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Chapter Four: Worker Struggles as Community Struggles 
 
The last chapter outlined the limitation of some South African labour historiography 
that relies on nationalist or Marxist narratives to account for worker action on the 
mines. It highlighted the need to re-visit the gap between the brief period of 
unionisation by AMWU in 1946, and the arrival of the NUM in 1984 and to explore 
the ways in which workers were organising their struggles without union structures. 
Furthermore, it explained the limitations of seeing worker struggles outside of 
historical, social, and political context and it showed the continuation of pre-colonial 
political practices, through migrant labourers on the mines. It then argued that in order 
to adequately theorise the nature of political activity on the mines today, it is 
important to see how cultural political practices, or what I have called a subaltern 
sphere of politics on the mines, has returned given the failure of the NUM to satisfy 
workers’ needs in recent years. Thus far, the critique levelled at labour and nationalist 
historiography is that it has silenced a whole sphere of politics that would enhance our 
understanding of how battles are fought and won between mineworkers and the mines 
in South Africa.  
 
This chapter links both the rural and the urban to understand the current context of 
mineworkers in Marikana today. Much has changed since the segregated and 
ethnically constituted single-sex hostels and the literature does not seem to reflect the 
changes in the spatial construction of mine-communities today. As the previous 
chapter has shown, most of the men who go to the mines from the former-Transkei 
and particularly Mpondoland, still have intentions to send money home and one day 
to return to the commons after their labour contracts have ended. However, many now 
have family members, including daughters, wives, and sons who have joined them in 
their shacks at the mines, often, to look for work. People generally still maintain the 
distinction between ‘home’ which is the Eastern Cape and Nkaneng, the shack 
settlement. Yet, together, the men, women, and their children in Marikana now 
constitute a new community that did not exist there before. The strikes and the 
subsequent massacre were an extreme moment of crisis for all and it was responded 
to, not merely through the constitution of worker committees but also as a 
community. If we are to speak about the worker, beyond productivist Marxist and 
economistic understandings, then we must begin to provide, analyse, and give 
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attention to the communities, which the workers are rooted in as people. In the case of 
the mineworker, these communities exist both in the rural and now, more recently, in 
the ‘urban’ mining space. The previous chapters have shown how the rural has and 
continues to influence and shape politics in the urban space. This chapter goes further 
in writing part of a living history of Marikana, which is conscious of all who live and 
work there. It is an attempt to show how worker struggles are often rooted in 
community struggles and vice-versa, and that to divorce them, as some Marxist 
historiography has done, misses a whole sphere of political activity that could offer 
more insight and understanding into ‘worker’ struggles and how they are linked to 
other struggles for dignity. It reveals, through interviews with the women’s 
organisation and some Lonmin employees, that there is definitely a subaltern sphere 
of politics that exists at the mines still, which has fused with rural and urban, pre-
colonial and post-colonial ways of organising. What remains however, is a fidelity to 
a conception of democracy, and attempts to deepen and explore democratic praxis in a 
more meaningful and participatory way than the ‘official domain’ of politics would 
allow marginalised people. The continuation of a sense of justice, loyalty and 
community is evidenced through the interviews and time shared with people who 
were unable and unwilling to divorce what happened on the 16th of August to broader 
practices of injustice by Lonmin against its employees and how the company, the 
government and the union had ignored and discarded the communities of people they 
were supposed to protect and to be accountable to. The chapter performs various 
functions and tries to tell several stories, which are only some of many narratives. It 
begins with women’s contributions to community struggle, not only because women 
have been relegated to the margins of history for so long, but also because what is 
particularly interesting about the women’s group in Marikana is that it was formed 
precisely during the moment of crisis in the community when there was a political, 
social and economic gap which the women had to face alone while the men were on 
the mountain. I have chosen to do this through various life stories of some of the 
women in the community. The first part outlines the formation of the women’s 
organisation, why it is important; the issues it tackles (like land, housing and services) 
and the functions it performs in the community. Most importantly it reveals the 
sometimes silenced political, social and reproductive work of women and how this 
creates the environment in which workers’ struggles become possible and, in some 
cases, successful. The second part of the chapter discusses the living history of the 
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subaltern mineworker at Lonmin and how race, domination, and exploitation continue 
to fundamentally shape people’s experiences of the places in which they live and 
work. Finally, it considers the importance of acknowledging and considering cultural 
context, precisely because this allows for an understanding of the subaltern sphere of 
politics present on the mines and the cultural political tools which mineworkers have 
once again begun to employ outside of union structures. It is, in many ways a 
counterforce to the limited understanding that some narrow Marxist and nationalist 
historiography offers in which the worker is theorised purely as a subject of capitalist 
exploitation devoid of agency, subjectivity, and most crucially context. Suren Pillay 
(2013: 37) has noted of the Marikana Massacre that “Where capital has provided the 
ideologically privileged turnkey for locating unions in a universal history of 
capitalism, the work as a migrant in a community resides within a subaltern history of 
colonialism and apartheid.” Perhaps it would be more useful to say that the migrant in 
the Marikana community resides within a subaltern history of colonialism, apartheid, 
and elite nationalism. It is within this space, that the following body of research can 
be located.  
 
Arriving at Wonderkop    
 
I arrived at Wonderkop on the 1st of December 2012, after meeting Nomzekhelo, 
Wendy and Ncomeka in Johannesburg. They had been attending a 1in97 workshop 
learning to print t-shirts and I called Nomzekhelo, I had seen her number on an online 
statement for the Women’s group in Marikana. She said I should pick them up at 8am 
at Johannesburg Park Station and we could drive to Marikana together. So I did. 
 
Nomzekhelo Primrose Sonti is a strong, loud and cheerful woman. She moved to the 
North West Province eighteen years ago from the Eastern Cape in search of work. She 
found work at Samancor, a mine near Mooinooi, for a few years before being 
transferred to Eastern Platinum working for a company inside the mines, which sold 
                                                        
7 Formed in 2006 to support Fezeka Kuzwayo, who brought a rape charge against the current president 
Jacob Zuma. The One in Nine Campaign is a feminist collective motivated by the desire to live in a 
society where women are the agents of their own lives. The Campaign supports survivors of sexual 
violence – those who report the crimes to the police and engage in the criminal justice system as well 
as those who choose not to or are unable to report their rapes. The campaign also works with 
individuals, communities, collectives, and organisations to generate feminist analyses of social 
problems and focuses on strategies for mobilisation and mass action. (See oneinnine.org.za) 
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clothes to mineworkers. She moved to a shack settlement in Wonderkop at Lonmin, 
Marikana in 2000 because it was close to where she was working at the Eastern 
Platinum mine. In 2012, she left her job because she was not earning enough money. 
In fact, she earned the same salary for the 18 years that she worked for Eastern 
Platinum. Her employers became increasingly more hostile towards her because of 
her involvement in community activism. They cancelled her leave because she did not 
attend work during the strikes and she started facing intimidation by employers.  
 
Now she refers to herself as an activist. She is the secretary of the ANC aligned South 
African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) branch at Wonderkop and she is one 
of the founders of the Marikana Women’s Group. The women’s group has also been 
referred to as the ‘Women’s Forum’ and the ’Women’s Movement’ since they were 
only able to register it at the end of 2013 under the name Sikhala Sonke, which means, 
‘We cry together.’ Nomzekhelo is a natural leader, commanding wide respect within 
the community, and is knowledgeable about how things work between the mine, the 
unions, the government, and the community. Ncomeka and Wendy have recently 
joined Sikhala Sonke, and they travelled with Nomzekhelo to the 1in9 workshops in 
Johannesburg.  
 
Ncomeka Mbulawa, moved to Wonderkop a few years ago from Lusikisiki, Eastern 
Cape with her mother and a few of her brothers and sisters. Her father has worked for 
Lonmin as a whinge-operator since 1975 and her fiancé is contracted to Lonmin 
through an external company. Some of her siblings have been educated near Marikana 
at the surrounding schools and eventually they all moved to join their mother and 
father on the mine. She is 28 years old, has two children, and is currently 
unemployed. One of her children lives with her at the Nkaneng shack settlement and 
the other stays at her home in Lusikisiki with her granny. She is quiet and more 
reserved than any of us in the car, but during the time I am in Marikana we get along 
very well and she lets me sit at her house when I have nothing to do and we talk and 
watch television. She is soon to be married, which scares her a little. The custom is 
for her to stay in the Eastern Cape as a makhoti [married woman] with her husband’s 
family to look after his mother. She does not want to go back, well at least not to look 
after someone’s mother. One day during the drive to Marikana town, where people 
have to go to buy grocery items they cannot get at the shops in Wonderkop, Wendy 
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tries to convince her to tell her fiancé she doesn’t want to go. They both laugh as they 
talk about what they are told to wear, to eat and how to speak. Wendy says she is 
pretty sure God did not say it should be so, and thinks it strange that Ncomeka has to 
look after someone else’s mother, “where are these women’s other children?” she 
asks. Wendy relates a story of her friend who called a family meeting when she 
arrived at her husband’s home. After she thanked everyone for welcoming her, she 
told them they should not stop doing what they normally did on account of her arrival: 
if they swept, they should not stop because she was there; if they cooked, they should 
not stop if she was there. Apparently, everyone was super surprised, but didn’t say 
anything. Ncomeka is intrigued but says it’s the law and her fiancé is a mummy’s boy 
anyway, so she will go for a month to appease people and return to Nkaneng to be 
with her husband.     
 
Wendy Pretorious, is 34 and is now divorced. Her family is originally from King 
Williams Town in the Eastern Cape and they moved to Welkom when she was 11 
years old because her father found work on the mine there. The mines slowly started 
to close and with them employment opportunities for many. Her father found work at 
Lonmin and had to leave his family in Welkom and relocate again. Six months ago, 
she decided to join her father to look for work on the mine, but this has not happened 
yet. Her father is a general worker at Lonmin and she was hopeful about finding work 
at the mine before the massacre. Now she is a little scared and hopes that as a member 
of Sikhala Sonke they can start other activities that will allow them to make some 
money.  
 
We share stories while we drive to Marikana, Nomzekhelo knows many short cuts 
and it only takes us about an hour and a half to get there. Arriving on the mine is a 
surreal experience, if one has never grown up around the Witwatersrand. Nothing 
prepares one for the endless mounds of earth and rubble, impressive machinery, 
vehicles, giant shafts and long conveyor belts in the sky joining one massive concrete 
building to the next, everything looks a bit post-apocalyptic at first. Yet, Nomzekhelo 
makes it easy to weave in and out of unnamed roads; passing one mechanical process 
after another, all the way across the mines to arrive at Nkaneng, without an access 
card. When we got to one access point, the guard stopped us, Nomzekhelo rolled 
down her window and spoke to him briefly in isiXhosa explaining who she is and that 
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we “were with her.” He let us through, while she turned to me and said, “we don’t 
know each other, but we understand each other.” Eventually we arrived at a Lonmin 
signpost pointing to the different shafts, finally the last arrow on the board pointed 
right to ‘Wonderkop Village’ and to the shack settlement Nkaneng.  
 
Nkaneng 
 
The landscape of the mines has changed dramatically since the end of the compound 
system. The new “living out allowance” is now an option for those who choose not to 
live in the single-sex hostels. The money offered by the mines to those mineworkers 
who chose to take it, has meant the creation of large shack settlements around the 
mines as those workers who want to live with family or on their own, which would 
allow them to cook their own food and live with a fair amount of privacy move into 
their own shacks. The shack settlement is now home to hundreds of people, 
mineworkers and their wives, or husbands, their children and the animals they keep. 
 
In isiXhosa and Sesotho, ‘Nkaneng’ is described by people who live there as, ‘taking 
away something by force’ and is the name given to the shack settlement, which 
symbolises the on-going struggle for land and services, people say they are literally 
there; ‘by force’ because no one seems to care about them and everything is a 
struggle. Chingono (2013: 12) also notes that it represents the intersection between 
ethnicity and settlement patterns. Nkaneng is home to mostly isiXhosa speaking 
people from the Eastern Cape, and a few other provinces in South Africa as well as 
other migrant labourers from Lesotho, Mozambique. This has created tension between 
people who live in the shack settlement and those who are able to live in RDP houses 
and receive services based on their ethnicity because the land here is owned by the 
Tswana Chief Bob Edward Bapo ba Mogale.    
 
Nkaneng is divided into two sections. The ‘old part’ of the shack settlement is where 
some are connected to electricity or have pre-paid meters and access to taps. In the 
‘new’ section, people do not have access to taps and many do not have electricity. 
There are no roads in the entire settlement. This is one of the major problems for 
people living there since everyone has to walk to the main road for taxis and other 
transport.  
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On the other side of Wonderkop, is the hostel section, where the male-only hostel 
blocks persist and the few family units available look like prison barricades with no 
yard, for the many children who are milling around, to play in. People sit outside in 
the boiling heat, as mineworkers come and go the whole day through, watching the 
buses take them and bring them back, watching men and a few women walk back and 
forth in their PPE (personal protective equipment). We pass taxis as they weave in 
and out of untarred roads, which are often barricaded by big cement blocks in the 
middle. We pass the closed National Union of Mineworkers office, a space they share 
with the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the African National Congress 
(ANC). No one one has been there since the massacre and the offices remain closed.  
 
When we get to the store where Thumeka works, some of the women whom we were 
going to meet are already there and Nomzekhelo and Thumeka hug after not having 
seen each other in while.  
 
Thumeka Magonwanya arrived in Wonderkop in December 1999, looking for 
“greener pastures.” Born in Stutterheim, in the Eastern Cape, she left to Cape Town to 
study dress-making and returned to Stutterheim where she could not find work. 
Thirteen years ago, she moved to Wonderkop hoping to find employment as a 
dressmaker. When she could not find any work, and in lieu of resources to start 
making garments, she began selling things in the street which did not raise her enough 
capital either. She soon found work at a tavern where she earned R700 per month. She 
now works as a cashier at a Somali-owned wholesaler in Wonderkop. She has not 
found greener pastures yet, but she says she is still trying. In the meanwhile, she says 
the Somalians are good to her and allow her to hold meetings at the shop when she is 
at work and cannot attend them at the office on the other side in Nkaneng. She is a 
member of SANCO and a founding member of the Women’s Group, Sikhala Sonke. 
Her daughter currently works for Lonmin handing out explosives underground. 
Thumeka refers to her as “her son,” because she is her only child and she has gone to 
the mines to make money for them, as a son would do.  
 
Nomzekhelo and Thumeka organised for me to meet with some of the women the 
next day in the office. The office is a large tin roofed structure with a concrete floor 
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that floods when it rains and heats up quickly when it is hot, it is used as a community 
centre and a meeting space for SANCO and now Sikhala Sonke.   
 
Sikhala Sonke 
 
Sikhala Sonke was started during the Lonmin Strikes in 2012. Nomzekhelo Sonti and 
Thumeka Magonwayana were two of the founding members of the organisation. It 
was initiated by the women who organically started to mobilise in the community 
because they were left to take care of homes and children and had the added 
responsibility of caring for the men on the mountain: husbands, brothers, sons and 
friends. They started to seriously think about an organisation of their own which 
would endure after the massacre through conversations with each other as well as 
through conversation and support from the women in the Marikana Support Group in 
Johannesburg. For Nomzekhelo and Thumeka there was no other choice than to 
support the men on the mountain and the women and children who were suffering 
because of the strike. Thumeka described the situation, as just really sad, “It was sad 
because the other women, they didn’t even have food in their houses. So we were 
helping each other. If I’ve got bread I would give my neighbour as well so she’s got 
something to eat with their children. So it was very sad. It was very sad. And other 
men didn’t even have money because they have to pay the mashonisa’s the loans, so it 
was very bad8.”  
 
They began praying together everyday after the first men were shot in Marikana, and 
approaching police to ask why they were in their community with Nyalas and guns. 
They soon started organising food by asking the people in the community for 
donations, mostly the Somali traders, and began to take food to the mountain daily. 
This food and support enabled the men to stay on the mountain in counsel together 
and to remain defiant.  
 
                                                        
8 Many of the women who I spoke to also spoke about the money-lending schemes and the outrageous 
amount of interest one had to pay to loan-sharks every month. Often mineworkers wages are not 
enough to sustain the home and they take loans to subsidise their wages, during the massacre this 
increased exponentially since many of the women had to take loans because the men were not being 
paid and they had to find money to take care of the home, children and wounded men.  
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After 44 mineworkers were murdered and 78 injured by the 16th of August, the 
women suffered a further blow with the subsequent arrest of 270 of the striking 
miners, 150 of who said they were subject to police brutality in prison (Lantier, 2012). 
During this dark period in Marikana, many women had to face harsh conditions in the 
community while their husbands, brothers, sons, lovers and friends were dead, in 
hospital, arrested or traumatised from the events of the days leading up to the 
massacre.  
 
Most of the women joined Sikhala Sonke because it was a time of a crisis; they 
needed to support the men on the mountain but they also felt the extreme pressure of 
not having an income during the strike and they all bore the brunt of police brutality. 
They began organising outside of the worker committees in their own spaces since 
they were not allowed to go to the mountain. Chingono (2013: 24) also acknowledges 
the mountain as having traditional Xhosa symbolism attached to it, he notes, “In 
Xhosa culture when there are problems in the family that need to be resolved the men 
converge at the kraal and the women are excluded as this is a gendered space. This 
symbolism is important given that many of the workers who converged at the koppie 
were from a Xhosa ethnic group with a strong attachment to their traditional beliefs.” 
 
In fact, many women responded in the same way to the mountain and the meetings 
held there. They often spoke as if it were something I should be aware of, especially 
the fact that they were not allowed at the mountain. Here again there seemed to be an 
allusion to the generational links between the Mpondo Revolts and Marikana. Others 
too recalled the massacre and the images it invoked of Ngquza Hill, whether 
memories of a time of revolt or oral history passed on to them (see Tolsi, 2013, 
Figlan, 2013, Gasa (2013:pers. comm). Although they would send messages back and 
forth and take them food, consistent with how women supported the mountain 
committees of the Mpondo Revolts, women did not attend. In an interview with an 
Mpondo woman, whose great grandfather was an Mpondo Chief in Port St Johns, she 
reiterated that in Mpondoland men and women practice politics separately and 
independently. Remembering stories of the Mpondo revolts, she said we must not 
mistake women’s absence at mountain committee meetings for lack of politics, 
because politics were never discussed in the home. The men went to the mountain and 
 93 
the women met separately, and that is how things are done. Often men used medicines 
and muti that women were not allowed to use and vice-versa.  
 
Many women in Sikhala Sonke confirmed that the reason women did not go to 
mountain was because the men were using muti they were not allowed to use. 
Therefore, they “agreed with them” and decided to form their own organisation. Often 
the representation of muti in academia and in elite public spaces comes from a 
colonial conception of Africans who make and use their own medication as 
‘backward’ or is often placed as the antithesis to western modernity, science, and 
rationality.  
 
For example, in their article on the Movements, Protests and a Massacre in South 
Africa, Patrick Bond and Shauna Mottier (2013: 297) condescendingly mention 
“dysfunctional spiritual suspicions (e.g. the use of muti/traditional medicine against 
bullets which allegedly wears off in the presence of women).” Of course, while is true 
that strikers were blessed by a traditional healer, a similar practice in almost every 
religion in the world where people seek comfort and counsel in prayer and religious 
practice when they are about to enter into a situation with uncertain outcomes, there is 
no reason to suggest that saying “muti will protect me against bullets” is any different 
from a Christian declaring “God will protect me” before he/she goes to war. Any 
interpretation of the use muti as backward, tribal, savage, like Bond and Mottier 
(2013: 287) have done, echoes what Michel Trouillot (2003) has described as ‘The 
Savage Slot’ and is nothing less than the use of colonial language and the re-
inscribing of colonial categories and must be firmly rejected.  
 
Therefore, in keeping with the traditional and cultural ways in which men and women 
discussed politics and made political decisions, including sometimes meeting 
separately, the women of Marikana formed a crisis organisation. They organised 
shelter and food at first. Then, when the police began entering the community, 
breaking down doors and shooting through people’s shacks, they decided to organise 
a march against police brutality9. They were denied a permit for the march they had 
                                                        
9 Things became extremely tense after the NUM shot at their own members, and that is when a large 
number of men, who were not RDOs and others who were not even employed by Lonmin decided to 
join the strike and for some this was linked explicitly to the fact that they formed a community. One 
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initially planned but eventually it went ahead on the 29th of September 2012. It was 
again through the support of the women in Johannesburg that they were able to go 
ahead with the march even though they were denied the opportunity to deliver a 
memorandum, which they had initially planned to do.  
 
The march, initially due to be held on the 22nd of September 2013, was twice banned 
by the Rustenburg and Madibeng municipalities. The reasons offered were 
unconstitutional, and the women of Marikana took both municipalities to the North 
West High Court for denying them the right to protest. The first refusal was 
communicated via sms on the 20th of September. It stated they had not met the 
requirement of a seven-day notice period and therefore their march could not go 
ahead. This was a false accusation. The Rustenburg local municipality then 
communicated in writing that the “purpose of the march does not meet the 
requirements of the Gatherings Act.” However, it is illegal for the authorities to 
regulate protests based on their purpose, as the Act does not allow for this. This 
appeared to be pure censorship and an attempt to impose a blanket ban any political 
marches in the platinum belt. In 2013, Jane Duncan and Andrea Royeppen reported 
that the right to protest was not respected by the Rustenburg district municipality who 
routinely denied people approval for protests based on arbitrary reasons. The 
Rustenburg municipality began to create their own list of criteria which protestors had 
to comply with that were not listed in the Regulation of Gatherings Act (RGA) in 
order to limit the amount of protests occurring in the region, particularly around the 
platinum belt (Duncan and Royeppen 2013). Rather than seeing protest as democratic 
expression of dissent and dissatisfaction, the municipality has responded with threats 
and attempts to undermine democratic participation.  
 
This is not a new form of repression under Jacob Zuma’s government either. The 
ANC–led government has increasingly begun to deny people the right to protest and 
                                                                                                                                                              
person who spoke to Chingono (2013: 27), said, “As a community when we saw the police pass 
through our settlement we could see they were prepared to use force…we all resolved that we have to 
be involved for this was no longer just a workers’ issue but a community struggle.” For another 
worker, “At first it was an RDO issue but as the strike progressed they demanded everyone to support 
them…even those passing by on the road they would call them to come and support them. For a 
Zimbabwean informal trader, he was at the Koppie out of fear rather than solidarity: “We had no 
choice but to be at the koppie and show them our support. It was either you are on their side or they 
would see you as the enemy. They have to force everyone to see their logic for the strike” (Chingono, 
2013: 27).  
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has often responded with violence when protestors hold government responsible for 
lack of public services and accountability. Most notably, the shack dwellers’ 
movement in Durban, Abahlali baseMjondolo(AbM), has been involved in an ongoing 
battle against the state for land and housing and for respect and dignity to be able to 
choose where and how people within the movement live. They have often been met 
with repression, authoritarianism and even claims of a ‘third force10’ being behind the 
movement in South Africa. In a response to these accusations titled, We are the Third 
Force, Sbu Zikode, Chairperson of AbM, states: “The Third Force is all the pain and 
the suffering that the poor are subjected to every second in our lives. The shack 
dwellers have many things to say about the Third Force. It is time for us to speak out 
and to say this is who we are, this is where we are and this how we live. The life that 
we are living makes our communities the Third Force.” 
 
In a recent report, titled Take Back the Streets: Repression and Criminalisatoin of 
Protest Around the World, the International Network of Civil Liberties Organizations 
outlines a global crackdown on peaceful protests through excessive police force and 
the criminalization of dissent. The report highlights a growing tendency to perceive 
people exercising the right to protest, a fundamental democratic right, as a threat 
requiring use of force by the police. It details a 2005 report about the experiences of 
social movements vis - a - vis the implementation of the Regulation of Gatherings 
Act, in which “the FXI [Freedom of Expression Institute] identified a disturbing 
pattern where social movements and organizations stridently opposed to government 
policies were isolated and targeted by local authorities through an overly technical 
interpretation of the RGA, imposition of unreasonable conditions on protest marches 
and outright prohibitions of gatherings based on flimsy and unsupported reasons” 
(INCLO, 2013: 46). 
 
Even when the illegality of state policy is revealed11, this often leads to further 
repression from the state. Still, many social movements and organisations utilise the 
                                                        
10 The third force is a term used to describe apartheid police personnel that covertly supported popular 
violence against the liberation movement.  
11 In 2009, AbM was successful in over-turning the KwaZulu-Natal Elimination and Prevention of Re-
emergence of Slums Act in the KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Durban where it was declared 
unconstitutional. Despite this legal victory they have continued to face repression from the state and in 
2013, there have already been three political assassinations of AbM members in the Cato Crest Shack 
settlement. (see Pithouse, 2013)  
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state legal system, which they rely on to maintain democratic principles. This 
response highlights the inability of the South African state to take ‘those who do not 
count’ seriously as reasonable citizens who are capable of thinking for themselves. In 
fact, Trouillot’s banalisation category of silencing seems to echo through narratives of 
“service delivery protests” or ‘irrational’ mineworkers who broke with ‘hard-won’ 
bargaining structures. Implicit in these claims, is the unthinkable notion that people 
are able to organise outside of the state, and outside of the party or the unions to 
demand access to public goods and services to live a dignified life. Thus, they are 
denied claims to the political and are marginalised and repressed because of the threat 
they pose to the conception of the nation or democracy. Partha Chatterjee (2004: 47) 
makes a similar point about the way in which a “widening arena of political 
mobilisation” causes “much discomfort and apprehension in progressive elite circles” 
where the complaint from the political elite and middle-class society is that politics 
has been “taken over by mobs and criminals.”  
 
Even when that same subaltern sphere of politics shows more reverence for due-
process, consultation, negotiation and the praxis of democracy than the thug-like 
politics of Zuma’s ANC, the appearance of poor people in these elite spaces is often 
met with shock and disdain. For example, when AbM spokesperson Bandile Mdlalose 
was arrested on the 17th of September 2013 and detained for seven days before she 
was granted bail, for protesting against the murder of seventeen-year-old Nqobile 
Nzuza by the police, she said  
 
“It was a way to silence me, it was a way to silence me and others who were 
protesting against the murder of Nqobile Nzuza. No one has been arrested for 
the murder of Nqobile, or the murder of Nkululeko Gwala or Thembinkosi 
Nyathi. And yet, people protesting against murder are beaten and I was 
arrested. I REFUSE to keep quiet and the sell the people who really fought 
hard for me to have a Constitutional Right of Freedom of Expression.”  
 
When she appeared in court again in November, she was told by the magistrate that 
just because she was dressed smartly doesn’t mean they have to treat her differently. 
Implicit in this derogatory remark was that she did not belong in those clothes or in 
that space because the law was meant to protect proper citizens, a category which she 
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did not occupy.  
 
Similarly, the women in Marikana displayed the same commitment to participatory 
democracy and belief in due legal process when they contested the Rustenburg and 
Madibeng municipalities, as well as the North West police force in the Rustenburg 
High Court and won the appeal. They did so despite threats and attempts to intimidate 
them because they were exercising their access to citizenship, something which 
government would rather deny poor people. Even though they had been repeatedly 
ignored and denied the right to march, they maintained a fidelity to democratic and 
political principles. In a statement released before the march on the 29th of September, 
they wrote:  
 
SA: Statement by Wonderkop Community Women’s Association, on North 
West High Court ruling that the Women of Marikana have the right to 
march (29/09/2012) 
 
We, the women of Marikana, have won a decisive victory against the 
Rustenburg and Madibeng Municipalities, which have twice banned our 
planned peaceful march against the Marikana police station. The High Court 
has ruled in our favour, setting aside the prohibition by the municipalities and 
telling us that we have the right to march. Our march is to protest the police 
violence in Marikana, which has led to the death and injury of many dozens of 
members of our community. We feel unsafe and scared in our communities 
and this is because of the police, who have behaved like criminals. 
 
Our first effort to march was on Saturday 22nd September, and following an 
unlawful prohibition by the Madibeng municipality, we notified to march on 
Saturday 29 September. The Madibeng and Rustenburg municipalities 
conspired, together with the Marikana Police Captain and North-West police, 
to prohibit our march for a second time. We had followed all legal 
requirements of the Gatherings Act, and had made every effort to cooperate 
with the authorities, but confronted bureaucratic confusion, obstruction and 
unlawful conduct by officials of the two municipalities and the police at every 
turn. 
 98 
 
Following the second banning, we briefed our lawyers to take the matter for a 
review decision by the High Court. Following ten hours of legal argument, the 
Court vindicated us by overturning the unlawful prohibition of the march by 
the two municipalities. The Court has confirmed what we already know – that 
we have the right to march! We will continue with the march, along the route 
that we have planned, to the Marikana police station to protest police violence 
and brutality. 
 
We are deeply disturbed by the authorities’ interference with our right to 
assemble, by the unlawful decisions of the municipalities, by the attitude of 
officials and police to our right to assemble, and by the undue influence of the 
police in the notification procedures outlined in terms of the Gatherings Act. 
 
We believe that the North West police have placed a blanket ban on all 
protests and marches in the wider Rustenburg area. The Judicial Commission 
begins its work on Tuesday 2nd October and it is important that it be 
conducted in a spirit that is open and which listens to our voices, if we are 
going to trust in its outcomes. We must have our right to assemble and express 
respected by the authorities and we call on the Commission to support the 
creation of this necessary climate. 
 
We know that other communities across the country experience the same 
problems as us when it comes to our democratic and constitutionally protected 
rights to assemble and express. We condemn this regular prohibition and 
banning of our legitimate protests. This is not the democracy we all fought 
for! 
 
We march for justice for the death of our husbands, fathers, sons and brothers 
at the hands of the police. We march for justice for the death of Paulina 
Masuthlo, our sister, who died on the 19th September, a few days after she 
was shot with rubber bullets by the police. We march for justice for the 
shooting of three other women with rubber bullets on Saturday 15th 
September. 
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We have had enough of the violence, and the fear and the criminality of the 
police. We want justice and we want to restore our community and our homes 
to places of safety. This can only happen when the police fully withdraw from 
Marikana, and when the police are held to account for their violent and 
unlawful actions. 
 
WE MARCH TO CONDEMN BRUTALITY AND CALL FOR JUSTICE FOR 
MARIKANA! 
 
In addition to highlighting the state’s attempt to politically silence what was 
happening within the community of Marikana, the women of Marikana also link their 
repression to a broader struggle against state repression in South Africa, where those 
who don’t count are constantly criminalised and excluded from civil society.  
 
Although they won the right to march, which they did with 800 women from the 
community, they were also denied the opportunity to hand over a memorandum they 
had prepared. In this memorandum, they expressed their anger and disbelief at the 
shooting of three women in the community and the death of a councillor, activist and 
friend, Paulina Masuthlo.  
 
Paulina Masuthlo was a PR Councillor for the ANC in Marikana. Nomzekhelo, who 
was a close friend of hers, describes her as  
 
“a brave woman. She was the hero. She was supporting those strikers who 
were fighting for their demands, just money. Even on the memorial service for 
these 34 people on the mountain there, it was only Paulina, who were wearing 
the mining uniform which is white uniform with the gumboots, with the 
makaraba helmet. She was nice. She was showing everybody that she is 
supporting this.”  
 
Most of the women who knew her testified to her brave character and her fierce 
loyalty to the community, and during the strikes, her support for the men on the 
mountain and their families. In many ways, she was the example of how people at 
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Marikana conceptualised local government, community leaders and the entrenchment 
of political principles and democratic practices rather than commitment to a party 
structure. Thumeka mentioned that even on the day of her funeral there were people 
who said some members of the community and within the ANC did not like her. Even 
though she was unpopular with the ANC for supporting the miners, Nomzekhelo 
captured her commitment well when she said,  
 
“Hayi, it was her work, because when you are the councillor, you are 
standing for the people in everything, its bad or its right you must be with the 
people. You see? You mustn’t go away if something is bad for the community 
you must be there because you are voted, you see? You are working for them. 
Even at Karangua, at the court, everyday we were with Paulina there, she was 
trying even for food for the people, she was supporting even those guys who 
were in jail, trying to get food, trying to get water, everyday.  
 
Paulina was shot on the 15th of September when police entered the Nkaneng 
community and started shooting at women and children with rubber bullets and using 
tear gas as they went through the settlement searching for weapons. While some 
reported that she was shot during a protest (see Nash, 2013) Nomzekhelo, who was 
with Paulina near the office waiting for other women to arrive for a meeting, 
remembers it vividly,  
 
 So they come with the hippos there, I didn’t see even the registration number 
for that hippo. They just come and shoot. So I didn’t run, even Paulina, 
because we were not expecting them to shoot, because we have done nothing, 
we hold nothing, because we are women you see? So they just come and they 
shoot. Even me, myself I don’t know how I survived at that time because I was 
next to Paulina.  I just turn, looked on the side where the Hippo was coming, 
where the other women were running, and the others just turned, when it 
comes, when I heard the first shot, I just turned on my side like this and just 
closed my eyes, waiting for the bullets on my back but fortunately they didn’t. 
They shoot Paulina on this side, and they shoot the other two ladies on the 
other side…  
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Paulina was then taken then taken to the mine hospital with the help of someone with 
a vehicle in the community. From there, she was transferred to a hospital in 
Rustenburg for the bullet wound in her leg. On the following Monday she underwent 
an operation to have the bullet removed from her leg. On Tuesday, she called 
Nomzekhelo to say everything had gone well and that she would be discharged on 
Wednesday 19th September, 2012. When Nomzekhelo called the hospital on the 
Wednesday afternoon, they told her Paulina was dead. She, Paulina’s sister and a few 
others who went to the hospital were in complete disbelief. For them, it is impossible 
that she would have died from a rubber bullet wound to the leg especially when she 
was fine after the operation. They were obviously devastated and received no proper 
explanation from the nurses who gave them the news. None of the people who were 
close to her believed that she died from the bullet wound and though they do not 
know what happened or who did it, many of the women I spoke to including 
Nomsekehlo, Thumeka, Wendy, Nomceka and Ncomeka’s mother Florence Mbulawa 
believe she was poisoned12. Paulina’s death was a huge blow to the community and to 
the already waning faith in the system and democracy.  
 
It was also devastating for other reasons. Despite countless efforts to engage the 
councillor of the ward, SANCO and the women’s group were repeatedly ignored. 
Nomzekhelo described SANCO, in a similar way in which she described the role of a 
councillor, which was based on the principles of transparency, common humanity and 
open democracy and here again, the stress on democratic consensus rather than 
representative democracy is apparent:  
 
The aim of SANCO in the community is to develop the place, which we are 
living in. The duty of the SANCO it is for the whole community, never mind 
you depend on which organisation, you are ANC, you are UDM, you are DA, 
what what. As long as you are in South Africa and you are staying here on 
that place you are the SANCO, because you are the resident of that place. So 
SANCO it stand for helping all those communities who are staying there, such 
                                                        
12 There has been at least one other case of alleged poisoning of an activist in hospital. In 2012 
Bhekimuzi Ndlovu, was visited in hospital in Durban by ANC members, after being shot by police 
during a protest. Shortly after they left his hospital room, he became violently ill and died. The cause of 
death was alleged to be poisoning (Pithouse, 2013)  
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as problems, assistance, everything you see, everything that is happening that 
is wrong, even the corruptions, we look after the corruption.  
 
Nomzekhelo and Thumeka described the councillor who did not believe in the same 
values as SANCO, as being ‘divisive’ in the community. They had initially voted for 
him because he knew the problems of ‘this side’ (Nkaneng) but when he became 
councillor he continued to ignore them like the former councillor did. By refusing to 
recognise the existence of SANCO as well as taking no action after the massacre or 
during the strikes, the councillor has offered no support to the community.  
 
In addition, many women said that they would not vote in the 2014 elections if Zuma 
was elected at Manguang. After the massacre, although many had not lost faith in the 
government’s ability to positively change their situation, their main concern was that 
the municipality and the government were continually ignoring them. The fact that 
Zuma had not even come to Marikana during the strikes or after the massacre was a 
clear indication of his disinterest in them, and that he had failed them, especially 
when it came to the issue of land.  
 
The Land on which Nkaneng is built 
 
There are 38 shack settlements around the Rustenburg platinum belt, and in 2010 
Lonmin estimated that “50% of the population who lived within a 15km radius from 
its mining operations lived in informal (sic) dwellings and lacked access to basic 
services (Chingono, 2013: 9). As a result, people in Nkaneng have had an on-going 
battle with the municipality over the issue of land and services. Although most people 
who live there acknowledge its temporary nature, because the Eastern Cape is still 
home, the conditions in which they are forced to live in return for their labour is 
unacceptable by any measure. Even today, ethnicity on the mine is still a contributing 
factor to broader and more generalised tensions between people. Since they do not 
have access to what is Tswana traditional land, they are all technically living in 
Nkaneng illegally and government and the mine have made no attempt to reckon with 
the new spatial configurations and consequently the community that has emerged, as a 
direct result of the ‘living out wage’ and persistent migrant labour system. They have 
also failed to provide proper services for their workers and their families. Aside from 
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basic services, there are no schools or crèches on the mine and the colonial mind-set 
of the mines to support the mineworker with only enough money to reproduce 
himself, ignores the growing poverty in rural areas as well as the very obvious new 
households on the mines.  
 
The women of Sikhala Sonke say the land the shack settlement occupies, as well as 
the land Lonmin stands on belongs to the Tswana Chief Kgosi Bob Edward Mogale 
of the Bapo ba Mogale Royal Family. Mogale will not cede the land to them, so they 
cannot build formal housing. The formal housing (brick structures) that does exist 
belongs to Tswana people, who are allowed to get RDP housing in that area because 
of ethnic citizenship. Traditional authorities tell people like Nomzekhelo, they do not 
belong there and the land is not for Xhosas. The municipality is as unhelpful and 
Lonmin has taken no responsibility for housing the mineworkers and their families 
who have to face this reality.  
 
The Bapo ba Mogale family are not happy with the shack settlement on what should 
be Batswana farming land and are demanding more money from Lonmin. Lonmin 
however has ignored the entire community there and refuses to help or to pay any 
money to the Bapo ba Mogale family who, according to women in Sikhala Sonke, 
regularly receives money from Lonmin and demands that their children and relatives 
receive jobs over isiXhosa people. They would like the government to buy the land 
for them so they are able to live and build on it. According to Nomzekhelo they,   
 
“Want to stay here freely because now, its still an informal settlement and then 
we don’t have any services. But the problem now, if they want us to vote for 
them they are coming and mobilising on our side and we are voting for them 
because its our organisation which is ANC, and we like them. But now we are 
very very disappointed, because this democracy its long time its 18 years but 
nothing happened here at Wonderkop as you see. We don’t have roads, we 
don’t have water, we don’t have toilets, we don’t have houses, everything we 
don’t have. Although we are voting, although we are the ANC members you 
see.” 
 
While many have suggested that the pervasion of ethnicity in people’s narratives 
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about life on the mines, is attributed solely to xenophobia and ethnicism or traditional 
patriarchy (Bond, 2013: 297; Cronin, 2012) this must also been seen in context. It is 
useful to consider what Stuart Hall, called the possibility of a Grasmscian analysis of 
race and ethnicity. Gramsci referred to a “national specificity,” to describe the 
different levels in “in complexly structured societies composed of economic, political 
and ideological relations” in which according to Hall (1986), it was important to 
consider “the character of different types of political regimes, the importance of 
cultural and national-popular questions, and the role of civil society in shifting the 
balance of relations between different social forces in society” (Hall, S 1986, quoted 
in Goldberg, 2009: 514).  
 
While it is true that under Zuma’s presidency, the emergence of an ethnic, patriarchal, 
homophobic and misogynist politics has proliferated South African state politics, 
ethnicity at Marikana is experienced in direct relation to people’s material existence 
and support networks, particularly during the strikes and the massacre. In fact, 
Nkaneng (made up predominantly of isiXhosa and then Sesotho speaking people) is 
now the majority community around Lonmin and Crispen Chingono (2013: 8) 
explains, “As a result the question of who is local and alien is often contested but 
quite crucial in understanding the socio-economic and political dynamics in those 
communities. Pillay (2013: 32) makes the important point that ‘cultural artefacts’ [sic] 
which workers bring with them into a strike “interrupts the desire in much of this 
scholarship (South African labour studies) for a revolutionary worker subject, that is 
fully universal without the particularities of race or ethnicity.” He adds that it is 
important for us to reckon with the migrant worker both as a product of capital but 
also as part of a history of in-direct rule and colonial governmentality (Pillay, 2013: 
50).   
 
Thus the frustration with being continually ignored by government and Lonmin based 
on their ethnicity must be taken seriously and not seen as the lack of a proper 
emancipatory process or historical project, which has its base in euro-centrism. It is 
on the basis of this exclusion that Sikhala Sonke has in some ways attempted to step 
in and take action to try to improve conditions in the community. This has not meant 
exclusion based on ethnicity or even vigilante violence as some have suggested (see 
Cronin, 2012). Rather, they have started through SANCO and now Sikhala Sonke to 
 105 
offer people help with identity documents; complaints about the councillor; rape; 
domestic abuse; and other forms of social services, which their municipality has 
denied them. One of their main concerns now is a road.  
 
In Nkaneng, there are no roads, and few cars struggle over the uneven muddy dirt 
roads that taxis refuse to drive on. Everyone must walk to the main road to get taxis. 
For many this is a very long distance, when it rains many cannot leave their homes. 
Few vehicles go in and out, mostly there are big trucks delivering goods to stores: 
every few days one is bound to see a huge Carling Black Label truck delivering more 
beer to the ‘Never say Die Tavern’ next to ‘the office’.  
 
The roads are the pivot of a whole range of activities that are denied to the community 
as a result: for example not being able to buy large grocery items, or attend school or 
work when it rains heavily, which is extremely common in the summer. Most 
importantly, it is impossible for ambulances to reach sick or injured people inside 
Nkaneng because of the road, especially crucial during the strikes and the massacre. 
Although they do not have other services, the old part of the shack settlement has 
some form of electricity or pre-paid meters, and people in the new part illegally 
connect to electricity as well. Some also have taps in their yards and others are 
allowed to buy 20l of water for R2, which is what Ncomeka pays, still that is a 
struggle for some. There are also long-drop toilets that are not ideal but “at least 
something.” Nomzekhelo, Thumeka and others in Sikhala Sonke feel if they are able 
to get a gravel road they would have made some positive contribution to life in 
Nkaneng. They have approached Lonmin many times for gravel; their response was 
that they do not have any trucks that can deliver the gravel to them. Nevertheless, 
Nomzekhelo says, “But it was long time ago when they said that. So if we can get 
help of the trucks and the permission to get that gravel, we as the women, we can do 
that ourselves. Not to ask somebody to help us on the road, we can do it by ourselves. 
If somebody, a man wants to help us, he can come and assist but we can do as Sikhala 
Sonke that road.” What is clear however is that they can no longer wait around for 
government to help them and they must organise by themselves. 
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Organisation at Point Zero 
 
For them it is incredibly important to link oppression in the home and the mines. 
When the men went on strike, they decided to start their own organisation not only 
because there was a crisis but also because they needed to contribute to improving the 
community, something that would strengthen the struggles of the men at that moment 
and in the future. The creation of Sikhala Sonke at this time of crisis is not an 
exception in the history of women who organise when their home space is threatened 
and when their children go hungry or when their political freedoms are curtailed.  
 
For instance the women’s anti- pass marches that took place from the early 1900s into 
the late 1950s in South Africa is testament to a tradition of women’s political 
organisation against repressive state policy. Nomboniso Gasa (2008: 136) discusses 
how African women in 1913 were most affected by the new pass laws the state had 
begun implementing in May, in which “In that month alone, the arrests for pass 
infringement quadrupled.” Many women were carrying up to 13 passes, which had 
direct economic and social consequences for the women who were supplementing 
their husbands already meagre salaries, and who had migrated from the Cape and 
other places to seek a better life (Gasa, 2008: 135). At first, they received little 
support, not only from the state, which they petitioned regularly, but also from within 
the national liberation movement. Many, including Sol Plaatjie and Dr Adbul 
Aburahman, thought the women acted out of turn and without consulting the 
leadership (Gasa, 2008: 135). On 28 May, 200 women marched to the center of 
Bloemfontein with placards and songs demanding an audience. On the 29th 80 women 
were arrested and all of them refused to pay their fines, filling the limited capacity 
gaols (Gasa, 2008:137). By the end of the women’s marches on local government, 
many of the men were ready to concede that the women were far more militant, 
determined and not afraid to openly defy the white man, as Plaatjie reported in his 
newspaper, “We, the men who are supposed to be made of sterner stuff than the 
weaker sex, might well hide our faces in shame” (Gasa, 2008:137). 
 
The militancy of migrant women did not end there. In Potchefstroom, women also 
protested against new pass laws, which would directly affect their livelihood in beer 
brewing and income from housing boarders from the mines (Gasa, 2008: 141). In 
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1956 again, 20 000 women marched to Pretoria to hand over a petition to J.G Strydom 
against pass laws. Some have argued that these marches were framed around 
women’s traditional roles and therefore were not feminist, however Nomboniso Gasa 
(2008) has shown how women were politically organising as mothers and wives and 
how, as Federici (2012) argues, women’s homes are both a space of oppression and 
the base from which to organise. There are definite points of connection to other 
struggles organised around the home, which speaks to certain universal principles of 
crisis and struggle. 
 
For instance, Manuel Castells, describes the way in which people in Glasgow, 
Scotland had been opposing rent hikes and long contracts since 1886 and by 1913 the 
Social Democratic Federation and the Scottish Federation of Tenants Association 
were fighting against rent hikes and demanding state housing (Castells, 1983: 29). 
The major pre-war organisational effort however, was started by working class 
women who formed the Women’s Housing Association in 1914 that was the driving 
force of the rent strike (Castells, 1983: 29). The grassroots organisations that formed 
the Women’s Housing Association were as a result of women’s initiatives, especially 
during WW1 when men were away at war and the men left behind were subject to 
war-time mandate and regulation which required them in the, mainly munitions, 
factories (Castells, 1983: 29). In fact by November the number of strikers had reached 
20 000 and 49 people were arrested, the men working in the factories threatened to 
strike and to flout the wartime regulations, since “they would rather risk that than 
have the wives and children of soldiers out in the street” (Castells, 1983: 29). The 
joint effort of these two sectors of society is explained by Castells (1983: 30) as “the 
secret of Rent Strikes: not only was there a common identity between shipbuilding 
industries, engineering and munitions workers (often working for the same firm) but 
also between the point of production and the communities where the workers lived.” 
 
Spence and Stephenson (2007) make a similar claim about the women who were 
involved in the 1984-1985 UK miners' strike. The paper argues that “one depiction of 
women's engagement in the strike has been privileged above others: activist women 
were miners' wives who embarked on a linear passage from domesticity and political 
passivity into politicisation and then retreated from political engagement following 
the defeat”. However they argue, this is based on a masculinist view which does not 
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recognise the emotional political work and small scale action and organisation which 
women in general, and not just women married to miners, undertook and continue to 
undertake in their communities. This is a crucial point since while it is evident that 
often moments of crisis lead to militant organisation, there is no quiet passage from a 
de-politicised space to a politicised one and often these moments are a culmination of 
individual battles waged in the everyday lived reality of people, which become a 
collective political project. The point of insurrection thus naturally follows from the 
everyday space, in the case of most women: the home.  
 
Annelise Orleck, writing about Militant Housewives in America during the Great 
Depression, highlights the way in which poor women in America approached their 
traditional roles with heightened urgency, yet they did not suffer alone. In fact, “the 
crisis conditions created by the Depression of the 1930s moved working-class wives 
and mothers across the US to organise on a scale unprecedented in US history” 
(Orleck, 1993: 2). They staged food boycotts and anti-eviction demonstrations, 
created large-scale barter networks and lobbied for food and rent controls (Orleck, 
1993: 1). Orleck (1993: 3), explains how even though the housewives demonstrations 
received wide-spread media attention, their position as housewives was nonetheless 
ridiculed by some. Not only were women who were forced into these traditional roles 
mocked when they highlighted how implicitly their lives were linked to the political 
and economic spheres, but often women who do not fall into these traditional roles are 
demonised and over-sexualised. Both of these tropes perform the task of de-
politicising any intervention that women make based on their own gendered lives, in 
society. Often even when these interventions, made on the basis of women’s roles as 
wives and mothers, are so explicitly linked to the political, the way in which it 
remains outside of mainstream historical nationalist accounts can be seen as nothing 
else but a deliberate attempt to write women out of HIStory.  
 
Take for instance, the famous narrative of the Paris Commune recorded by Karl Marx, 
then Castells and then Alain Badiou, amongst others. Even when Badiou (2003), 
mentions that in fact women were instrumental to the incitement of the revolt, the 
character and shape of the politics of the women, and then the other Parisians is not 
mentioned. When Karl Marx writes about the Paris Commune of 1871, it is 
reminiscent of a great surge of working class power directed towards the capturing of 
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a state and the overthrow of the capitalist class through dictatorship of the proletariat. 
The only real reference he makes to women being a part of the commune is when he 
writes,  “In their stead, the real women of Paris showed again at the surface-heroic, 
noble, and devoted, like the women of antiquity. Working, thinking, fighting, 
bleeding Paris-almost forgetful in its incubation of a new society, of the cannibals at 
its’ gates -radiant in the enthusiasm of its historic initiative! (Marx, 1989: 88). Aside 
from the overly triumphalist tone taken by Marx here, in The Commune of Paris, 
1871, Manuel Castells tells an entirely different story especially about the women 
whom Marx compares to “women of antiquity”.  
 
Castells (1983: 19) tells us not only were the women “the most active element in the 
mobilisation of people, in the combat with the army, in the neighbourhood meetings, 
and in the street demonstrations,” but that: 
 
The great majority of these women were of ‘common’ origin. Their family 
situations were generally ‘irregular’ – according to the bourgeois morality – 
most of them living unmarried with men, and many being separated from their 
husbands. The press and legal system were extremely harsh to these women, 
dubbed the petroleuses, because of the derogatory rumour according to which 
they carried bottles of petrol to start fires in the houses of bourgeois families. 
Many of the women that went on trial as communards had a criminal record – 
a fact that reveals the conditions in the nineteenth century cities where 
common women were often used as a source of pleasure by rich men and a 
source of profit by poor men. The world of lower class women was always on 
the edge of urban deviance.  
 
This has particular resonance with the caricature of women on the mines in South 
African literature, where these women too always appear on the edge of urban 
deviance. They are at the mines as prostitutes, mistresses or beer-brewers, or they are 
common women whose contributions are only sexual. There is no doubt that it has 
historically been the case that migrant women often had to attach themselves to men 
in one way or another because of the conservative patriarchal structure of apartheid 
law in South African society. However, the depoliticisation of sex as work, whether 
one is a wife, girlfriend, or sex-worker, creates the image of urban women as cheap 
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and therefore operating outside of the realm of the political. Yet, it is also the case 
that many women in Marikana have come to seek work, or to be with husbands and 
boyfriends or fathers and brothers, and to carve out a small space for themselves 
within the community and to improve it.  
 
The formation of the women’s movement in a time of crisis not only brought the 
home space into contestation as well as made visible the invisible social reproductive 
labour of women and their contribution to the waged labour of men, but it also 
shattered the historical depictions of life on the mines and the roles women occupied 
vis-à-vis men. After the women’s march it was impossible for the media not to make 
at least a sweeping reference to, and in some cases to publish in-depth stories, about 
the women of Marikana. Even if the coverage did not engage with the political sphere 
of women’s organisation, they had successfully managed to insert themselves into the 
narrative and to establish their presence at the mines and their ability to speak about 
and organise around the crisis within their communities. Whether this will be included 
in labour studies and historiography in the future however, remains to be seen.  
 
By the beginning of December 2012, there were approximately 50 women in Sikhala 
Sonke who attended meetings at regular intervals, and what had started out as crisis 
relief had now evolved to encompass other issues around the community. These 
included working with male members of SANCO to start a committee that would 
attend the Marikana Commission of Inquiry weekly at Rustenburg and report to 
others. The Farlam commission, set up by the South African state has offered little 
hope thus far for the people in Marikana, and their sentiments echoed those of people 
in Mpondoland when the apartheid state set up a commission of inquiry after the 
Ngquza Hill massacre. They felt that the commission, which should be listening to the 
people, was trying to criminalise the men rather than bringing justice. They felt that 
this was the only way to ensure that they knew what was really going because of the 
distrust they had for the media during the strikes and the massacre.  
 
Most of the women complained that the television coverage of the strikes as well as 
reporting on it was inadequate and bias and they were interested in telling their own 
stories. Many of the women believed the coverage did not reveal many parts of what 
occurred on the mountain that day. For instance, that police hippos had driven over 
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people or that some of the dead mineworkers’ skins were severely discoloured, which 
family members noticed during their burial. Thumeka and others believe they were 
injected with poison or some other medication, since they found the empty syringes 
on the mountain.  
 
In 2013, Nomzekhelo wrote a play about the massacre and the role of women 
performed by 50 women from the community at the one-year commemoration of the 
massacre on 16 August 2013. The play plot was described in a Daily Maverick article 
a few days later:  
 
A woman leaves her Eastern Cape village in August 2012. She has no TV to 
watch the news, but she hears two men have been killed in the platinum 
mining town of Marikana, where her son lives and works. She leaves for 
Marikana immediately. She meets the women of Marikana and persuades them 
to approach the management at the Lonmin mining company to persuade them 
to accede to workers’ demands. The women, however, are too late. The 16 
August massacre begins as they journey to see the mine bosses. (Nicolson et 
al, 2013).  
 
The play is based on the real experiences of the women who planned to go to the 
Lonmin management to plead with them to end the strike, because they had heard 
about the NUM shooting at NUM members and they had seen a large number of 
police being deployed to Marikana on the television. For Nomzekhelo, they were not 
even thinking of negotiating and would take anything: “Never mind what kind of 
peace it is, and at least enough is enough now, and they are hungry the people at the 
mountain and we stay alone here you see?” However, they were too late, by the time 
they started heading towards Lonmin the killings had already begun.  
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They died like animals: Struggles for dignity in Nkaneng 
 
Nomzekhelo echoed the sentiments of many, when she said the police killed the 
strikers on the koppie like animals. When one mineworker described the appearance 
of the barbed wire with which police started enclosing the strikers, he said, “We are 
not chickens or pigs that we should be in barbed wire.” This appeal to a common 
humanity, despite being treated like animals, living with animals, working like 
animals and living like animals is characterised by the violence inherent in being 
treated like ‘those who do not count’. Whether through the confined, hot, dark 
claustrophobic space one is forced to work in, or the reality that one will find no 
reprieve from these circumstances at home relays a story of struggle that has been 
centuries in the making.  
 
For Jacques Depelchin, (pers. comm) it seems as if every time capitalism remakes 
itself, every time it modernises it also takes something away. It erodes the 
consciousness of people so that we do not know that we are losing something in the 
process. Slavery has been modernised to the point where we no longer question the 
way in which it functions, we do not realise what it means for the universal qualities 
of humanity and human dignity, or for the particular histories of colonialism and 
apartheid. Indeed in The Black Jacobins, CLR James’ (1963: 11), provides 
historically detailed and visceral depictions of black slaves who were taken from 
Africa to Haiti and into mines and onto plantations for hours, worked like animals and 
housed like them too,  
 
The difficulty was that though one could trap them like animals, transport 
them in pens, work them alongside an ass or a horse and beat both with the 
same stick, stable them and starve them, they remained, despite their black 
skins and curly hair, quite invincibly human beings; with the intelligence and 
resentments of human beings. To cow them into the necessary docility and 
acceptance necessitated a regime of calculated brutality and terrorism… 
 
The long passage of time that chronicles the regime of calculated brutality from 
colonial law to apartheid state law and brutality still finds continuity on the mines 
today. The need to live a life with dignity and respect is also intrinsically tied up to 
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the experiences of working at Lonmin and its treatment of its workers. It is not merely 
that people do not have access to land and live in shacks without any basic services, 
but that they are there as a direct result of the mines as people who are resigned to 
work at the mines earning money to send home and trying to live well. The support 
they offer the mines is met with the realisation that the mines still treat people as 
cheap black labour power.  
 
Solisi Wanda, who was born in Nkaneng, has spent his whole life living there. He 
started working for Lonmin in 2004 and quit his job a year before the massacre in 
2010. He was at a SANCO meeting when he starting speaking about his experiences 
at Lonmin, which he referred to as a “paternalistic company” where,  
 
“the environment there, the workforce, the relationship between the employer 
and employees everything seems to be a mess. The work is strenuous, people 
don’t get trained. You can see for yourself, they don’t have even nice places to 
live. You can’t carry on working for a company like that, they only using you 
whereas you don’t benefit from them. And then, most important is time, 
because time is going also, so when you busy wasting yourself in a company 
whereas you don’t derive anything useful from them, to me it’s a problem. I 
mean I start to be stressed until you decide to quit the company, because you 
don’t see any future in that company.  
 
For Solisi, working at Lonmin was also profoundly linked to being black and seeing 
the favouritism, nepotism and racism on a daily basis, in which treatment inside the 
work space was directly linked to how one experiences their own lives outside of it. 
For him, “when you look at white people they are staying in nice places, living in nice 
houses, and when you look at the (black) people all of them, they are suffering, look 
at the place now?”  
 
For many at Lonmin, these racialised zones of exclusion represent a colonial world 
which Frantz Fanon (1967: 39) described as a world cut in two compartments and 
inhabited by “two different species” in which, “The cause is the consequence: you are 
rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich.” What Fanon 
(1967:39) calls the ‘human realities’ can never be masked by economic inequality 
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because “what parcels the world out is to begin with the fact of belonging to or not 
belonging to a given race, a given species,” and it is life experienced as the ‘other’ 
species that comes to dominate narratives of working for Lonmin. This ‘other’ does 
not only function to de-legitimate claims of the universality of the working class 
subject, but it also undermines the post-apartheid rainbow nation citizen. Both 
discourses function to exclude the particularities of race and ethnicity and how it 
functions at capillary level in the lived experiences of South Africa. What both 
limited understanding of Marxism and Nationalism promote is the single-identity 
worker or citizen who is either subjectified by capital or the nation state. Thus, 
accounts of people’s everyday experiences of work and life in Marikana provide a 
living subaltern history excluded from the ‘official domain’ of politics and society 
alike.  
 
For Silvia Tlkabane, one of the few employed women I spoke to, this is abundantly 
clear. Silvia grew up in Vryburg East and moved to Marikana West to find work at 
the mines in 2008. A few years ago, she moved to the RDP section of Marikana. She 
qualifies for RDP housing since she is from the area and she is Tswana. Silvia started 
working at Lonmin in 2008 as a construction helper underground; she was injured by 
a turn-style door at Lonmin and then sent to work on the surface while she re-covered. 
Her supervisors in the Human Resources (HR) department told her that it would be 
temporary and she would return to her job after some time. Although surface work is 
safer and usually better in terms of space and working conditions, people are paid 
more to work underground and the demotion to a surface cleaner meant a pay cut for 
Silvia. After a while, she was given the position permanently without consultation and 
a long battle with Lonmin ensued. Even though at the time of her injury in 2008 the 
mine ambulance collected her and took her to a mine clinic, Lonmin has since tried to 
claim that she was not injured at work and has evaded any responsibility for her 
injury, despite having had a medical examination to ensure she was in good health 
before starting work at the mine. Silvia has been fighting this case for the past four 
years and is still in the same position, after being expelled from the company once for 
what she describes as “exercising her rights,” she was reinstated in the same cleaning 
position after she consulted a lawyer. They still refuse to acknowledge her injury. She 
attributes to this to the work environment and the way people are treated in the 
workplace, in which consultation, respect, and formal structures are absent. After she 
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described her situation as well as her on-going intimidation by her supervisor she 
said,  
 
“I’ve got so many (stories) to tell, because really I, if I talk about these issues, 
I feel like I can burst, because this company really it doesn’t treat us like 
human beings. We are nothing, especially we blacks, we are nothing. You’re 
compensated after you’ve taken some steps. But like just easy like that, it 
doesn’t do that. This company before it can do something for you have to act, 
if you don’t act nothing happens.”  
 
In addition to all her supervisors and managers being white, Sylvia also has to 
contend with a hierarchy of toilets, which are reserved for some members of staff 
only. After reporting these issues to Human Resources and to her union, which was 
NUM at the time, she received no reprieve and her experiences supported what 
Buhlungu and Bezuidenhout (2008:270) described as the increasing gap between 
unions, their workers, and the serious tensions which racial discrimination creates 
between members and some shaft stewards.  
 
In fact, the corruption, favouritism, bribes and ethnically constructed conflict within 
the mines which Buhlungu and Bezuidenhout (2008) describe at length is evidenced 
by Silvia’s experience of favouritism and nepotism on the part of management as well 
as people paying for promotions. For women bribes are an especially de-grading 
issue, while men can usually pay money for their positions, Sylvia says  
 
“if you are a woman, you have to, to pay sexually, you have to sleep with him 
for the position and then after sleeping for the position, then you gonna get the 
position. So because me, I’m not doing that, I’m not sleeping with them, I’m 
not giving them briberies, that’s why I’m in the cleaning position. Because I 
am not exchanging anything for the position”.  
 
This is again linked to many broader issues within the structure of the mines, like the 
assertion that “Women create difficulties for NUM and its members,” as well as some 
members capacities to turn a blind eye to sexual harassment and say “forgive those 
who put them under pressure” (Buhlungu and Bezuidenhout, 2008: 281). Buhlungu 
 116 
and Bezuidenhout claim “What is remarkable about the NUM is the way in which 
they are able to accommodate various political traditions,” included in these are the 
BC movement, the charterist movement (ANC and SACP), the UDF and some left 
intellectuals. Yet, they have failed to incorporate any gender-based issues and 
women-specific needs into their organisation, or embrace them as political traditions.  
 
Many women are changing their union affiliation from the NUM to the previously 
whites-only union because their women –specific issues like maternity leave, sexual 
harassment, housing and ablutions in the workplace are taken more seriously than 
they are in the NUM, or they do not join unions like the NUM at all because they feel 
they are underrepresented (Benya, 2013).  
 
In many cases attempts to assert one’s dignity and exercise one’s rights, leads to 
intimidation which is further exacerbated by an abuse of power by supervisors and 
managers not monitored by shaft-stewards who are enjoying the new perks of their 
office jobs. The clear lines of patronage that exist on the mine are evidenced by the 
way Silvia was denied permission to attend her daughters graduation while others are 
allowed special favours, as well as other workers stories of having to pay for 
promotions.  
 
Like Walter Diniso, who grew up in East London in the Eastern Cape and has been a 
general worker at Lonmin since 2008. Despite receiving training for various positions, 
he has never received a promotion, after each attempt, the company tells him the 
position is over-complemented, i.e. there are no positions available. For him, “they 
say it’s a democratic country, but when you see the progress, there’s no democracy, 
there’s apartheid. Most people in South Africa are greedy. When they are supposed to 
help you, they can’t do it for free. Even if you are in HR, and you know your job…but 
ey, this company, they want something.” 
 
Another anonymous Lonmin employee experienced similar problems. He too is a 
general worker who receives R3000 a month. After attending various training 
exercises and receiving a section 3 qualification of engineering, as a boilermaker, he 
was never promoted. Yet, in his experience, there have been many white artisans with 
the same level of qualifications who are allowed to progress.  
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Both this worker and Silvia said it was clear that Lonmin did not want black people to 
progress, something that was echoed by many others. This is consistent with 
Buhlungu and Bezuidenhout’s (2008: 272) research at Karee Mine, where many felt 
the workplace order was still partially like apartheid. For many, the experience of 
Lonmin as a workspace is fundamentally shaped by race, and the denial of their 
dignity at work has a direct connection with their material lives in the home and in 
their communities, Lewis, who did not give his full name, expressed this very clearly.  
 
It was midday on a hot, dry, typically Highveld Sunday, and Lewis was washing his 
overalls in a bucket outside. He was in the company of a few men who were drinking 
beer and listening to music playing out of a car boot in the front yard of a group of 
connected tin shacks. Lewis called out to us, seeing the camera and throwing the 
overall out of the bucket and onto the floor, he started his monologue, with not even a 
question asked.  
 
“How much can you pay me to wash your overall? 12.5%. I don’t get it.” We 
were fighting for what? Why were we fighting? Why we were fighting? My 
wife is cross with me, she doesn’t want me. But I’m working now, everyday 
I’m going at 3 o clock. Get up and stand up and stand up and go to work. I’m 
working for what? Why am I working? For nothing, for this thing? Ai, fuck 
man. I’m tired. I want to resign. On January, I resign. No more, no more 
Lonmin, No more Lonmin. I want to stand up, and get up and think for 
my(self)…I want to leave this Lonmin alone. This Lonmin too, can leave me 
alone. Because it’s like, look at there another guy. He looks at me, he says 
hey! Look at this guy Lewis, big man but he must do the washing. The boss on 
Monday, he wants to see the shesha bonakala [overall] for him. Skoon! 
[Clean] Who can help me? Ohh, I’m tired, I’m tired. I want to quit, because I 
quit. I quit. I quit. I’m not alone, all these guys want to go look for the box. 
11.5 – Mahala. I’m right neh? Aii lady. Why do we want 11.5, for what? Why 
am I making this clean, for what? For nothing., he asks, who is very 
important, my family or this one (the overall)? My bosses say, why this 
sheesha bonakala and its not clean. How much he pay me to make clean my 
shesha bonakala? How much, and he say’s, No man remember last of last 
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month, I pay you 200, and the first of this month I pay you another 200. Hey 
madoda. I’m gonna quit. I’m going to make clean this shesha bonakala for the 
boss on Monday. The first Monday January, I can make it iron, hey boss I 
quit. Take your shesha bonakala.  Take it! I’m quitting now. No more on my 
hands, or my body this shesha bonakala, because you don’t care for me. And I 
must care for the shesha bonakala, wash my shesha bonakala, make skoon my 
shesha bonakala. But what about my family huh? Look at this small boy, I can 
take him crèche now, But I got no money to take him to crèche.  I’m quit, I’m 
quit. But I can make skoon the shesha bonakala for boss, that bass hey hey. 
That bass man! Because that boss…why my shesha bonakala is not skoon? On 
Monday, I’m going to shop, I’m coming, I can’t buy a sweet for small boy. 
He’s gonna cry to me, he’s gonna say, yah tata, ungathi ungaluxoka ngoku.  
He gonna make the young generation, the respect, I deserve the respect. He 
deserves the respect. All these people, my family deserves the respect. Me 
also, I deserve the respect that’s why I wash this shesha bonakala, what is the 
advantage for this one. Why? Why I can make every Monday skoon this thing. 
Look my shoes, they say, Lewis you will out me. Don’t worry, because my boss 
he promised me, one day is one day and if my boss betaal me I can make it the 
big master.  
 
Lewis did not say much else. He went into his room and came back with his pay slip, 
which had not changed since the strike. He was clearly traumatised by the events that 
took place, he repeatedly spoke about how he didn’t want to fight and the strike was a 
“terrible time” in which it wasn’t clear what they were fighting for because so many 
people had died already. He ended by saying, “A lot of people die from this, guys you 
see? Our brothers, my brother also too. I can show you the certificate for my brother. 
It better to leave this, you can come let me talk to them now, something has come on 
my mind” and walked away.  
 
For Lewis and others, the feeling of disappointment and grief is an everyday 
experience, and they cannot understand how their own government could respond to 
them with such violence. It is certainly not the kind of triumphalism one sees 
celebrated in the work of Peter Alexander, et al. What is even more horrifying was 
how the NUM responded to its own members during that period. It was because of 
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that horror that mineworkers in Marikana decided to return to old cultural political 
practices of democracy and participation.  
 
The NUM and the subaltern  
 
By the end of November 2012, despite the fear of union rivalry and faction fights, 
many in Nkaneng had begun to wear AMCU t-shirts, and at the Farlam Commission 
in Rustenburg, the NUM “Organise or DIE” t-shirt bearers were mostly from outside 
Marikana. The once revolutionary slogan had taken on an entirely new meaning, as 
people dressed in “Justice Now for Marikana Strikers!” t-shirts wove in and out of the 
crowd gathered at the centre. Even though there were no longer people wearing the 
NUM’s t-shirt in Nkaneng, and the office they shared with the SACP and the ANC 
remained closed, everyone was extremely tense. There was a general feeling the 
NUM was now trustworthy, especially after reports of NUM officials shooting at their 
own members days before the massacre (see Sacks, 2013).  
 
Most of the men on the mountain had been members of the NUM and there were 
splits in the community because of the decision to break with the hegemonic power of 
the NUM and for some, to join AMCU (Association of Mineworkers and 
Construction Union). Thumeka revealed how people who came from the same 
villages were not speaking to each other because of their differences over the unions.  
 
For Sikhala Sonke, the choice was simple; they decided to support AMCU13, because 
they believed that if AMCU listened to the workers they could improve their situation 
and because they could not trust the NUM any longer. Although the strikes at Lonmin 
were organised outside of any union structures, after the massacre most workers 
quickly left the NUM and joined AMCU. By November 2012, it was estimated that 
AMCU had over 50% of the workforce as signed up members. By May, 2013, the 
estimated membership increased to 70% making them the majority union at Lonmin 
(Sobiso and de Wet, 2013).  
 
                                                        
13 Although AMCU was launched in South Africa in 2001, as a breakaway union from the NUM, it 
was only during the strikes on the platinum belt in the last two years that they gained a larger 
membership and won the rights of a bargaining structure. 
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The NUM earned its name as the ‘sweet heart union,’ because of the comfortable 
relationship it has shared with capital and the ruling ANC for years now. The union 
has become increasingly estranged from the initial mandate of dealing with ‘bread 
and butter issues’ (see Buhlungu, 2010, Buhlungu and Bezuidenhout, 2008, Buhlungu 
and Tshoaedi, 2012) yet; the massacre seems to have been the breaking point for 
many. The obvious narratives of bribery, corruption and collusion with capital 
explored above pales in comparison with the experience, like that of Tholakele, of 
having NUM officials and shop stewards open fire on their own members.  
 
Tholakele ‘Bhele’ Dlunga, was born in East London in the Eastern Cape and is a 
Rock-drill Operator (RDO) at Karee Mine. He was also one of the organisers of the 
ad-hoc workers committee, elected by miners and constituted during the strike. When 
he explained the events leading up to the 16th of August 2012, he was still shocked 
and angry. There are detailed accounts of the events of 16th August (see Alexander et 
al, 2012), however the events leading up to the 16th when 10 people lost their lives at 
Marikana are still unclear, little proper investigation into them has taken place and no 
arrests have been made. Bhele (which is Tholakele’s clan-name and what he is called 
by friends and peers), relayed the events of the week from the 8th to the 16th of 
August, in which he says, all their attempts to meet with management and to talk 
about their demands were ignored.  
 
Bhele explained how RDOs on strike tried to meet with management to speak with 
them directly, reassuring them that, “We are not fighting, we just want to talk. If you 
answer us, we can go back to work tomorrow.” However, that never happened, and on 
the 25th of October, he was arrested in his home and spent the next six days in jail 
where police repeatedly tortured him (see Marinovich, 2012). His was not an isolated 
experience, of the 270 mineworkers arrested on murder charges by the South African 
state under the apartheid Common Purpose Act, 150 reported that they were tortured 
in prison (Lantier, 2012). 
 
The response of the state and the NUM, supposedly representing the majority of 
mineworkers at them time, with brute force, is a clear indication of the way in which 
the post-apartheid state under Jacob Zuma has become increasingly more violent and 
authoritarian. This realisation is not limited to the experience of workers during the 
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massacre. Before they officially declared the strike on the 8th of August, 
representatives from Eastern, Western and Karee mines, all three of which constitute 
Lonmin, had a meeting on the 6th of August to establish an informal workers 
committee (Alexander, et al, 2012: 21). This committee would organise a mass 
meeting of all Lonmin RDOs on the 9th of August at the Wonderkop stadium.  
 
Bhele noted that once the NUM had shot at them on the 11th of August, it was clear 
using union structures was no longer an option. Even though, he admitted that perhaps 
they had made a mistake and should have consulted the union first, as management 
pointed out to them, they had little faith in the NUM and when they approached them 
to speak to them about their plans to strike, the bullets they were met with was 
evidence enough. Therefore, they had already started reverting to old channels of 
organisation and elected a workers committee, which was chosen representatives who 
would speak to management and convey the workers discontent. Chingono (2013: 
20), points to two prevalent narratives about the worker’s committees’ elected at 
Implats and Lonmin mines, the first is that the committees were independent and not 
aligned to any unions, this is evidenced by the fact that the men on the mountain were 
from “across the workforce and the community.” The second, in Chingono’s (2013: 
20) “strong view” is that the committees were not independent at all and that “some 
workers claimed this was a well-planned move and premeditated by AMCU.” 
However, the evidence shows that most men on the mountain were in fact NUM 
members at the time; secondly, AMCU repeatedly stated that they were not involved 
in the strike action. In addition, most people in Marikana said they had only thought 
about joining AMCU after the strike as a result of how the NUM had treated them. 
While it is unclear why this is such a strong view, it must also be considered with 
caution. It is often the case that people thinking and acting on their own outside of 
official structures and procedures are threating to many people, specifically 
academics, who prefer to see the world through particular lens in which action only 
occurs within specific frameworks (in the case of labour, a Marxist framework). This 
sometimes does the work of discounting workers’ agency and attributing their actions 
to a more palatable source, like trade unions.  
 
The workers’ committee therefore, must be seen as elected and constituted by the 
workers themselves. While some of the men on the mountain were from Lesotho and 
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Swaziland, the majority were from the Eastern Cape and the elected workers 
committee was almost entirely constituted of RDOs who came from Mpondoland 
(Reddy, 2013: 3)14. In the extensive interviews available in Peter Alexander et al’ A 
View from the Mountain, there is much evidence of the organising tools employed 
during the constitution of the worker committees along the lines of the old moral 
economy and by extension the pre-colonial cultural political tools used before and 
during the Mpondo revolts. In various interviews, people involved in the strike and 
those who were present on the mountain noted that,  
 
The leaders were elected on the basis of their historical leadership in 
recreational spaces, the community and the workplace. Mambush, or ‘the man 
in the green blanket’, one of the leaders who was killed during the massacre, 
had obtained his nickname from a Sundowns’ soccer player named ‘Mambush 
Mudau’. He was chosen since he had organised soccer games and always 
resolved minor problems in the workplace. He was particularly well known 
for having a mild temperament and for his conflict-resolution skills both at the 
workplace and at his home in the Eastern Cape. (Alexander et al, 2012: 10) 
 
In fact, in Chingono’s own interviews, when speaking about the language they used 
during the strikes, the workers said they chose to use fanakalo (which is a truncated or 
mixture of language used by mine management to overcome language differences 
amongst workers, because they could not speak any African languages fluently). For 
the NUM officials (often more educated) the use of fanakalo, was racist and a marker 
of inferiority and poor education, but for the workers, who are mostly illiterate, “The 
committee used fanakalo because they are in touch with what’s happening on the 
ground. Unlike NUM, they are in touch with reality. They know what is happening. 
The interim committee are people who are coming from within us…they are part of 
those doing the hard work…they know what is appropriate for the workers.” This 
stress on electing people who were familiar with the workers and their way of doing 
                                                        
14 In fact, in one of my interviews with an anonymous member of the NUM, he blamed the massacre 
‘on counter-revolutionaries’ who were trying to destroy the NUM and believed that the police were 
protecting themselves from the miners who had muti. When asked why, if the claims about muti being 
used to protect miners were true, were they killed by police, he replied, “Yes they died because that 
muti, is not strong. They use 9mm and not other guns, they use the short guns. I know muti because I 
come from there in the Eastern Cape. I know muti, these nyanga muti is coming coming from the 
Eastern Cape. Zabe Pondoland”.  
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things, as well as the emphasis based on integrity and home –networks is extremely 
important in understanding how the subaltern sphere of politics functions at the 
mines. For one mineworker, “on the mountain, they had been eating together and 
making fire together, and it was like home” (Alexander et al, 2012: 33). Many said 
leaders were chosen because they had previously dealt with emergencies that occurred 
in their communities back home and took responsibility for things like informing 
family members of the death of mineworkers, ensuring that the body goes home and 
is transported to the funeral as well as collecting donations for the family of the 
deceased (Alexander, et al, 2012: 22).  
 
In his research in Mpondoland in the Eastern Cape, Micah Reddy (2013: 31), recounts 
attending the funeral of Alton Joja, the traditional healer who allegedly gave muti to 
the men on the mountain and who was murdered in his home in Bizana, Mpondoland 
in March 2013 just before he was due to testify at the Farlam Commission (Sosibo, 
2013b). The funeral was nationally documented and hundreds of people attended with 
the costs of the funeral borne by the migrant labourers. The men Reddy (2013: 31) 
accompanied claimed to have contributed R12 500 collected from their shaft alone. 
Reddy (2013: 31) notes that  
 
“This sort of communal consumption has interesting parallels with beer 
drinking rituals among Gcaleka people of the Eastern Cape. McAllister has 
observed that these symbolic affairs play a crucial role in the process of 
labour migration. During these occasions, with their strong religious 
overtones and constant references to appeasing the ancestors, the migrant is 
reminded of his duties as a responsible man”  
 
A further key responsibility of the worker committee (which was reconstituted a few 
times after people left, were intimidated, or murdered), was the ability of the elected 
representative to maintain peace and order and a commitment to the kind of 
leadership founded on the principles of negotiation and ‘keeping one’s cool’ (see 
Alexander et al, 2012: 2; 10; 11; 22; 104; 131). There are clear links here to the way 
in which chiefs chose their counsel in the 1800 – 1900s, to how mountain committees 
functioned during the Mpondo revolts and later how mineworkers in the ethnically 
segregated hostels elected izibonga or room officials. Furthermore, the stress on the 
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ability to maintain peace and order is consistent with Mbeki’s stress on the ethical 
morality of mountain committees and their insistence on as little violence as possible 
(Drew, 2011: 79).  
 
While the committees elected representatives of a certain caliber, the RDOs decided 
that they would approach management all together on the 11th of August to avoid 
intimidation and to protect each other and when it came time for negotiation, the 
elected officials would speak, since, as one person said, “We can all sing, but we can’t 
all speak at once” (Alexander et al, 2012: 1). The representatives could also be rotated 
at any point, depending on their “negotiating capability and who they were speaking 
to” (Alexander, et al, 2012: 2).  
 
The commitment to this style of engagement that prefaced the need for a flexible 
politics of inclusion and dynamism is reminiscent of the old moral economy rooted in 
a subaltern sphere of politics that allows for an open dialectic of experience where, 
people ‘make the road by walking it’. The appearance of the five madoda (literally 
five men) at the mountain in Wonderkop is testament to this principle. While one 
person said that it was the police who asked for five elected representatives, the same 
person also remarks, “You see my brother, the five madoda, the word used by the 
police, they said they wanted the five madoda, that is the language they used. And that 
is the language we use in the mines (Alexander et al, 2012: 104). The five madoda 
were elected from the already existing committee, and could be rotated at any time, 
they were the negotiators and on the 14th of August they requested the employers 
come to the mountain to speak to them, but if necessary they would go to them 
(Alexander, et al, 2012: 31), this was never fulfilled15.  
 
The mountain however, remained a [gendered] space for equality, negotiation, and 
consensus. Chingono (2013: 27) makes the point that the move to the koppie, in itself 
signaled a community in crisis, and all the men from the community, regardless of 
whether you were a mineworker or not were required to be there to show their 
solidarity. The outrage the men on the mountain expressed, when NUM National 
Chairperson, Senzeni Zokwana arrived in a police hippo and refused to get off and 
                                                        
15 The practice of rotational leadership during negotiation, as well as the stress on accountability and 
honour is also evident in urban struggles in South Africa, notably Abahlali base Mjondolo in Durban. 
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address the crowd, as an equal is reminiscent of the disgust people associated with 
Botha Sigcau in the helicopter during the Mpondo Revolts refusing to speak to the 
people to whom he was supposed to be accountable. The Hill committees, like the 
worker committee in Marikana and in earlier years on the gold mines, did not elect 
leaders but rather messengers and organisers, so they could avoid replicating the 
hierarchical structures of the chiefs (Wylie, 2011:203). The respect workers had for 
the five madoda, their counsel and elected representatives, is marked by workers 
kneeling 20metres in front of police vehicles as the five men went forward to 
negotiate on behalf of everyone, this has become a hallmark feature of the Marikana 
strikes.  
 
The emblematic image of Mgcineni ‘Mambush’ Noki, standing above thousands of 
seated men with a raised fist above his signature green-blanket clad shoulders and a 
stick in his other hand, minutes before he spoke to police, demonstrates not only the 
reverence people had for him, but also the faith that, through days of counsel together, 
he would carry their demands to police and their employers so they could finally 
leave the mountain. Minutes after he spoke to police however he was killed in a 
shower of bullets that marked the beginning of the massacre. At the one-year 
commemoration held at the mountain this year, journalists Luke Sinwell and 
Simphiwe Mbatha (2013) recount how,  
 
At about 3pm on 15 August 2013, 30 workers crouched down as if they were 
again under attack by the police. This time, however, they were not – and 
instead of carrying the machetes and spears that they gathered after being 
shot at last year by their own union, NUM, they now carried small sticks as 
symbols of their defence and resistance. The workers were attempting to 
connect to the spirit of the men who died on the mountain. At the centre of the 
workers' reflection was a man who has since become an icon of the struggle in 
Marikana and also a working class hero: Mgcineni Noki, 'The Man in the 
Green Blanket,' or 'Mambush' – as the workers affectionately call him.  
 
The appearance of the five madoda at Impala Platinum mines in neighbouring 
Rustenburg, during a six-week strike in 2012, shows obvious links to other spaces of 
action. The worker’s committee at Implats was part of a broad strike that quickly led 
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to the demise of the NUM at the mines. Here too, people had elected representatives 
to negotiate on behalf of them outside of union structures and the reverence workers 
showed for the five madoda at Marikana was clearly neither unique nor isolated. 
Journalist Kwanele Sosibo (2012) describes his own experience at the strikes: “The 
machismo with which the committee carries itself can be seen, for instance, in how 
workers caution me to approach it with respect as I head in the wrong direction in the 
vicinity of Number Eight hostel, where AMCU's southern branch office is situated”. It 
was the Implats strikes in February 2012, which was organised through independent 
worker committees led by the RDOs and the five madoda and not the unions, which 
started the action on the platinum belt. The news spread to Lonmin through home-
networks, which people still sustained and it was these home-networks which brought 
the news of the fall of the NUM. A striking resonance with the way in which peasant 
insurgents called for corrupt chiefs huts to be burnt down during the Mpondo Revolts 
is visible also in the songs used by mineworkers at Implats. “"Watsh' umuzi ka 
Zokwana ([NUM president Senzeni] Zokwana's house is burning)" is an example of a 
refrain used to denote the continued downward slide of the NUM at the mine” 
(Sosibo, 2013).  
 
In fact, it was also in the homes of community members and others that the strikers at 
Marikana, like the Mpondo rebels, sought refuge and shelter. Bhele described how 
many of them fled the mountain on the day of the massacre and ran into the 
community, seeking protection. Women in the community cared for their wounds 
when they were too scared to go to the hospital for fear of being arrested as many 
others had been. In another interview with the Daily Maverick, Bhele recounts going 
to the shop after the massacre to buy some groceries and "The owner offered him the 
items for free, as he has been doing for affected miners throughout the strike. Dlunga 
refused, saying the Somali had a business to run, and paid for the bread, tea and eggs. 
Yet Dlunga was, as he put it, “Broke, broke, overbroke” (Marinovich, 2012). Yet, 
there are many instances where shop-owners gave food to mineworkers for free, 
during and after the strikes, and some traders and men who were not employed by 
Lonmin went to the mountain in solidarity with the strikers. One such person recalls, 
“All the men from the community were required to be at the mountain as a show of 
support. Every morning they would blow a whistle across the entire neighbourhood 
calling all men to be at the koppie. We had no choice we had to be there. They argued 
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that everything in this community is about mining so everyone has to support the 
strike and will benefit in some way…” (Chingono, 2013: 27). 
 
The shared struggle and the shared grief that followed is part of the complex cultural 
and political milieu of the Marikana strikes and massacre. It has clear links to ongoing 
struggles for land, access to the city and the right to live with dignity in urban social 
movements in South Africa and the rest of the world. This is only part of an attempt 
to make sense of the events that took place before, and after, the Marikana massacre 
and to show the continuation of a people’s politics rooted in the struggle of the 
everyday. What is certain, like Mbeki (1964:126) wrote in the early ‘60s is that the 
revolts were the local praxis of larger political implications. Alain Badiou (2012: 80) 
provides an important articulation of locality and the space in which politics takes 
place when he writes:  
 
Courage is the name of something that cannot be reduced to either law or 
desire. It is the name of subjectivity irreducible to the dialectics of law and 
desire in its ordinary form. Now, today, the place of political action – not that 
of political theory, political conceptions or representations, but political action 
as such – is precisely something irreducible to either law or desire, which 
creates the place, the local place, for something like the generic will.   
 
We know that the strikers at Marikana were not led by Marxist theory or a socialist 
ideal but the massacre did spark countrywide protest immediately, it also inspired 
people who have been struggling for access to land to name a land occupation in the 
Western Cape and two in Kwa Zulu Natal after Marikana, in both cases Mpondo 
people were prominent organisers. These acts of defiance form part of a larger on-
going resistance to the corruption, greed, and nationalist politics of the ANC-led 
government. Within this resistance we find at every level the everyday politics of 
race, class, gender, dignity and respect which coalesce around life on the mines in 
South Africa.  
 
It is because of the history of colonialism and apartheid in South Africa that Fanon’s 
(1976: 39) warning, “Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched every time 
we have to do with the colonial problem. Everything up to and including the very 
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nature of pre-capitalist society, so well explained by Marx, must be thought out 
again” becomes even more apparent. We must thus begin to re-think the frameworks 
used to speak about the massacre which do not deal with the points of connection 
between community politics and workers’ organisation and the political tools workers 
employ that do not find their articulation through class analysis. The subaltern sphere 
of politics which has persisted outside of the current state’s elite nationalist project 
calls for an openness to the way in which people actually organise and how 
conceptions and praxis of democracy within this sphere shape how people relate to 
formal structures like unions, the government and Lonmin.   
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Conclusion  
 
This thesis has attempted to do several things. Firstly, it has highlighted how 
Marikana was received in the elite public sphere in South Africa, and how colonial 
discourse on ethnicity and culture came to characterise the strikes. Rather than a 
conversation with workers about the political organisation of the strikes, many chose 
rather to speak to ‘official voices’ or to draw their own conclusions. Workers, it 
seemed, were only engaged to explain what were imagined to be the ‘cultural 
peculiarities’ of the strikes.  
 
Secondly, it has shown how often narrow and reductionist Marxist and liberal 
frameworks create linear trajectories of development and struggle and that these 
theories are often the base from which most elite nationalist historiography is written 
in way which disciplines other subaltern narratives of resistance through these 
frameworks. It then showed how several narratives of experience have been silenced 
in elite nationalist historiography in South Africa.  
 
The erasure of the history of the Mpondo Revolts is an example of how the rural 
sphere has been ignored and anthropologised as a set of quiescent, ‘backward,’ or 
‘traditional’ spaces where people are represented as bearers of culture and ethnicity in 
a rainbow nation society. In these accounts, ethnicity and culture are not profoundly 
linked to the political or to political praxis that, sometimes, functions differently from 
western/liberal conceptions of electoral elite democracy. By exploring the history of 
the Mpondo revolts, and the pre-colonial political organisation of Mpondo society, it 
is possible to locate a subaltern sphere of politics, which still functions, apart from the 
‘official domain’ of politics in the elite public sphere in South Africa. The exploration 
of recent historiography on the Mpondo Revolts not only revealed the presence of a 
subaltern sphere of politics, but also that of a silenced sphere of women’s political 
actions and resistance. If subaltern studies was highlighting an absence of the 
subaltern from history, this has been a parallel attempt to show how women remain 
stuck in the kind of domesticity which consistently renders them outside of the realm 
of the political, even when, at times of insurrection, subaltern men briefly appear 
politically active, women are often relegated to the margins. It becomes clearer as one 
reads the history of the Mpondo revolts, that women’s resistance, of which little is 
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known and documented, functioned to strengthen and sustain the revolts and the 
subaltern sphere of politics in Mpondoland. 
 
It then becomes possible to link the use of this mode of subaltern politics to worker 
organisation on the mines during the 1948 – 1984 period when there were no unions 
on the mines. Workers on the South African mines therefore, without trade union 
bargaining structures used other modes of politics to negotiate with management on 
the mines, what Dunbar Moodie, following E.P Thompson calls, The Moral Economy 
of the mines. This moral economy functioned well into the 1980s, even after the 
arrival of the NUM, which had to reckon with the old structures of bargaining in order 
to organise workers into the new union. After the NUM revolutionised the mines in 
the late 1980s, during the post-apartheid era, the NUM under its umbrella 
organisation COSATU has become increasingly distant from its constituency. When 
workers at Lonmin felt that they could no longer trust the NUM to represent them or 
to take their concerns seriously, they returned to other modes of political organisation. 
  
The presence of other forms of democratic praxis during the strikes at Lonmin, 
Marikana, which are not captured by reductive Marxist or liberal frameworks of 
analysis points to the continuation of a subaltern sphere of politics. Although these 
forms have evolved and changed over the years, there is a common thread that 
continues to link migrant workers in Marikana to their home-base in the Eastern 
Cape.  
 
What has been explored in the thesis is an alternative narrative, which broadens our 
understanding of why and how workers acted when they felt they were being treated 
unjustly by the NUM and Lonmin. It is not suggesting that class analysis is not useful 
in explaining the strikes but that, in its reductionist form, it has serious limitations, 
especially when it comes to race, gender, ethnicity, and community. It has shown how 
culture cannot be mobilised purely to explain away ‘peculiarities’ about the strikes 
that cannot be explained by modernist theory. It has been shown that in fact  culture is 
central to understanding the political praxis of people and how they access universal 
ideas of dignity, recognition, and respect. This political praxis is a challenge to the 
narrow conceptualisation of the modern, and it provides a way in which to open up a 
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discussion of what counts as political modernity in South African post-apartheid 
society.  
 
It argues also, that most labour and nationalist historiography has been silent on the 
political contributions of women because of how reductive modes of Marxist and 
liberal analysis frame struggles through disciplined notions of work and resistance. 
Rather than objectifying workers as representative of a homogenous and universal 
class of people devoid of context, the thesis has linked ‘the worker’ to the community 
from which s/he comes and community specific struggles, which are supported and 
sustained, often, by the parallel struggles of women in the community.  
 
Chingono (2013: 30) has outlined that the social distance between people living in 
Nkaneng and union shaft stewards is compounded because most of the striking 
workers came from the shack settlements and had to face the harsh realities of living 
in a space without land, housing or access to services, while NUM branch committee 
members lived in family units or in Rustenburg, Skoomplaas or Mooinooi (nearby 
suburban places).  
 
Many of the RDOs who started the strike came from outside of the local community, 
most from Mpondoland, and therefore live in Nkaneng in harsh conditions. This 
means that their struggles are fundamentally linked to the poor conditions that they 
are forced to live in, and the militancy and determination of many came from a refusal 
to live without dignity. This is a struggle that is not similarly faced by union 
representatives, who are usually paid more, or employees who are from the area and 
have access to land, housing, and government services. For many workers on strike, a 
living wage didn’t merely signify more money but also an all-round better standard of 
living, which would also translate to improving the conditions of the community 
where they live. These sentiments are strengthened by the women’s movement that 
began to mobilise around the same community-specific issues, which differentiated 
Nkaneng from other communities living around the mines.  
 
The women who started Sikhala Sonke, during the time of the strikes made their 
presence in the felt in the popular and elite public spheres. In many ways, they 
shattered the conception of the mines as a masculine and male-populated space as 
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well as stereotypical beliefs of women on the mines only being there because they are 
involved in sex-work or beer brewing. Their political interventions in the public 
sphere meant that they could no longer be ignored or left out of political life on the 
mines. It was their marches and actions, which drew public attention to police 
brutality and the harsh conditions in which people in Nkaneng have to live. The 
strikes on the koppie could no longer be divorced from the struggles for dignity in the 
workplace and the community, and these two spheres of political action made that 
abundantly clear.  
 
We know that the strikers at Marikana were not planning a countrywide insurrection 
against capital, but that the massacre, which sparked countrywide protest immediately 
after formed part of a larger on-going resistance to the corrupt, greed, and nationalist 
politics of the ANC-led government. Marikana moved people who were frustrated 
and relegated to the margins of civil society, to take the center.  
 
Micheal Neocosmos (2012:531) uses the term ‘displacement’, from which we can 
begin to think about politics beyond ‘social location,’ or ‘state-subjectivities.’ Here an 
emancipatory project arises from a movement ‘out of place,’ in which those who are 
allocated a place, in which they are not supposed to think, do. It has long been the 
practice of Marxist historians to construct histories through the created categories of 
class and social location to capital, by disciplining history through rigid notions of 
time and linear development and leaving out a myriad of other human experiences 
and relations to an everyday lived reality. This thesis has shown how this everyday 
lived reality has informed the struggles of mineworkers and their families and that it 
is this experience, and a fidelity to a localised conception of democratic praxis that 
moved strikers to the koppie in the days before the massacre. While many have and 
will continue to argue that the cultural aspects of the strikes were peculiarities that ‘do 
not fit’ with the challenge mineworkers, as the working class, were posing to capital 
during the Marikana strikes, this has been an attempt to tell a different story founded 
in culture, society, politics and what Aimé Césaire called, “A humanism made to the 
measure of the world” (Césaire, 1972: 22).  
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